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ABSTRACT
Symbolization and Learning Competence
An Elaboration of the Theory of
Development of the Anisa Model
February 1977
Geoffry W. Marks, B.A., Beloit College
M.A.T., Beloit College, M. Ed., Ed. D.
,
University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Daniel C. Jordan
The purpose of the dissertation is to set forth a theory of
symbolization that will guide educational practice by providing the
basis for the derivation of developmentally-based curricula in mathe-
matics, language, and the arts for the pre- and elementary-school
child. The theory is constructed within the philosophical and theo-
retical framework of the Anisa Model—an educational system developed
at the University of Massachusetts. The dissertation is part of a
larger effort undertaken by the Anisa project to lay the theoretical
foundation on which education may emerge as a science.
The theory proposed defines symbolization as the representa-
tion of abstract conceptions by concrete entities that enables one
to
conceive and communicate meaning. The theory also regards symboliza-
tion as a uniquely human phenomenon, views it as being
inextricably
bound up with consciousness, and asserts that symbolization
is at
once the act that makes thought possible and the
means of its expres-
sion.
vi
The theory places symbolization in the perspective of evolu-
tion and man's innate endowments, and compares the symbolic activity
of man to the ability of primates to use signs as found in recent
studies. Examining the relationship of symbolization to conscious-
ness, the dissertation reviews symbolization’s basic functions; defines
such key terms as symbol, sign, signal, and symbol system; discusses
the fundamental properties of symbols; describes the role symbols play
as bearers of meaning; distinguishes between logical and aesthetic
symbols; and identifies mathematics, language, and the arts as the
basic symbol systems that man uses to mediate his interaction with the
physical, human, and unknown environments, respectively.
The dissertation also reviews the development of symbolization
in the child, discusses the relationship between symbolization and
learning, and considers symbolization's role in the development of
learning competence and the actualization of psychomotor, perceptual,
affective, and volitional potentialities—the five categories of psycho-
logical potentiality identified by the Anisa theory of development.
Working on the premise that educational curricula must be
developmentally based, the dissertation concludes by speculating on
the implications of what is known about the development cf
symboliza-
tion for the construction of curricula in mathematics, reading,
and
writing for the young child. The hypothesis is that a wide
variety
of experiences in decoding and encoding messages
represented in suc-
cessive levels of representation that children go
through in the course
of development will make it easier for them
to learn the complex
symbolic tasks of mathematics, reading, and
writing.
vii
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INTRODUCTION
Few scientists and scholars from the varied disciplines would
disagree that symbolization the capacity to conceive and use a symbol
—
is a fundamental function of the human mind. Some would even claim that
it is the most basic capacity, one that makes us human and differen-
tiates us from the animal. Regardless of the relative emphasis placed
upon it, symbolization is unquestionably an important human function.
Consider, for example, mathematics, reading, and writing, subjects
which are standard components of any curriculum for the elementary
grades and which have been the objects of an enormous amount of re-
search by psychologists and educators. Both involve symbols—numbers
and words—which represent certain meanings, the apprehension of which
is rooted in symbolization.
In spite of the fact that symbolization underlies mathematics,
reading, and writing, it has been largely neglected by psychologists
and educators. Bernard Kaplan, who, along with his teacher and col-
league, Heinz Werner, has contributed notably to the literature on the
subject, comments on the importance of symbolization and the inatten-
tion it has received:
During the past fifty years it has become increasingly
recognized that symbolic activity is among the most character-
istic features of human existence and that the whole develop-
ment of human culture is based upon man's capacity for
trans-
forming simple sensory material into symbolic vehicles—carriers
of the finest intellectual and emotional distinctions.
. • .
Despite this general recognition of the centrality o
sym
bolic activity tc the very definition of man,
relatively little
1
2work has been undertaken by academic psychologists to clarify
the nature of this activity (1961, p. 52).
Theodosious Dobzhansky (1967), the reknowned geneticist and
evolutionist, expresses similar sentiments. He attributes the inatten-
tion symbolization has received to a rejection of the psychological
phenomena central to it:
Man is said to be a being who lives by reason rather than by
instinct; man is aware or conscious of his self; he has a
mind, an ego and a superego; he is capable of insight, abstrac-
tion, symbol formation, symbol thinking, and of using symbolic
language. The dominant trend in academic psychology . . . re-
jects these words and the concepts for which they stand (pp. 64-
65 ).
An explanation for the omission of symbolization as an area
worthy of research may be found by an examination of the premises
which underlie contemporary Western psychology, the more immediate
roots of which are the behaviorist principles established in the
early years of the twentieth century.
Behaviorism holds that the only proper subject of psychology
is behavior because it is easily observable, measurable, and conducive
to empirical investigation. Behaviorists seek to ensure objectivity
and empirical integrity by claiming that such variables as conscious-
ness, purpose, and will are not useful because they are not directly
observable. Such notions are regarded as subjective and incapable of
empirical verification, and, therefore, beyond the realm of scientific
inquiry (Kendler 1968). John Watson (1924), the principal architect of
behaviorist psychology, explained the object of behaviorism and its
view of consciousness:
Behaviorism . . . holds that the subject matter of human psychol-
ogy is the behavior of the human being . Behaviorism
claims 1 1a
3consciousness is neither a definite nor a usable concept; itis merely another word for the soul of more ancient times. Thebehaviorist, who has been trained always as an experimentalist
holds, further, that belief in the existence of consciousness
’
goes back to the ancient days of superstition and magic (p. 2).
The denegation of consciousness as a legitimate construct of
psychology ruled out symbolization as a field of inquiry, for, as we
shall see later, symbolization is inextricably bound up with conscious-
ness and is one of its central powers and its chief vehicle of expres-
sion.
Because behaviorism limited itself to the study of behavior
without regard for conscious experience, much of its research has been
carried out with animals as primary subjects. Animals present little
in the way of consciousness and thus many of the methodological and in-
terpretive problems that occur when human subjects are used do not
arise. The widespread use of animals as subjects in psychological
research and the omission of conscious experience as a topic of in-
vestigation has resulted in a blurring of the distinctions between man
and animal which has left unanswered important questions about man's
nature. "The trouble is, however," Dobzhansky (1967) explains, "that
pretending that the problem of the nature of the difference of mind
found in animals does not exist is no help in bringing nearer a solu-
tion of this problem" (p. 65).
Kaplan (1961) , referring to the small amount of research on sym-
bolization that has been undertaken by psychologists, comments on the
problem that arises when fundamental distinctions between man and
animal
are not kept in mind:
Even where work has ostensibly been undertaken on the
problem
of symbolization, it has often been done by those who
are
4theoretically disposed to play down any uniqueness in man's
capabilities and who are hence inclined to treat symbolization
in man on the model of sign-behavior in animals (p. 52).
Kaplan suggests that there is a difference between the sym-
bolization in man and sign-behavior in animals and argues that man is
unique in his capabilities
—
positions this dissertation affirms and
elaborates upon. He also implies that one's theoretical bias can lead
one to overlook important aspects of man's reality.
The distinguished biologist and humanist, Rene Dubos (1964) be-
lieves that the major impediment to the investigation of crucial as-
pects of man's nature is a material view of man. After reviewing evi-
dences of primitive man's spiritual life which evince a yearning for
unity with the cosmos as seen in the magical function of Paleolithic
cave paintings and sculptures, and in the belief in immortality re-
flected in primitive burial practices, Dubos predicts that unless
scientists abandon a material view they will be blind to a full un-
derstanding of man's reality:
All these spiritual activities point to the weakness of
a crudely materialistic concept of human evolution. They make
it probable that evolutionists, and scientists in general, will
remain only on the fringe of the study of the nature of man,
if they continue to shut their eyes to the nonmaterial aspects
of his nature and insist on regarding him as a mere animal. . . .
Man cannot be defined only in terms of his animal characteris-
tics and of his evolutionary past. One could almost say that
his genesis is understood from his ends, rather than from his
beginnings. In the words of Aristotle, 'The nature of man is
not what he is born as, but what he is born for' (p. 74).
As Dubos suggests, the scope of scientific inquiry is
largely
determined by one's basic assumptions about what reality is
or might
be. "If one is drawn by unassailable scientific
argument to the con-
clusion that man is a cockroach, rat, or a dog,"
wrote Koch (1969),
5"that makes a difference" (p. 14).
Since one s worldview has a direct influence on the assumptions
one makes about man and his capacities, it is necessary in studying so
fundamental a capacity as symbolization to view it within the broader
context of man's reality and his place in the universe. Such a per-
spective provides the philosophical basis upon which a theory of sym-
bolization can be constructed which clarifies the relation of symboliza-
tion to other human capacities. Moreover, a treatment of philosophical
considerations helps one avoid the limitation of behaviorists
,
who,
through their omission of consciousness, have failed to achieve the
conceptual depth needed to treat adequately so difficult and complex
a subject.
To ensure adequate depth and scope for an examination of sym-
bolization, I have adopted the philosophy and theories of the Anisa
Model as a framework. The Model, developed at the Center for the
Study of Human Potential at the School of Education, University of
Massachusetts, and implemented in public schools and private day care,
head start, and child development centers in New England and the Mid-
west, provides the conceptual basis for the development of a scientifi-
cally based educational system which incorporates all aspects of human
development. The Model has several features which make its adoption
as a framework for this dissertation attractive: (1) a philosophy
of
organism that views man as a being of infinite potential and
which
ascribes central importance to the role of consciousness
in human
life; (2) a theory of development derived from
the philosophy that idea
tifies mathematics, language, and the arts as symbol
systems which
6mediate man’s interaction with the world; and (3) its comprehensive-
ness, conceptual coherence, and clarity, which stem from the depth of
its basifc premises (Jordan and Streets 1973).
Central to the Anisa Model is the view that if all children are
to be given equal educational opportunity, instruction must be indivi-
dualized. Because each child's needs are unique, the only way educa-
tional opportunity can be equalized is by guaranteeing that each child's
potentialities are actualized at an optimal rate according to the direc-
tion, course, and timing of his own development. If this is to be done,
education must become scientific. Only when the efforts of teachers
are guided by sound educational theory and grounded in a thorough know-
ledge of human development will teachers be able to diagnose a child's
developmental needs and prescribe experiences that meet those needs.
Only when education rises from the shallows of the trial and error
method to the summits of scientific certainty can educators guarantee
that every normal child will acquire in the course of his elementary
education the basic skills necessary for a happy, healthy, and produc-
tive life characterized by continuing development.
The foremost goal of the Anisa Model, then, is to help estab-
lish education as a science. Science, broadly conceived, is the sys-
tematic organization of knowledge arranged to explain, and thereby
foster an understanding of, the phenomena it describes (Jordan 1976a).
Because people are the subject and object of education, the
Anisa Model has set forth a set of underlying assumptions, or
first
principles, about the nature of man. These assumptions
represent a
philosophy that explicates the reality of man, defines his
purpose, and
7describes his relation to the rest of the universe. To be certain that
the philosophical basis of the Model rests on a solid foundation, Jor-
dan examined both Eastern and Western streams of thought about man and
his relation to the cosmos starting with Parmenides, the most signifi-
cant philosopher before Socrates, and continuing to the present day.
The work of iilfred North Whitehead, Jordan found, represents a synthe-
sis of the great philosophers and scientists down through the ages.
Whitehead's cosmology, set forth in Process and Reality
,
is of particu-
lar significance in that it has caused a shift from the mechanistic
perspective stemming from the fixed notions of Newtonian physics preva-
lent in the 18th century to the process perspective stemming from or-
ganismic philosophy which gave birth to the relativist notions of
Einsteinian physics of the 20th century. Whitehead's process philo-
sophy has special relevance to education because it describes the nature
of the universe in developmental terms and explains how man fits into
it. This gives education a broad conceptual context within which to
appreciate and interpret all the work undertaken by researchers in
human development—biologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and
psychologists (Jordan 1975c). The essential features of Whitehead's
cosmology relevant to the Anisa Model are presented in Chapter I.
To ensure coherence and consistency of thought, theories
of
development, curriculum, pedagogy, administration, and
evaluation have
been logically derived from the philosophy. The theory
of development
explains what human potential is and how it is actualized.
The theory
of curriculum describes what teachers and
children do to actualize
human potential. The theory of pedagogy shows
how teachers can guide
8children in ways that release their potential. The theory of adminis-
tration explains how the staff can be organized to meet the objectives
of the curriculum efficiently and effectively and is concerned with
actualizing the potentialities of the staff and the institution it-
self. The theory of evaluation indicates what kinds of data should
be gathered and how they should be analyzed in order to yield informa-
tion that refines the theories, improves educational practice, and
accumulates empirical knowledge (Jordan 1976a). A fuller description
of the Anisa Model appears in the Appendix. For the sake of economy,
only those propositions of the Model that directly concern the dis-
sertation will be discussed here. Readers wishing to know more may
consult Jordan (1973), Kalinowsky and Jordan (1973), Streets (1975),
and Streets and Jordan (1973).
Thus far, a number of dissertations have been written on
various aspects of the Anisa Model. Topics of the dissertations include
the philosophical basis of the Model (Shepard 1972), volition and its
relation to purposive behavior and human development (Conway 1973),
the biological dimensions of Anisa’s theory of values (Raman 1974),
cooperation and its relation to moral development (Theroux 1974), the
Anisa theory of administration and its role in releasing the collective
potential of a social system (Walker 1975), the development of the con-
cept of number and the design for a parent-teacher training program
based on developmental considerations (Waite 1975), the Anisa theories
of learning competence and pedagogy (Carney 1976a), and the actualiza-
tion of biological potentialities and the design for a comprehensive
health-care delivery system emphasizing parent education and
tailored
9for use in the public schools (Bowen, forthcoming). Each of the above
dissertations serves as a major reference document for the theoretical
underpinnings of the Anisa Model and seeks to synthesize the knowledge
contributed by theorists and researchers in the respective areas under
examination. By reviewing the pertinent literature and formulating a
position on important issues consistent with the philosophy and theories
of the Model, each dissertation aims to substantiate inductively the
theoretical propositions of the Model's theories and make a contribu-
tion to educational practice through the implications it holds for the
development of learning competence. Some have been or will be used
in graduate courses at the Center for the Study of Human Potential and
in training programs for administrators and teachers at the Model's
sites of implementation. Some form the basis for the derivation of
materials used for training teachers and developing curricula for
children.
The purpose of this dissertation is three-fold: (1) to augment
the Anisa theory of development by explaining the nature of symbols and
symbolization and the role of the symbol systems in the construction
of knowledge; (2) to clarify the nature of learning competence (de-
fined as the conscious ability to learn) by explicating the relationship
between consciousness and symbolization and by describing the role of
symbolization in the development of learning competence, and (3) by
contributing to the body of knowledge that leads to the equalization
of educational opportunity by providing the theoretical basis
for a
method of instruction in mathematics, reading, and writing
that will
enable each child to achieve competence in these skills
with a minimum
10
of difficulty.
Chapter I lays down the philosophical assumptions whose explicit
expression is necessary for the construction of coherent and internally
consistent theory. Chapter II places consciousness in the perspective
of evolution and man's innate biological endowments, and discusses
the basic power of the human mind that underlies intellect and con-
sciousness. Chapter III relates consciousness to symbolization and
discusses symbolization's role in the functioning of the intellect and
in the twin capacities of consciousness— immanence and transcendence.
Chapter IV sets forth the basic propositions of the theory of symboliza-
tion. It describes symbolization's basic functions, defines key terms,
discusses the properties of symbols, presents the basis for a new
philosophy of meaning, explains the role of symbols as bearers of
meaning, examines how the symbol systems of mathematics, language, and
the arts mediate man's interaction with the physical, human, and un-
known environments, respectively, and concludes with an analysis, for
comparative purposes, of the capacity of primates for using signs and
symbols. Chapter V discusses the development of symbolization in the
child. Chapter VI relates symbolization to learning and learning com-
petence and considers the role of symbolization in psychomotor, percep-
tual, affective, cognitive, and volitional development, and in the for-
mation of technological, moral, and spiritual competence. Chapter VII
speculates on the implications that the development of symbolization has
for education and outlines the fundamental features of curricula
for
mathematics, reading, and writing for the pre- and elementary
.school
child based on the presentation of successive levels
of representation
11
that match the. child's developing symbolic abilities.
To gain the broadest possible perspective on symbolization and
its function in human life, I have used the works of theorists from a
number of disciplines philosophy, systems theory, biology, evolution,
psychology, linguistics
,
and the arts. The authors I have drawn upon
most—Suzanne Langer, Ernst Cassirer, Lev Vygotsky, Ludwig von
Bertalanf f y , and Philip Phenix—all subscribe to the process view and
buttress the organismic philosophy of Whitehead on which the Anisa
Model rests. These authors stand in contradistinction to behaviorists
whose work, while stimulating, lacks the comprehensive view of man and
his potentialities and therefore is inadequate to serve as the warp
and woof out of which a comprehensive theory of symbolization may be
woven.
Because sound theory rests on precise definitions, careful
attention has been given to defining key terms and explicating the
relationships among the phenomena under investigation. While the dis-
sertation seeks to be definitive, it must be realized that issues are
extremely complex and by no means clear cut. As psychology weans it-
self from the limitations of behaviorism, the relation of symbolization
to cognition and learning is beginning to emerge as a fertile field of
inquiry and is becoming subject to the diversity of views common to new
areas of research. In constructing a theory of symbolization, I have
tried to take positions after analyzing points of agreement and dis-
agreement within the framework of process philosophy and the Anisa
theory of development.
While the effort is bold, it by no means claims to be the final
12
word on the subject. Exploration into this interdisciplinary field
must continue; research on the relationship between symbolization and
meaning, on the relationships among the symbol systems, and on the ef-
fectiveness of the curricula must be conducted. The dissertation
represents an initial attempt to lay down essential propositions that
relate symbolization to human thought and learning and from which a
more detailed examination of symbolic phenomena may be undertaken. If,
after the passage of time and the emergence of new information and new
insights into thought, learning, and symbolization, certain proposi-
tions must be modified or discarded, I will be heartened by the know-
ledge that the propositions were useful in guiding others along the
path to a clearer understanding of the workings of man’s mind.
CHAPTER I
PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
"The task of philosophy," Whitehead (1948) affirms, "is to pene-
trate beyond the more obvious accidents to those principles of existence
which are presupposed in dim consciousness, as involved in the total
meaning of seeming clarity. Philosophy asks the simple question. What
is it all about?" (p. 131). Elaborating on Whitehead's affirmation of
the function of philosophy, Jordan and Shepard (1972) write that "The
purpose of philosophy is to disclose the nature of our experience and to
make sense out of it by presenting evidence in support of basic premises
from which logical thought proceeds." Moreover, they explain that
philosophy "creates a coherence on which understanding depends. It
provides perspective—a gradation of relevance—which orders experience
and gives meaning to an otherwise overwhelming abundance of fragmentary
details" (p. 23).
In addition to bringing order to man's understanding of the uni-
verse, philosophy brings order to science by stimulating the formation
of theories—sets of propositions used as principles which explain how
a certain class of phenomena operate. From theories, hypotheses are
derived which may be tested for their validity. As hypotheses are con-
firmed, the theories from which they stem become laws and the body of
empirical knowledge expands (ibid.).
Philosophy, then, is not an intellectual exercise devoid of
13
14
practical value. Indeed, it is of enormous practical value for it leads
to ordered, logical thought from which intelligent action may spring.
It thus fosters efficiency and, when a number of people act on the basis
of the same philosophy, creates unity.
It stands to reason, then, that a system of discipline will
achieve coherence, efficiency, and unity when it operates within the
framework of an explicit philosophy. Most systems and disciplines do
not have a clearly articulated philosophy. In its absence, individuals
within them operate on the basis of implicit assumptions about the
phenomena with which they are concerned—assumptions which may or may
not be in harmony with the assumptions of others. If the assumptions
differ, conflicts tend to arise which, if unresolved through a rational
appeal to principles commonly recognized as authoritative, result in
the eventual disintegration of the system, foreshadowed by symptoms
that signalize disorder: inefficiency, waste of resources, and counter-
productivity, to name a few.
Such is the condition in which a number of systems and dis-
ciplines find themselves today. The United States government and the
governments of a large number of other nations, the American family,
and the American educational system are examples. Education, to take
a case in point, lacks a set of assumptions about the nature of man
the phenomenon with which it is concerned. As a result, little agree-
ment exists within the profession when it comes to choosing curricula,
formulating policies, selecting instructional materials, giving grades,
or evaluating the usefulness of various theories of learning. ,
Without
a coherent philosophy, educators find themselves in the
untenable
15
position of making decisions about what should happen to the child
without having defined the reality of the child. The lack of a clear
conception of the child and what he should become has created a crisis
which has serious implication for the welfare of children. The gravity
of the crisis has been exclaimed by a number of observers (Holt 1969;
Illich 1971; Silberman 1970).
The construction of a philosophy on which a science of edu-
cation may be established is one of the major goals of the Anisa Model
(Jordan 1973a). To achieve this goal, the Model draws heavily on the
works of Alfred North Whitehead, the foremost proponent of process
philosophy. Whitehead and his colleagues—Henri Bergson, Charles
Sanders Pierce, William James, C. Lloyd Morgan, Suzanne Langer, and
John Dewey—have set forth basic principles about the nature of the
cosmos which have initiated a revolution in modern thought by causing
a shift from a mechanistic view of the universe to an organismic view.
Current Conceptions of Reality
Ervin Laszlo (1971), a contemporary systems theorist, calls
for a return to an integrative philosophy in order to rescue philosophy
from the paralysis of excessive analysis and to bring it to a new and
expanded level where it views the world as coherent organization. "We
need an expansion of the system of traditional physics," he writes; "we
need concepts and models adequate to deal with the biological, behav-
ioral and social universes; and we need abstract models which, by means
of isomorphisms in their formal structure when applied to diverse
realms
of phenomena, can function in an interdisciplinary ana
integrative
16
manner" (p. 60).
The organismic philosophy set forth by Whitehead fulfills the
integrative function for which Laszlo calls. Organismic philosophy
maintains that the universe is an open system characterized by perpetu-
ally changing states of energy which operate according to laws hier-
archically ordered on the basis of teleological principles. The shift
to the organismic view has altered dramatically the theoretical con-
structs fundamental to the physical sciences. The recent change in
physics which saw the mechanistic principles of Newton being superceded
by Einstein s theory of relativity is a case in point. The influence
of the organismic view has only barely begun to be felt in the social
sciences. The recent emergence of "humanistic" or "third force"
psychology is an example.
Whitehead's cosmology "represents an apex in scope, relevance,
and coherence of effort to arrive at a systematic understanding of the
universe" (Jordan 1973a, p. 86). Moreover, Whitehead's work is "a
synthesis of historically important contributions to philosophy" and
thus provides "the broadest possible context within which to understand
man's nature and his relation to the universe . . ." (Jordan 1975a, p. 6).
Charles Hartshorne, the major living process philosopher, sums up the
significance of Whitehead's contribution:
The basic principles of our knowledge and experience, physical,
biological, sociological, aesthetic, religious, are in this
philosophy given an intellectual integration such as only a
thousand or ten thousand years of further reflection and
inquiry seem likely to exhaust and evaluate, but whose wide
relevance, and in many respects at least, comparative accu-
racy, some of us think can be already discerned (cited in -
Lowe et al. 1950, p. 41).
17
Whitehead (1929c) asserts that the most fundamental character-
istic of the universe is change, not static actuality, and that a
dynamic, tension exists between the two elements of change, permanence
and flux. When there is too much permanence, stagnation results; when
there is too much flux, change becomes radical and cataclysmic. In
either case, degeneration sets in. If change is to endure, it must
strike the right balance between permanence and flux so that it moves
slowly enough to build a solid foundation for future change and fast
enough to keep moving.
In Process and Reality
,
the volume that sets forth his cos-
mology, Whitehead explains that inherent in the notion of change is
the notion of process, because the change of an entity into another
state involves some kind of a transformation over time and space. More-
over, Whitehead asserts that inherent in process is the notion of poten-
tiality, for movement from A to B presupposes at state A the possibility
of arriving at state B.
If the universe be interpreted in terms of static actuality,
then potentiality vanishes. Everything is just what it
is. . . . But if we start with process as fundamental, then
the actualities of the present are deriving their characters
from the process, and are bestowing their characters upon the
future. Immediacy is the realization of the potentialities
of the past, and is the storehouse of the potentialities of
the future (1938, pp. 99-100).
The view of reality as process and process as the expression and
unfoldment of potentiality means that the reality of something is most
accurately described by the process by which it changes and the poten-
tial states to which it may attain. Thus, in order to know the true
reality of something, be it a rock, a rose, or a child, one must
take
into account its formation and the final (or, in the case
of man, the
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ideal) states it may reach, and the process it goes through in reaching
it. This means that the reality of something cannot be viewed apart
from what it may become. It also means that development
— the process
of becoming—may be defined as the translation of potentiality into
actuality. Whitehead (1933) writes, "the very essence of real
actuality that is, of the completely real— is process. Thus, each
actual thing is only to be understood in terms of its becoming and
perishing. There is no halt in which the actuality is just its static
self, accidentally played upon by qualifications derived from the shift
of circumstances. The converse is the truth" (pp. 274-75). From
Whitehead’s definition of development as the translation of potentiality
into actuality Anisa's theory of development is derived.
Another basic principle of Whitehead’s cosmology bound up with
the principle of process is what Whitehead terms "the general inter-
connectedness of all things." This principle, he explains, "transforms
the manifoldness of the many into the unity of the one. We speak in the
singular of The Universe, of Nature, of <pocruq> which can be trans-
lated as Process. There is the one all-embracing fact which is the
advancing history of the one Universe. This community of the world,"
he continues, ". . . is the matrix of all begetting, . . . whose
essence is process with retention of connectedness . . ."(ibid., p. 150).
"It lies in the nature of things," Whitehead remarks, "that the many
enter into a complex unity" (1929c, p. 32).
The motive force behind the urge toward unity is what White-
head calls "concresence" (1933, p. 236). The word concresence comes
from two Latin roots, concretus (grown together, hard) and esc er e
(with
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inchoative force), and thus denotes the fusion of things into new
entities. Whitehead also makes concresence synonymous with creativity
and regards it as the source of nature’s dynamic development. "Nature,"
he maintains, "is never complete, it is always passing beyond itself.
This is the creative advance of nature. The 'creative advance' is the
application of this ultimate principle of creativity to each novel
situation with which it originates
. .
." (1929c, p. 347).
Rene Dubos (1967) also describes the advance of nature as a
creative process:
Life operates as if most of its structures and functions
were designed to fulfill some ultimate end, for the good
of the individual and of the progeny. Life has its roots
in the past, and its activities are projected into the
future. Furthermore, it is a creative process, elaborating
and maintaining order out of the randomness of matter, end-
lessly generating new and unexpected structures and proper-
ties by undergoing spontaneous changes, and by building up
associations which qualitatively transcend their constitu-
ent parts (pp. 46-47).
Martin Foss (1949), like Whitehead, speaks of nature's constant
changing, not as a random process, but as an ordered process of becoming.
Like Dubos, he sees that process moving in a definite direction:
Nature in its concrete reality is not merely changing, but
'becoming,' and in the movement of becoming, as in all
movement, is a necessity of direction. Direction in change,
tendency in change is what we call becoming and it is the
idea of force with which we grasp this necessity of direc-
tion (p. 28).
Whitehead sees the direction of development as being the crea-
tion of ever—expanding circles of unity. Moreover, he maintains that
the highest expression of that unity is beauty. Beauty, he writes,
stems from the appearance of ordered relations among things and "is
the internal conformation of the various items of experience with
each
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other" and "concerns the inter-relations of the various components of
Reality.
. . . The teleology of the Universe," he concludes, "is
directed toward the production of Beauty" (1933, p. 265). Whitehead's
universe is thus dynamic and interconnected, and propelled by the power
of concresence to new degrees of unity, the highest expression of which
is beauty.
Man and His Position in the Universe
Whitehead’s principle of process as reality suggests that an
understanding of man and his relation to the universe can best be gained
by examining his position in the broad sweep of evolution. Julian
Huxley, describing the general character of evolution, expressed a view
of reality similar to Whitehead’s: "the whole of reality is one gigantic
process of evolution. This produces increased novelty and variety, and
ever higher types of organization
. .
." (cited in Dubos 1962, p. 77).
Whitehead's (1938) survey of the hierarchical structure of
evolution identifies four major classifications of organization : non-
living (or mineral), vegetable, animal, and human. These levels are
summarized by Jordan and Shepard (1972)
:
The first level is the nonliving which functions according
to the laws of nature with a total suppression of individual
self-expression. The next is the vegetable level in which
life is superimposed upon inorganic nature. Viewed dif-
ferently, the latent potentiality in lifeless matter can be
seen as awakened into realization in the vegetable by the
operation of a higher-order principle. In the animal level
of existence the lower levels are incorporated into that of
a unified and self-directed organism. Finally, the human
level incorporates them all and adds the ability to respond
to the influx of ideals which shape its purposes and mold its
actions (p. 27).
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Each level takes its definition from distinguishing charac-
teristics which do not appear in previous levels. The salient charac-
teristic's of each ontological level are outlined below:
Mineral level: inorganic matter and cohesion.
Vegetable level: photosynthesis, reproduction, and growth.
Animal level: sense perception, instinct, mobility, and the
ability to learn.
Human level: consciousness and the ability to transmit
knowledge from one generation to the next.
Each level incorporates the characteristics of those beneath it, while
at the same time adding new ones. In this sense, the levels are hier-
archical. Each level also operates according to principles and laws
specific to it. Each level, then, must be known on the basis of its
own characteristics and the principles and laws which operate on that
level, and not merely on the basis of the characteristics, principles,
and laws of the level below it.
The existence of separate laws and principles governing the
operation of phenomena on different phylogenetic levels has been des-
cribed by the physicist and philosopher, Michael Polanyi (1969), who
identified boundary conditions in the operation of hierarchical struc-
tures. Boundary conditions, Polanyi explains, set the limits within
which the principles governing the operation of phenomena at particular
levels of organization. Polanyi cites the structure of written language
as an instance. Written language, he says, consists of five levels.
(1) phonemes, letters, and sounds; (2) words; (3) sentences; (4) the
structuring of sentences into a particular style; and (5) the .composi-
tion of the text. He demonstrates that the operations of the higher
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levels cannot be accounted for by the laws governing the lower levels:
You cannot derive a vocabulary from phonetics; you cannotderive grammar from a vocabulary; a correct use of grammardoes not account for good style; and a good style does notprovide the content for a good piece of prose (p. 155).
In the same manner, tulips cannot be known fully by studying rocks,
dogs by studying tulips, and man by studying dogs. Seen from this
perspective, the flaw of modern psychology is its failure to specify
the boundary conditions separating man from animals. Because of this
failure, it has formulated theories about the operation of human
capacities (particularly learning) based on the results of studies which
largely concern animal behavior. This is not to imply that animal
studies have no relevance to man; indeed, research on animals has been
of enormous value to man, particularly in the bio-medial sciences. But
the subject of this research has been those aspects common to both
animal and human levels, like enzyme activation and suppression, for
example. The misapplication of data comes when results of behavioral
studies conducted on species that belong to lower ontological levels
are used to account fully for psychological phenomena belonging to man.
Conway (1973), elaborating on Polanyi’s concept of boundary
conditions, states that they "are equivalent to the ideal potentialities
of the system" (p. 32). Each level has its own range of potentialities,
although there is a vast difference in the breadth of each range. How-
ever, from the mineral to the human levels there exists a progressive
development in the range of potentialities each level may express. The
concept of a range of potentialities of a particular ontological level
or species within a level is valuable because it can be used as a
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measure to evaluate man’s position In relation to the rest of evolution
Conway continues:
By the time we reach the human organism the potential forms
of expression are incredibly vast so that novelty of expres-
sion becomes the predominant activity. Thus, the conceptual
entertainment of unrealized possibility emerges as a major
factor in human mentality. For the lower forms of existence
the realm of potential is more restricted and consequently
mental experience is much less intense, becoming negligible
among inorganic entities (pp. 32-33).
Huxley, Dobzhansky, and Suzanne Langer, a philosopher, express
the same concept of boundary conditions operating over the spectrum of
evolution and speak of the greatness of man’s potentialities.
Huxley, reviewing the process of evolution throughout the
universe, divides it into three phases, "each with its own method of
working, its own rate of change, and its own kind of results":
Over most of the universe it is in the lifeless or inorganic
phase. On earth (and undoubtedly on some planets of other
suns) it is in the organic or biological phase. This works
by natural selection and has produced a huge variety of
animals and plants, some astonishingly high organizations
(like our own bodies, or an ant colony), and the emergence
of mind.
Finally man (and possibly a few other organisms else-
where) has entered the human, or as we may call it, the psycho-
social phase, which is based on the accumulation of knowledge
and the organization of experience. It works chiefly by a
conscious selection of ideas and aims, and produces extremely
rapid change. Evolution in this phase is mainly cultural,
not genetic; it is no longer focused solely on survival, but
is increasingly directed towards fulfillment and towards
quality of achievement (cited in Dubos 1962, pp . 77-78).
With man, Dobzhansky (1967) says, "evolution transcended itself":
Inorganic evolution went beyond the bounds of the previous
physical and chemical patternings when it gave rise to life.
In the same sense, biological evolution transcended itself
when it gave rise to man. There obviously exist phenomena
and processes, ranging from self-awareness to the human forms
of society and of history, which occur exclusively, or almost
exclusively, on the human level. It seems unnecessary tolabor the point that a great range of potentialities are
open to man only (p. 45).
Langer (1942), a student of Whitehead’s, also proposes boundary condi-
tions between the human and animal kingdoms in her monumental work,
Philosophy in a New Key
. Like Huxley, she singles out the mind as the
new factor in evolution which has lifted it to an entirely new plane:
I propose, therefore, to try a new general principle:
to conceive the mind, still as an organ in the service of
primary needs, but of characteristically human needs ; instead
of assuming that the human mind tries to do the same thing
as a cat s mind, but by the use of a special talent which
miscarries four times out of five, I shall assume that the
human mind is trying to do something else ; and that the cat
does not act humanly because he does not need to . This dif-
ference in fundamental needs, I believe, determines the dif-
ference of function which sets man so far apart from his
zoological brethren; and the recognition of it is the key to
those paradoxes in the philosophy of mind which our too
consciously zoological model of human intelligence has
engendered (pp. 43-44).
The concept which the humanistic evolutionists and process
philosophers propose is that with man evolution has produced life
conscious of itself—a capacity which makes man aware of his potentiali-
ties and therefore able to pursue them as long as he is cognizant of
them. In Huxley’s (1960) words, man is "the only repository of cosmic
self-awareness in the universe," a capacity which makes him "managing
director of the biggest business of all; the business of evolution"
(p. 13). Teilhard de Chardin (1959), a biologist and philosopher,
describing the same transcendent quality of man, portrays him as the
ascending arrow of the great biological synthesis" (p. 36). In a White-
headian sense, man’s awareness of his own potentialities makes it pos-
sible for him to direct his own concresence. The conscious ability to
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direct his own concresence lifts the creative advance into novelty and
the production of ever-increasing degrees of unity and beauty to a
level unparalleled throughout the rest of nature.
This is the view of man which the Anisa Model acclaims. It is
a view that can uplift the profession of education to a new level of
unity in its philosophy and practice by virtue of its ability to inspire
educators with an attitude of reverence for the child and a deep sense
of the responsibility they carry as the trustees of his potentialities.
To make explicit in practice what is implicit in these assumptions
about the nature of man and his relation to the cosmos is the ideal of
the Anisa Model.
.
. ,
Jordan (1973a) writes. "To guide practice so
that it reflects that ideal, we have generated a body of theory
concerning development (the translation of potentiality into actuality),
curriculum, pedagogy, and administration" (pp. 86-87).
Jordan and Shepard (1972) maintain that the organismic view
of man and the universe also is capable of bringing all the sciences in
closer touch with reality:
Here we can discern the beginnings of a possible recon-
ciliation between the world as given in experience and the
world as known in science. The hierarchical view suggests
a type of scientific unity which focuses on the importance
of patterned action. It is a unity of process and purpose
rather than a unity of kind. Furthermore, it is a view
which not only admits but requires diversity as a necessary
element in the structure of reality and one which places
man and his potentialities at the pinnacle of an evolution-
ary process which is seeking its meaning through man's
transcendent actualization of potentialities. Thus, it is
the spiritual and not the material nature of man which is
the central determinant in the future course of evolution,
and the meaning of man is to be sought in that transcendent
generality which is the essence of his being rather than in
the operation of laws whose powers have been expressed in
lower-order categories of existence (p. 27).
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S. Radhakrishnan (1956), the distinguished Indian philosopher,
summarizes in the following paragraph the hierarchical order and ever-
advancing character of the cosmos and maintains that the purpose under-
lying the universe is the spiritual progress of man—views which stand
in full agreement with the organismic view:
The world is not a mere repetition of order; it makes
advances into the future. In the cosmic process we notice
the emergence of a series of levels of being each obeying
its own laws, yet constituting an advance on the preceding
numbers of the series. An early Upanisad, the Tattiriya
,
mentions five levels of reality in the cosmic process, anna,
or matter, prana or life, manas or animal mind, vijnana or
human intelligence and ananda or spiritual freedom. These
are qualitatively distinct. Each level has its own govern-
ing principles or laws peculiar to it. The laws of the
higher level do not displace those of the lower but add
something new or qualitatively distinct to them. Even the
theory of dialectical idealism (Hegel) or materialism (Marx)
admits this fact of advance. History is a forward movement
and not an endless recurrence of repetition. The aim of
the universe, for the Upanisad, is to produce beings in whom
mind (manas ) and intellect (vijnana ) shall lead to the
spiritual excellence (ananda ) . When the Kingdom of the
Spirit, brahma-loka as it is called, is established we have
the triumph and the fulfillment of the cosmic process (p. 81).
Having established a philosophical perspective on man and his
position in the universe, we turn in the next two chapters to a discus-
sion of consciousness through the perspective of evolution, examine the
powers it bestows, and consider their relation to symbolization.
CHAPTER II
CONSCIOUSNESS
—AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE
The Development of Culture
In the preceding chapter we discussed basic questions about the
universe and man s position in it. Man was described as possessing
limitless potential, an attribute which, when combined with the ability
to direct the course of his own development, places him at the fore-
front of evolution. However, while the concept of regarding man as a
being of infinite potential is useful in that it develops an attitude
of reverence for man, it nevertheless is an abstract notion which begs
for amplification. It is a broad statement which informs us of the
range of man’s abilities, but tells us nothing of what those abilities
are and how they function.
The anthropologist and philosopher, Ernst Cassirer (1944),
wary of definitions of man that try to pinpoint his "metaphysical
essence," prefers a more concrete and functional definition:
. . . if there is any definition of the nature or "essence"
of man, this definition can only be understood as a func-
tional one, not a substantial one. We cannot define man by
any inherent principle which constitutes his metaphysical
essence—nor can we define him by any inborn faculty or
instinct that may be ascertained by empirical observation.
Man’s outstanding characteristic, his distinguishing mark,
is not his metaphysical or physical nature—but his work.
It is this work, it is the system of human activities, which
defines and determines the circle of "humanity. Language,
myth, religion, art, science, history are the constituents,
the various sectors of this circle (pp. 67-68).
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The system of human activities to which Cassirer refers is
none other than culture, that ubiquitous entity which exists wherever
there are humans, whether primitive or civilized. Culture is part and
parcel of human life and has no parallel in the non-human world. By
examining the salient features of culture we can understand more clearly
the uniquely human capacities necessary for its appearance.
Culture is defined by Dubos (1968) "as everything learned by
experience and translated from one generation to the next" and as "the
expression of man s responses to the physical and human environment"
(p. 38). Jordan (1971a) speaks of it as "ways of thinking, feeling,
speaking, and behaving that are transmitted from one generation to
the next" (p. 673). Both definitions include the essential element
of social transmission from generation to generation of information
about life.
Dobzhansky (1956) comments that the appearance of culture
marked the advent of a totally new mechanism in evolutionary develop-
ment, the transmission of culture by teaching and learning:
The appearance of culture signified the beginning. of a
hitherto non-existent type of evolutionary development
—
the evolution of culture or human evolution proper. . . .
Biological heredity is transmitted by genes; consequently
Jordan (1973a) adds another environment— the unknown—as a
third environment with which man interacts and about which he also trans-
mits information to subsequent generations. The unknown environment
includes such things as "the infinitude of the universe, death, and all
of the latent potentialities which in fact are unknown to us until they
become translated into actualized powers. The future itself is always
an unknown" (p. 89). Other unknowns are undiscovered phenomena in the
physical and human environments. The addition of the unknown environ-
ment bears significantly on our discussion of symbolization. As will
be discussed later, the arts are the symbol system that mediates man's
interaction with unknowns.
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it is handed down exclusively from parents to their children
and other direct descendants. Culture is transmitted by
teaching and learning. At least in principle, ’the social
legacy can be transmitted by anyone to anyone, regardless of
biological descent. Man may be said to have two heredities,
a biological one and a cultural one; all other organisms have
only the biological one (pp. 26-27).
Volpe (1970), another evolutionist, points out the significance of
this development
:
Modern man has a double heritage. He is a product of
both biological and cultural evolution. Human culture has
emerged out of man's exercise of reason and his ability to
communicate his rational thoughts. Man’s cultural endowments
supplement and transcend his purely biological inheritance.
The child is born uncivilized, and acquires his customs,
beliefs, and values by instruction and imitation. Each new
generation is able to draw upon the rich store of past
accumulated knowledge and ideas (p. 166).
Waddington (1960), yet another contemporary evolutionist,
suggests that the development of the process of transmitting information
from one generation to the next has been so significant as to stand as
a criterion by which man may be defined:
The human situation is characterized by an enormously
important step in the evolution of the evolutionary mechan-
ism. Indeed, it might be not unreasonable to define
humanity by this fact. In man, the processes of teaching
by the older members of the population and learning by the
younger ones, have been carried to an incomparably higher
pitch than is found in any of the prehuman forms of life,
where they play only a relatively minor role, for instance,
in the determination of bird song, and a few other examples.
In man, they have developed not only to highly effective
person-to-person learning, as in apprenticeship, but, by
the invention of writing and other more recent devices, to
an extremely elaborate system by which the whole conceptual
understanding of the past is made available to present
recruits to human society. We have here what in effect
amounts to a new mode of hereditary transmission. It is
true that this cannot transmit a new variation in our
bodily structure as do the genes, but it can transmit con-
ceptual knowledge, beliefs, feelings, aesthetic creations
and other mental phenomena, together with a vast variety of
non-human artefacts. It may be referred to as the cultural
system (p. 102).
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Waddington (ibid.) refers to human culture as a "socio-genetic system,"
a term which reflects the two means by which culture advances, social
and genetic transmission. Waddington also discusses the various modes
by which culture is transmitted. The modes are modeling, apprentice-
ship, rote-learning, and deutero-learning, or learning how to learn.
These modes are ranked according to the level of abstraction involved
in the learning process.
The first mode, modeling, involves the transmission of informa-
tion direct from individual to individual, through unverbalized behavior
of the teacher which conveys some inarticulate message to the learner,
either as a model to be imitated or as a directive to some course of
action" (ibid., p. 115). Although this form of learning is the most
primitive and is shared with a large number of animals, it is not with-
out power. It remains the major vehicle by which attitudes and values
are transmitted.
The characteristics which differentiate the products of the
best public and secondary schools and Oxbridge from those
of the secondary modern and Red Brick have been in the main
passed over by this mechanism which man shares with such
other social creatures as the red deer and the prairie dog
(ibid., p. 116).
While modeling is powerful, it nevertheless is inefficient
because it is incapable of transmitting ideas— information which must
be conceptualized. A more efficient, though relatively simple, mode
is the system of apprenticeship, which largely involves teaching by
example and only partially the use of words and formal instruction.
"Human apprenticeship teaching, however," Waddington explains, differs
from animal model-mimic transmission in such factors as the conscious
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utilization of repetition as a means of indoctrination, and in its
development of a long-term course of instruction leading towards a
definite recognized goal. It is still utilized even in the most
highly evolved societies even at many levels of sophistication, from
the training of a plumber or a cobbler through that of a doctor or
lawyer to the most rarefied spiritual level of a guru and his pupil”
(ibid., p. 116).
The next mode of learning in the socio-genetic system is rote
learning, characterized by the inculcation of information usually
recorded in written form, though the existence of a written text is not
necessary, as the handing down of traditions and legends attests. The
invention of writing, Waddington notes, "removed from the socio-genetic
mechanism the necessity for person-to-person contact between the trans-
mitter and the recipient” (ibid., p. 117), thereby rapidly increasing
the acceleration of learning and the advancement of the sciences.
The highest stage in the evolution of the socio-genetic mechan-
ism has been the appearance of "deutero-learning,” or learning how to
learn. Deutero-learning refers to a process by which the learning of
one lesson enables the learner to learn the next better (ibid., p. 141).
In this mode of learning, "the content which is acquired from the
learning process is the ability to learn from other things more quickly
or more efficiently" (ibid., p. 115). This form of learning is regarded
by the Anisa Model as the acme of human learning. Referred to as
learning competence, it signifies having acquired a conscious knowledge
of the hows of learning— that is, having mastered the underlying
processes of learning so that they can be consciously applied to new
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situations (Jordan and Streets 1973). Such learning puts one in
charge of his own destiny and makes him capable of directing the
course of his own concresence.
Waddington states that the appearance of deutero—learning in
evolution ranks among the most important^ steps in the development of
®^olutionary structures and is comparable to the organization of genes
into chromosomes, the adoption of bisexual reproduction, and the evolu-
tion of the socio-genetic mechanism itself (ibid., p. 115).
With the appearance of the socio-genetic mechanism, and par-
ticularly, with the onset of deutero-learning, ideas take on the func-
tion shared by genes in a strictly biological system. Waddington
cites the work of Kenneth Mather, who draws close parallels between
ideas and genes:
Ideas have many properties which we find in genes. . . .
they are transmissible, and therefore, permanent in the
same sense as genes, they vary and they are selected.
Because they vary and are selected, the caucus of ideas
and concepts on which the structure of society depends is
not only capable of evolution but must evolve. . . .
This social evolution . . . has come to overlay and
obscure the genetical variation which we see when we look
within societies (ibid., p. 106).
The important development arising from the appearance of deutero-
learning and the consequent role of ideas in cultural evolution is that
evolution advanced to the conceptual level and became capable of con-
scious control; while man cannot control the genes he receives from
his parents, he can control the ideas he thinks.
The Mental Roots of Cultural Transmission
As a means of determining more accurately the unique capacities
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of the human mind, Waddington tries to identify the requirements of
man's mental functioning which make it possible for him to participate
in a system of cultural transmission.
Foremost among the requisites are two fundamental, interrelated,
and mutually supportive elements, an authority-bearing system and the
ability for role-differentiation. Piaget (1965) asserts that the
authority-bearing system is essential to the appearance of moral
consciousness, which in turn is responsible for maintaining order in
the human environment. He believes that children have a predisposition
to obey authority that makes them receptive to accepting what their
parents teach them.
It seems to us to be an undeniable fact that in the course
of the child's mental development, unilateral respect or
the respect felt by the small for the great plays an essen-
tial part; it is what makes the child accept all the com-
mands transmitted to him by his parents and is thus the
great factor of continuity between different generations
(p. 102).
Waddington argues that, in addition to this function, the
authority-bearing system is essential to disposing the new born "to be
a recipient for socially transmitted 'information' in general the
word 'information' being used in the wide sense given to it in
scientific theory" (ibid., p. 157).
Waddington states that the authority-bearing system is a
deeply rooted human disposition, perhaps genetically determined,
which goes beyond mere respect for one's elders. Discussing Piaget s
position on the child's authority-bearing system, Waddington states:
Piaget realizes that 'respect,' in its ordinary meaning
at least, does not fully describe the situation he finds.
'It is a fact,' he writes (1965, p. 379), 'that the child
in the presence of his parents has the spontaneous feeling
of something greater than and superior to himself. Thus
respect has its roots deep down in certain inborn feelings
and is due to a sui generis [unique] mixture of fear and’
affection which develops as a function of the child's rela-
tion to his adult environment (ibid., p. 157).
Delving deeper for the roots of the authority-bearing system,
Waddington turns to Hallowell, another biologist and evolutionist, who
points to role differentiation, and, beyond that, to self-obj ectif ica-
tion, as the underpinnings of the human authority—bearing system.
Hallowell explains that role differentiation is essential to
any kind of social organization and, in infrahuman species is biologi-
cally linked to helplessness of the offspring and their prolonged need
for nurturance. In these species "the structure of the group is deter-
mined by the roles which the adult members of both sexes play towards
each other and their offspring" (cited by Waddington 1960, p. 148).
In humans, the moral order is characterized "by the fact that role
differentiation is mediated through socialized values and goals
acquired by organisms capable of both self-awareness and of making
choices between courses of action with reference to socially sanctioned
goals and values" (ibid.).
Waddington concludes that the existence of a socio-genetic
system of transmission requires "one particular role, namely, that of
receiver or acceptor of socially-transmitted information;" without it,
he states, "no mechanism would be provided for the serial transmission
of information down the generations, or at least this would only occur
in a haphazard and chance manner and the content of the transmitted
messages would be very low" (ibid., p. 150).
of role differentiation is that an individualAnother aspect
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may assume the role of teacher vis-a-vis himself by internalizing
authority:
We find, as an empirical fact, that man can as it were
internalize authority. He can with one part of his
mental make-up play the role of the taught in relation
to some other part which functions as the teacher. Con-
science may, as we well know, become a stern internal
authority (ibid., pp. 150-151).
The internalization of authority constitutes the conscience of the
mature adult. The child* s acquisition of moral behavior, however,
initially depends on his comprehension of the adult as the teacher
and himself as the taught. Hallowell explains that role differentia-
tion in turn depends on the capacity for self-objectification, which
\
makes it possible for one to observe and regulate one's own behavior.
The functioning of a social system as a moral order
depends on a capacity for self-objectification on the
part of the actor, self-identification with his own
conduct and that of others in a common framework of
socially recognized and sanctioned standards of behavior.
Without a psychological level of organization that per-
mits the exercise of these and other functions, moral
responsibility for conduct could not exist, nor would
any social structure function as a moral order (ibid.
,
p. 148).
Our examination of the requisites of culture has revealed that
the transmission of information from one generation to the next depends
on learning. Evolution has furnished man with a most efficient and
powerful form of learning, deutero-learning, which has as its object
the acquisition of knowledge about learning itself. This mode of
learning makes it possible for man to apply his knowledge of the
learning process to whatever he wishes to learn, thereby making his
capacity to actualize potential unlimited. We also found that the
moral order so indispensable to culture depends on a differentiation
of roles between the teacher and the taught and on the capacity for
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self objectification. Deutero-learning, role-differentiation, and
self-objectification are functions of consciousness, for they require
the ability to be aware of the operations of one’s mind as separate
aspects of experience. As such, they help form the basis of man's
transcendence—a capacity to be discussed more fully in Chapter III.
We now look at evolutionary theory's explanation of the origins of
culture and human consciousness.
The Origins of Culture
The appearance of a socio-genetic system in man and the
accompanying features of deutero-learning, role differentiation, and
self-objectification are without parallel in the rest of nature.
Biologists and evolutionists consequently have been challenged to ac-
count for the appearance of such unique features within the framework
of evolutionary theory. The most promising explanation set forth by
a number of theorists is the notion of quantum evolution, first pre-
sented by Simpson (1953)
.
Quantum evolution refers to large scale
alterations in the evolution of a species where "the whole genotype
and the whole phenotype are reconstructed to reach a new adaptive
balance" (Dobzhansky 1962, p. 199). According to the principle of
quantum evolution, a number of factors interact simultaneously to
cause the emergence of a new evolutionary pattern.
Dobzhansky (1962) outlines the factors which might have com-
bined to effect the appearance of human culture.
Continuous sexual receptivity of the female made
monogamous family life possible and thus freed the male
from the constant necessity of warding off interlopers.
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He could now specialize in hunting and food gathering away
from home, while the female could remain more nearly
stationary, tending her offspring, gathering food in the
near vicinity of her abode, and doing the domestic chores
that accumulated with the growth of technology and, par-
ticularly, with the use of fire. As the male was now able
to relax his aggressiveness and dominance, particularly over
his mate, domination could change to cooperation and in the
long run even to chivalry. If man is 'pre-eminently a
sexual animal,' he has at least managed to make his sexual
urges less acutely competitive than they were in his
remote ancestors. Cooperation between mates made possible
the extended family (individuals of several generations
with their respective mates living together) and eventually
clans, tribes, and nations. Different males now could co-
operate to provide for the families and this permitted
stalking, cornering, and killing big game that was in-
accessible to the lone hunter until he was equipped with
powerful weapons. Cooperation, in turn, made communication
a necessity and stimulated the development of language.
Thus a series of new selective pressures were set up, of a
kind which did not exist on the prehuman level (p. 199).
As to the question of which of the factors outlined above
(constant sexual receptivity of females, symbolic language, monogamous
family, change in food habits, relaxation in male aggressiveness)
came first, Dobzhansky says, "Obviously we cannot answer with cer-
tainty, but it is most likely that these changes went together, with
mutual reinforcement. What we are dealing with is the appearance of
a whole new evolutionary pattern, a transition to a novel way of life
which is human rather than animal" (ibid., p. 199). So distinct is
the human pattern that it deserves to be rated as different in kind
and not merely as different in degree:
Man is not simply a very clever ape. On the contrary,
he possesses some faculties that occur in other animals
only as rudiments, if at all. Quantum evolution, emer-
gence of novel adaptive designs, may involve breaks in the
evolutionary continuity when the difference between the
ancestors and the descendants increase so rapidly that they
are perceived as differences in kind (ibid., p. 203).
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As to the question of whether the capacity to symbolize
developed as a result of superior brain development, or whether brain
development followed the growth of symbolization, Dobzhansky (1965)
answers
:
This question belongs in the same class as the puzzle of
which came first—the chicken or the* egg. It is clear
that, to have acquired even the rudiments of a trans-
missable culture, considerable development of the cerebral
cortex was necessary. Our ancestors were becoming more
and more intelligent animals, and this fact gave them a high
fitness. Now, the increase of fitness owing to the ability
to transmit the experience gained from one generation to
another placed greater and greater adaptive value on
further development of the brain. The two processes,
growth of the brain's capacity to assimilate culture and
growth of the culture, must have been interconnected through-
out human evolution. They continue to be interdependent at
present (p. 105).
The view that man's capacity for symbolization developed hand
in hand with the neural specification derives from the broader evo-
lutionary principle that genetic determinants and cultural expressions
develop interdependently
.
The basic thesis (set forth by contemporary evolutionists
like Washburn, Bartholomew, Birdsell, Oakley, Avis, and
Lollowell) is that the physical and genetic endowments of
the human species now living have evolved as a result of
and hand in hand with the development of culture. That is
to say biological evolution and cultural evolution are
interdependent (Dobzhansky 1962, p. 193).
Although evolutionists have marshalled a great deal of evi-
dence to support the principle of quantum evolution and the inter-
dependence of cultural and genetic factors in the evolution of man,
the theory remains more a description of the external factors operat-
ing on the evolving organism than an explication of the origins of
the psychological structures crucial to the formation of human
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culture. Dubos (1962) clarifies the difference between our knowledge
of prehistoric man's mode of life—which suggests inferences about the
interplay of various phylogentic factors—and knowledge of the origins
of consciousness:
Considered as a whole, the existent knowledge of pre-
history makes it possible to construct a fairly continuous
story of human migrations and human handicrafts over
hundreds of thousands of years. But what first made Homo
sapiens develop self-consciousness, plan for the future,
and thus become qualitatively different from the rest of
creation, is as mysterious as ever. The origins of man
are hidden behind clouds of ignorance as thick as those that
surround the origin of life. We know a great deal con-
cerning the evolution of living things in general, but
there is no factual information concerning the passage from
matter to life, nor concerning the emergence of self-con-
sciousness and of culture out of animal instincts (p. 73).
Whether or not the proposition of quantum evolution is correct,
the fact remains that with the appearance of man a most remarkable
phenomenon, unprecedented through the whole of creation, has occurred;
namely, the appearance of mind. As Hallowell states:
The great novelty, then, in the behavioral evolution
of the primates, was not simply the development of a
cultural mode of adaptation as such. It was, rather,
the psychological restructuralization that not only made
this new mode of existence possible but provided the
psychological basis for cultural readaptation and
change (cited by Dobzhansky 1967, p. 52).
Dobzhansky (1956) echoes these thoughts and specifies more clearly
the nature of the psychological basis of culture in his book. The
Biological Basis of Human Freedom :
The transition from the adaptive zone of a prehuman
primate to the human adaptive zone was brought about
by the development of the biological basis for the
ability to use symbolic thought, language, to profit
by experience, to learn, in short by the development
of educability (p. 121).
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So extraordinary has been the power available to man through
the potentialities inherent in his mind that he has been able to
extend the capacities with which he has been genetically endowed by
using his mind, whereas other species have had to submit to the forces
of biological evolution for the onset of new powers. By mastering the
laws which govern the physical environment, man has been able to extend
through mechanical means his senses of sight (spectacles, binoculars,
telescopes, and microscopes), hearing (hearing aids, tape recorders,
and sonar) and speech (telephones, dictaphones, and tape recorders);
his ability to travel in the air, in and under water, and on the ground;
to write (typewriters and printing presses); and even to think (com-
puters) . These powers make man the master of the planet and cause all
other creatures to pale before him. Consideration of how far man
towers above the animals causes Dubos (1962) to recall the words of
MacDonald Critchiy, who suggests that a definite gulf exists between
the two worlds
:
Even in the case of the most untutored, primitive savage
human communities, the language system is so far removed
in its complexity from the crude and simple utterances of
the sagest of the primates as to be scarcely comparable.
And nowhere and at no time has there been any hint of an
approximation between these two extremes. Can it be,
therefore, that a veritable rubicon does exist between man
and animals after all? (p. 73).
Man's Innate Biological Endowments
Our excursion into evolutionary theory has uncovered a number
of basic features of man necessary to the performance of his works,
the criterion singled out by Cassirer as "the outstanding character-
istic and distinguishing mark" of man. Among these features are the
socio-genetic system of transmitting information from generation to
generation, role-differentiation, and self-objectification. Considera-
tion of the explanations by evolutionists of the origins of culture
and of the mind led to the view that the two developed in mutual inter-
dependence. Our search for those capacities unique to man, however,
would not be complete unless it took advantage of the work of biolo-
gists and ethnologists who have tried to specify the innate biological
equipment of human beings.
The ethnologist, Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1970), reports that part of
man's innate biological equipment is a sense of curiosity. "Whereas
most mammals are curious only in their youth, this characteristic of
youth is retained by man for the rest of his life. He is forever
ready to actively explore new things and to experiment with new things
in his environment" (p. 459). Eibl-Eibesfeldt believes that man's
curiosity and the early appearance of play behavior stem from a drive
to learn:
There seems to be a drive to learn that can be called
a "curiosity drive." It can be demonstrated that there is
a drive to learn new perceptual impressions and thus to
acquire knowledge (p. 239).
Play always implies a dialogue with the environment, and
this dialogue is always the result of an internal drive.
One could even assume a separate drive to play, but I am
inclined to believe that the drive to learn, which is the
basis of all curiosity behavior coupled with an excess of
motoric motivation, will suffice to account for the
phenomenon of play (p. 240).
Dubos (1968) gives us a clearer clue to the fundamental
capacities of man in his list of man's unique biological character-
istics :
Two eyes, a four-chambered heard, the ability to maintain
an approximately stable body temperature, the sucking
instinct in the infant, sexual drive in the adult, the
capacity to think symbolically and to learn a symbolic
language are all characteristics that develop in almost
every human being irrespective of the environment in which
he lives. Their development is coded in the genetic con-
stitution in such a manner as to be little effected by
external factors (p. 65).
Most pertinent to our discussion is Dubos's inclusion of "the
capacity to think symbolically," a capacity Dobzhansky also includes
among the biologically specified capacities responsible for the
transition from the world of the prehuman primates to the world of
the human being.
Searching for a common denominator, Volpe and Eibl-Eibesf eldt
single out the uniquely human capacities for imagination and planning.
Through his capacity to absorb, transmit, and modify
the body of learned tradition known as culture, man has
been able to reach beyond himself. In contrast to other
animals, he can imagine and plan (Volpe 1970, p. 166).
Higher mammals have the capacity to solve problems
without actually trying out all possibilities. A
chimpanzee, confronted with the task of getting a
banana fastened at the roof of the cage out of reach,
may sit down quietly and, by looking around, spot a box
and finally, without moving, discover the solution of
placing the box beneath the banana. In man the capacity
to experiment in imagination is advanced so far that we
may rightly call him the "phantasy" being (A. Gehlen 1950)
.
We combine our engrams and thoughts in ever-new ways, and
not only when a concrete task demands a solution. We play
with these contents of our mind, build castles in the air,
devise plans for our actions, and thus dissolve old habits.
This capacity enables us to stay open to adaptive modifi-
cations (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1970, p. 460).
The Basis of Intellect and Consciousness
What do the capacities for curiosity, for learning, for
symbolization, for imagination and planning have in common? Are they
separate and distinct capacities which act together, or do they spring
from a deeper, more fundamental capacity? For an answer we turn again
to Cassirer (1944), who draws upon the work of Kant for an explanation
of the crucial element of the human intellect. Cassirer explains that
Kant concludes in Critique of Judgement that the quality which dis-
tinguishes the human intellect from all other modes of knowing is "the
characteristic of human knowledge, which is such that the understanding
is under the necessity of making a sharp distinction between reality
and the possibility of things" (p. 56).
It is this character of human knowledge which determines
the place of man in the general chain of being. A dif-
ference between ’real' and ’possible’ exists neither for
the beings below man nor for those above him. The beings
below man are confined within the world of their sense
perceptions. They are susceptible to actual physical
stimuli and react to these stimuli. But they can form no
idea of 'possible' things. On the other hand the super-
human intellect, the divine mind, knows no distinctions
between reality and possibility. God is actus purus .
Everything he conceives is real. ... He cannot think of
a thing without, by this very act of thinking, creating
and producing the thing. It is only in man, in his
'derivative intelligence' ( intellectus ectypus ) that the
problem of possibility arises (p. 56).
The ability to differentiate the actual from the possible is
the uniquely human function, which, I believe, lies at the root of
consciousness. Whitehead (1929c) confirms this thesis when he says
that "the negative perception," or the apprehension of what is not,
"is the triumph of consciousness. It finally rises to the peak of
free imagination, in which the conceptual novelties search through a
universe in which they are not datively exemplified" (p. 245).,
differentiate the actual from the possible isThe ability to
the basic power of the mind on which thought about the external world
and about one’s self is founded. Thought about the world outside one-
self involves the observation of the present and speculation about the
future, which lead to the formation of hypotheses and theories. Exter-
nal thought culminates in the construction of the arts and sciences.
Thought about one's self involves self-objectification and the forma-
tion of one's destiny. Both external and internal thought draw upon
the same basic capacity the ability to postulate possibilities about
future states. Theories predict what will happen when things operate
in a certain way; ideals are visions of perfection and express hope for
what the future will be like.
In regard to thought about the external world, the ability to
differentiate the actual from the possible requires the contemplation
of the future, because possibilities are as yet unactualized entities
which exist ^in potentia and which we know only in so far as we can
speculate or imagine what they will be like when realized at some
point in the future. Because all things are in process, we are able
to know of possibilities by witnessing a tangible trace of the process
which leads us to conclude that the possibility that this trace
eventuate in an acutal entity exists. Highly imaginative people are
those who are able to visualize from the faintest stirrings of process
the possibilities they present. Visionaries are able to foresee which
of the possibilities latent in the present will eventually be realized.
On the other hand, people with dull imaginations are bereft of a sense
of the future. They are unable to infer from present possibilities
future events, even though process may disclose signs of inevitable
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occurrence, much as gathering clouds betoken rain.
Once possibilities are grasped, the notion of probability may
be entertained. Probability is the assessment of the degree of like-
lihood a particular possibility has of becoming actualized. The aware-
ness of probability in turn leads to the formation of hypotheses, which
are statements or propositions that attempt to explain why a certain
type of phenomena operate as they do. They try to explain why certain
possibilities from among a wide array of possibilities become actualized
on a regular and orderly basis. Hypotheses give rise to a search for
verification and, when validated, become laws. Upon laws the sciences
are founded.
The formation of hypotheses and theories is related to the
differentiation of the real from the possible in an even more fundamen-
tal sense. Cassirer (1944) explains that the great scientific dis-
coveries have been made by considering how something would operate
in not just a possible, but in an ideal sense, that is, under perfect
conditions, usually without the influence of other factors, which can
only be imagined and not enacted:
When Galileo founded his new science of dynamics he had
to begin with the conception of an entirely isolated body,
a body which moves without the influence of any external
force. Such a body had never been observed and never could
be observed. It was not an actual but a possible body
and in a sense it was not even possible, for the condition
under which Galileo based his conclusion, the absence of all
external forces, is never realized in nature. It had been
rightly emphasized that all the conceptions which led to
the discovery of the principles of inertia are by no means
evident or natural; that to the Greeks, as well as to men
of the Middle Ages, these conceptions would have appeared
as evidently false, and even absurd. Nevertheless, without
the aide of these quite unreal conceptions Galileo could
not have proposed his theory of motion; nor could he have
46
developed 'a new science dealing with a very ancient sub-ject. And the same holds for almost all the other great
scientific theories. Upon first appearance they were
invariably great paradoxes that it took unusual intel-
lectual courage to propound and to defend (p. 59).
A more recent example of a scientist formulating a theory that
led to a restructuring of how man looks at an area of inquiry is Noam
Chomsky’s work in linguistics. Chomsky’s (1965) basic premise dis-
tinguishes a speaker s ideal competence from his actual performance and
has become the basic premise from which the research of most contem-
porary psycholinguists has proceeded:
Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal
speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-
community, who knows its language perfectly and is un-
affected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as
memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and
interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying
his knowledge to the language in actual performance. This
seems to me to have been the position of the founders of
modern general linguistics, and no cogent reason for modify-
ing it has been offered. To study actual linguistic per-
formance, we must consider the interaction of a variety of
factors, of which the underlying competence of the speaker-
hearer is only one. In this respect, study of language is
no different from empirical investigation of other complex
phenomena (pp. 3-4).
By throwing the actual into the broad perspective of ideal, we
can see how the components of the actual interrelate and how the forces
acting on them influence the operation of the component parts. This
analysis gives rise to the formation of hypotheses—propositions about
how and why things work as they do.
Another name for this manner of thinking is abstraction. The
word, "abstract," comes from two Latin words, abs (off, away) and
trahere (to draw). Among its earlier meanings are "drawn away., removed,
separate; withdrawn from the contemplation of present objects; and
withdrawn or separated from matter, from material embodiment, or from
particular examples." It later took on the meaning of thought in the
ideal sense: "the abstract consideration of things, the ideal." The
word abstraction" is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary (1971
edition) as "the act or process of separating in thought, or consider-
ing a thing independently of its associations; or a substance inde-
pendently of its attributes; or an attribute or quality independently
of the substance to which it belongs" and "the result of abstracting:
the idea of something which has no independent existence; a thing
which exists only in idea; something visionary." Thus, the words
"abstract" and "abstraction" literally mean to separate the ideal from
the actual. Today the words commonly refer to thought that entertains
ideas and that is based on but is essentially divorced from concrete
experience. (The original meaning of the word "idea" gives additional
credence to the notion that abstract thought has its roots in the dif-
ferentiation between the actual and the ideal. It derives from the
Greek and was used to represent the Platonic notion of "general or ideal
form as distinguished from its realization in individuals;" and "the
conception of anything in its highest perfection or supreme development;
a standard of perfection; an ideal.")
The differentiation between the actual and the ideal is also
apparent in thinking about oneself. As the child's awareness of pos-
sibilities increases, he begins to think abstractly. As the child
himself is a part of the environment, he, like any other entity,
becomes a subject for abstraction. This is the root of self-obj cctif i-
Gradually, through the example of his parents and the idealscation.
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they hold before him of what is good, he begins to form a vision of
his ideal self. As his ideal self grows and as his awareness of his
actual self increases, so does his apprehension of the difference
between them. This difference creates a tension called "conscience."
When his behavior leads him away from his ideal self, he has a "pang
of conscience." As he matures, the attributes which define his ideal
self become more and more his own. If they vary with those implanted
in him by his parents and society, he undergoes a restructuring of his
self-ideal. This happens commonly during the period of adolescence,
but can happen at any time in the life cycle. The roles he assumes
also change as he matures. Starting with the original role of learner,
they diversify as his responsibilities increase and as his own ability
as a teacher increases.
But what does the ability to differentiate the actual from
the possible have to do with symbolization? As will be explained more
fully in subsequent chapters, symbolization, broadly defined as the
ability to let something represent something else, requires an appre-
hension of the dichotomy between the actual and the possible in that
one must know that the symbol is not the referent. One must know,
for example, that the word "I" is not the actual "me"— it just stands
in place of me in my mind. In this sense, "I" is an abstraction a
symbol—and is not the actual me.
Phenix, Cassirer, Kaplan, and Vygotsky make the same point.
Phenix (1964) states that the basis for symbolization is the
dual
quality of reflective awareness" that enables one to
differentiate the
real from the possible: "The essence of a symbol is
that it is both
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identified with its referent and distinguished from it. For example,
the word symbol 'tree’ is not a tree, and yet by the power of thought
the symbol stands for a tree" (pp. 24-25).
Cassirer (1944) also provides a rationale for the dependence
of symbolization on the differentiation of the actual from the possible
. . . for symbolic thought it is indispensable to make a
distinction between real and possible, between
actual and ideal things. A symbol has no actual exis-
tence as a part of the physical world; it has a 'meaning.'
In primitive thought it is still very difficult to dif-
ferentiate between the two spheres of being and meaning.
They are constantly being confused: a symbol is looked
upon as if it were endowed with magical or physical
powers. But in the further progress of human culture
the difference between things and symbols becomes clearly
felt, which means that the distinction between actuality and
possibility also becomes more and more pronounced (p. 57).
Kaplan (1961) points out that a duality that recognizes the
difference between actuality and possibility is necessary for symboli-
zation. Without such a duality, primitive perception, as Cassirer
mentions in the above passage, confuses the symbol with its referent
and the two are treated as equals.
It is important to stress the difference between early
perception and later symbolic representation. In contrast
with primitive perception, where no duality exists, symboli-
zation obtains only where there is a tension between symbol
and referent. Where such a duality is not maintained,
symbol (word) realism is manifested; i.e., the material
entity is regarded as consubstantial with the referent
and the distinction between the two collapses. The
material entity is then treated in the same way as the
referent (p. 58).
The confusion of symbol and referent is also discussed by
Vygotsky (1962). He explains that an inability to differentiate the
symbol from its referent results in "a primitive linguistic conscious-
ness" common to the young child and primitive man. In both cases, tne
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word is an integral part of the object it denotes. He cites the
example of the child who thinks that a cow is so named because it has
horns, and of the rustic who said he wasn’t surprised that astronomers
with all their instruments could figure out the size of stars and
their courses what baffled him was how they found out their names!
It is precisely this differentiation between the actual
thing and its symbolic representation which animals cannot make. As
Langer suggests in Philosophy in a New Key
,
a dog and a child may learn
the same name, "Jack," which for the dog is his master and for the boy
is his brother, but when someone says, "Jack!" the dog will become
excited, as if Jack had entered the room, while the child will think
of Jack and may ask, "What about Jack?" To the dog, "Jack" is
synonymous with the presence of Jack and is a signal. To the boy,
’’Jack" arouses the idea of Jack and is a symbol.
Man, unlike all other animals, uses ’signs' not only to
indicate things, but to represent them. To a clever dog,
the name of a person is a signal that the person is present;
you say the name, he pricks up his ears and looks for the
object. If you say ’dinner,' he becomes restive, expecting
food. You cannot make any communication to him that is not
taken as a signal of something immediately forthcoming.
His mind is a simple and direct transmitter of messages
from the world to his motor centers. With man it is dif-
ferent. We use certain ’signs' among ourselves that do not
point to anything in our actual surroundings. Most of our
words are not signs in the sense of signals. They are used
to talk about things, not to direct our eyes and ears and
noses towards them. Instead of announcers of things, they
are reminders. . . . They serve, rather, to let us develop
a characteristic attitude towards objects in absentia ,
which is called 'thinking of' or 'referring to' what is not
here. 'Signs' used in this capacity are not symptoms of
things, but symbols (p. 37).
Herein we have the basic difference between man and animals.
Animals, devoid of the ability to abstract, to symbolize,
and to con-
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template future possibilities, are bound to the concrete of sense per-
ception. Amon (1975), discussing the limitations of chimpanzees like
Washoe and Sara who have been the recipients of extensive assistance
by researchers who have tried to teach them language through the visual
rather than spoken medium, reports:
What the apes have accomplished is so outstanding that
it is easy to overlook what they cannot do—and probably
never will. They do not discuss what happened in the past
or plan what to do tomorrow. They cannot write detailed
instructions about how to play a game or solve a problem
(p. 109).
These limitations stem from an insufficiently developed power of abstrac-
tion. White (1949) expresses a similar opinion about the limits of
animals
:
It is impossible for a dog, horse, bird, or even an ape,
to have any understanding of the meaning of the sign of
the cross to a Christian, or of the fact that black (white
among the Chinese) is the color of mourning. No chimpan-
zee or laboratory rat can appreciate the difference between
Holy Water and distilled water or grasp the meaning of
Tuesday
,
3
,
or sin . ... It is not, as we well know, that
the lower animals can do these things but to a lesser
degree than ourselves; they cannot perform these acts of
appreciation and of distinction at all . It is, as Des-
cartes said long ago, 'not only that the brutes have less
Reason than man, but that they have none at all' (pp. 23-24).
In addition to these limitations, there is no evidence that the chimps
are able to teach their young the sign-language they have learned by
humans— the ability essential to the development of culture.
Dobzhansky (1956)
,
summarizing the experiments of a number of
researchers on animal intelligence, reports on the degree of difference
between man and the chimpanzee, the most intelligent of the primates:
The patient observational and experimental work of
Kohler, Yerkes, Missen and others has disclosed that
the chimpanzee is much superior to other non-human
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primates in memory, imagination, and learning ability.
Nevertheless, there is a vast gulf between the intel-lectual capacity of chimpanzees and of man. Symbolic
responses can be learned by chimpanzees only with con-
siderable difficulty, and their frequency fails toincrease with experience and age (p. 102).
Man's capacity to think abstractly, together with the deri-
vative abilities of imagination, planning, and symbolization make it
possible for him to formulate and pursue ideals. This is the basis of
his works the arts, sciences, history, and religion. Whitehead (1948)
underscores the uniqueness of these aspects of human intelligence with
the following statement:
You can observe animals choosing between this thing or
that thing . But animal intelligence requires concrete
exemplification. Human intelligence can conceive of a
type of things in abstraction from exemplification. The
most obvious disclosures of this characteristic of
humanity are mathematical concepts and ideal of the
Good ideals which stretch beyond any immediate realiza-
tion (p. 113).
That abstraction is the root power from which symbolization and
the works of man stem is attested by Rapoport and Dobzhansky. Rapo-
port (1965)
,
discussing the possibility for "a genuine common denomina-
tor in the philosophical, the psychological, and psychiatric approaches
to the phenomenon of symbolization, states: "It seems that this common
denominator is the process of abstracting—the one, and perhaps, the
only biological invention which man can claim for his own" (p. 96).
Dobzhansky (1956) identifies abstraction as the key variable to the
development of culture and discusses its adaptive significance:
. . . the ability of abstract thinking . . . did confer
tremendous adaptive advantages on the human species. This
basic ability has enabled man gradually to achieve a
mastery over his environments, to develop ways and means
to alleviate hunger, poverty, and disease. And the same
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ty has been mad e possible the birth and develop-ment of science, art, philosophy, and religion. If naturalselection has not developed genes for philosophy, it hasfavored genetic endowments which enable their carriers toecome, among other things, philosophers (pp. 132-33).
The artifacts of culture produced by science, art, and religion
contribute to the sum of culture, which is in itself the embodiment of
an ideal world being pursued by the entire society. Cassirer (1944)
explains that "Human culture taken as a whole may be described as the
process of man’s progressive self-liberation. Language, art, religion,
science, are various phases in this process. In all of them man dis-
covers and proves a new power—the power to build up a world of his
own, an ideal' world" (p. 228). "This spontaneity and productivity,"
he continues, "is the very center of all human activities. It is man’s
highest power and it designates at the same time the natural boundary
of our human world. In language, in religion, in art, in science, man
can do no more than to build up his own universe—a symbolic universe
that enables him to understand and interpret, to articulate and organize,
to synthesize and universalize his human experience" (p. 220). Such is
the path of man's collective concresence.
CHAPTER III
CONSCIOUSNESS AND SYMBOLIZATION
Consciousness is one of the most difficult of all phenomena to
define. And yet it is the most dominant feature of human life. Wher-
ever man goes, consciousness goes with him; whatever he thinks about,
consciousness is closely involved in the act of thinking. Its ubiquity
may be the very cause of the problem. As McLuhan (1964) remarked, the
fish would be the last of all species to recognize water. Things can
only be known by contrasting them with something else so that their
distinctive features become recognized. However, one cannot contrast
consciousness with something else in any objective way because the very
act of thinking about it is subjective as well as conscious. It is
impossible for one to gain the distance needed for the necessary con-
trast. Because of this problem, psychology, in its desire to work with
phenomena that can be carefully defined and measured through empirical
analysis, has neglected it and concentrated on observable behavior.
The problem of defining consciousness scientifically has been
addressed by Herrick (1956) . He writes that "awareness" and "mind"
cannot be reduced to chemistry or adequately described scientifically
by a complete explanation of the methods, or mechanics, of their opera-
tion. Awareness, he states, because it is self-awareness, can only be
apprehended by the individual concerned through introspection.
Organismic philosophers and some psychologists and biologists
who have tried to identify man's distinctive features have also grappled
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with the problem. The insights of biologists are particularly helpful;
their knowledge of life on many levels brings a perspective to bear on
consciousness which many psychologists lack. The power of abstraction
and the related capacity for self-awareness are seen by these theorists
as the basic features of consciousness. Penfield and Roberts and Homer
Smith speculate on definitions:
Today it is just as difficult to give an adeaute definition
of the mind as it ever was. Consciousness is an awareness,
a thinking, a knowing, a focussing of attention, a planning
of action, an interpretation of present experience, a perceiv-
es* These words are descriptive, but they hardly constitute
a satisfactory definition (Penfield and Roberts 1959, cited by
Dobzhansky 1967, p. 66).
Irom the perspective of evolution, then, we may venture
a tentative definition of consciousness as awareness of en-
vironment and of self—revealed objectivity, by self-serving
neuromuscular activity which exhibits choice between alterna-
tive actions and relates past experience to anticipated future.
Whether the time-binding activity extends over a period of
seconds or of years is immaterial to the cogency of the defini-
tion (Smith, cited by Dubos 1962, p. 76).
Vygotsky (1962) proposes a similar definition. He explains
that he uses the term consciousness "to denote awareness of the activity
of the mind— the consciousness of being conscious. A preschool child
who, in response to the question, 'Do you know your name?' tells his
name lacks this self-reflective awareness: He knows his name but is
not conscious of knowing it" (p. 91).
Each of these definitions equates consciousness with awareness,
which, as was discussed in Chapter II, is derived from the ability to
abstract, which in turn is derived from the ability to differentiate
the actual from the possible. The ability to abstract at once consti-
tutes the seat of man's intellect and his ability to look into the past
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and future. We may dehine con*clou*ne!>A
,
then, a* the ability to
abAtAact £Aom eoncAete, physical expedience conception* about the gene-
Aal natuAe oh actuality, an ability commonly AefieAAed to a* mentality
oa thought; derivative abilities aAe the ability to fahmulate concep-
tion* about oneAelh, and about the peat and the iutuAe, and to AepAe-
*ent conception* by Aymbol*. All o
^
the abilttie* contribute to the
conAtAuctcon oh Immanence and tAa*cendence--capacitie* which make man
ApiAitual and capable oh inhinite development
.
1
The view that consciousness derives from the abstraction of
conceptual ideas from concrete actuality is supported by Vygotsky and
Whitehead. Vygotsky (1962) wrote that "The higher forms of human inter-
course are possible only because man's thought reflects conceptualized
actuality" (p. 7). Whitehead (1929c) explained that "wherever there
is consciousness, there is some component of conceptual functioning.
For the abstract element in the concrete fact is exactly what provokes
our consciousness. The consciousness is what arises in some process of
synthesis of physical and mental operation" (p. 370). Whitehead (1948)
also wrote that "Our conscious thought is an abstraction of entities
from the background of existence" (p. 111).
The remainder of the chapter offers a rationale for the defini-
tion of consciousness given above and discusses its implications.
^The term spiritual as used here should be understood as a
psychological characteristic rather than one defined by a particular
religious doctrine. It refers to man's ability to devote himself to
ideals and to construct his own destiny. Man's spiritual nature is
discussed later in this chapter.
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Mentality
Whitehead (1929b) states that mentality is "the experience of
forms of definiteness in their disconnection from any physical experi-
ence, but with an abstract evaluation of what they can contribute to
such experience (p. 32). This definition of mentality is congruent
with the view of abstraction presented earlier as the capacity which al-
lows one to detach the essential aspects of something from its concrete
manifestation and to form conceptions about them. By abstracting from
concrete experience, a conceptual orientation to the world is achieved
which leads to the acquisition of knowledge. Whitehead (1927) states
that "there is no conscious knowledge apart from the intervention of
mentality in the form of conceptual analysis" (p. 2). Conceptual analy-
sis, then, according to Whitehead, is the key to the construction of
knowledge. My thesis is that conceptual analysis is based on the ability
to abstract.
Philip Phenix (1964), trying to identify the psychological sub-
stratum of meaning in his book. Realms of Meaning , locates its seat in
man's capacity for reflection, or self-awareness, which he equates with
thought. Describing meaning as "an experience, in the sense that it
pertains to human consciousness" and which "refers to the inner life,
or the life of the mind," he states:
This inner life has the peculiar quality of reflectiveness,
or self-awareness. Automatic reaction to environmental stimuli
is not the characteristic human mode of response. The unique
human response is one in which the person is aware of his re-
sponding. He acts consciously rather than mechanically. As
the psychologists say, thought is a 'mediating process inter-
vening between stimulus and response. Reflective mediation is
the basis of meaning (pp. 21-22).
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Explaining more fully how reflective thought is the locus of
meaning, Phenix states that "meaning presupposes a basic principle of
duality, or of self-transcendence" inherent in the character of con-
sciousness. This principle of duality enables a person to conceive of
himself as an object of knowledge and is, therefore, the basis of all
• knowledge:
He is at one and the same time both subject and object, knower
ana known, agent and patient, observer and observed. This dual-
ity is what enables one to know anything at all. One knows some-
thing if he is at one and the same time distinct from and iden-
tified with what he knows. All perception of relationships is
based on this duality. A relationship is identity-in-differ-
ence: two things are united in the one act of consciousness in
order that their non-identity may also be recognized (ibid., p. 22).
Phenix' s view that knowledge depends on the recognition of non-
identity, or difference, is congruent with Whitehead’s view that knowl-
edge cannot exist apart from conceptual analysis, the act which estab-
lishes the difference. Conceptual analysis must necessarily involve the
differentiation and comparison of critical features which can be ab-
stracted from concrete experience and held in contrast with each other
and with other phenomena. This allows one to apprehend the relation-
ships ("identity- in-difference") among things, which gives rise to mean-
ing. The principle of duality, which differentiates knower and known,
is also cited by Phenix as the source of symbolization (see pp. 48-49)
.
While thought draws its data from psychomotor and perceptual
mechanisms, its true character comes from the conceptual operations which
alone can be performed by the power of abstraction. Explaining the in-
timate relation between cognition and perception, Whitehead (1927) states
:
I prefer to restrict mentality to those experiential activi-
ties which include concepts in addition to percepts. But much
of our perception is due to the enhanced subtlety arising from
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a concurrent conceptual analysis. Thus in fact there is noproper line to be drawn between the physical and the mental
constitution of experience. But there is no conscious know-ledge apart from the intervention of mentality in the form of
conceptual analysis (p. 20).
Waite (1975), explaining the relation of cognition to conscious-
ness, writes: "although cognition has its origins in a psychomotor and
perceptual base (physical reality) it moves beyond them into the world
of abstract knowledge. This advance represents a large portion of what
is described as consciousness and it accounts for much of man's adap-
tive control over his environment" (p. 23).
Cognition, then, is the principal, but not the only, function
of consciousness. Through the process of abstraction, experience is
transformed into conceptions, or ideas, which become part of the body
of knowledge available to the individual.
The view that knowledge is transformed or constructed by the
mind and is not a mere copy of reality is implicit in Whitehead's
description of mentality. It is also congruent with contemporary
epigenetic developmental theory which holds that learning occurs through
an interaction between man and his environment and that the acquisition
of knowledge follows developmental stages as the child's mind matures
in its ability to perform cognitive operations which act on reality,
building up new structures that become integrated into existing struc-
tures (Piaget 1974; Hunt 1961; Jordan and Streets 1973).
Because the construction of knowledge involves abstraction, it
also involves symbolization. Kaplan (1961) explains the interactionist
position and points out the role of symbolization in conceptualizing
reality
:
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* * ’ obj ect s of human perception are permeated through and
through with our human activities as knowers and doers. Nodirect, unmediated contact with things-in- themselves exists
which can in any way be the subject matter of cognition. In
other words, perceived objects as known are made and not dis-
covered they are productions or constructions in which the
knower’s activity plays a constitutive role. From this van-
tage point, the 'given' is indeterminate as to its character-
istics and even as to its nature; the specific determination
given to presented phenomena varies with different individuals,
for the same individual at different times, etc. Furthermore,
this determination rests in large part on an underlying activ-
ity of schematization
,
which is indissolubly linked with sym-
bolic activity (p. 55).
That symbolization is indissolubly linked to the reconstructive
process of cognition is demonstrated by Kaplan, who cites the following
statement of A.F. Chamberlain, a Mohawk Indian educated in English-
speaking schools:
When I listen [to the whip-poor-will] with my Indian ears,
it seems to me utterly impossible to form any other word for
the imitation of its notes than kwa-kor-yeuh
,
but when I put
on my English ears I hear the bird quite distinctly saying
whip-poor-will (ibid., p. 55).
This example demonstrates how symbolization is the vehicle through which
experience is constructed; it is the agent of the mind which acts on
reality and transforms it into an intelligible form in which it may
be integrated into existing patterns or structures and stored in memory.
"Conceptions," Kaplan explains, "in order to be grasped, must either be
immanent in some particular event or else be represented by some tangible
form intended as a symbol. Conceptions," he concludes, are therefore
always tied up or interdependent with some symbolic process. . . . Again
we contend that probably under all circumstances, but at least in cer
tain phases of cognitive activity, the symbolic process enters into
the articulation of conceptions and thus determines the meaning that
ideas have for us in our lives" (ibid., pp. 55-56).
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Cassirer, elaborating on the relation of symbolization to
thought, demonstrates how victims of aphasia lose all ability for ab-
stract thought. Drawing upon the 18th century philosopher, Herder,
for a definition of reflective, or abstract, thought, Cassirer (1944)
states: "Reflection or reflective thought is the ability of man to
single out from the whole and undiscriminated mass of the stream of
floating sensuous phenomena certain fixed elements in order to isolate
them and to concentrate attention upon them" (pp. 39-40). He then re-
views some of the problems of those suffering from aphasia and other
kindred diseases, and concludes that while they may perform the tasks
of everyday living satisfactorily, "they are at a complete loss as soon
as the solution of the problem requires any specific theoretical or re-
flective activity."
They are no longer able to think in general concepts or cate-
gories. Having lost their grip on universals, they stick to
the immediate facts, to concrete situations. Such patients
are unable to perform any task which can be executed only by
means of a comprehension of the abstract. All this is highly
significant, for it shows us to what degree that type of thought
which Herder called reflective is dependent on symbolic thought
(ibid.
,
pp. 40-41)
.
Werner and Kaplan (1963) draw a similar conclusion. They re-
port observations made by Goldstein (1948) and Head (1929) of brain in-
jured patients who suffered from what Head termed "asymbolia"—an im-
pairment of the function of representation. The patients were unable,
when asked, to demonstrate how to drink with an empty glass or with no
glass at all. These observations, along with Cassirer’s, suggest that
symbolic representation and abstraction are mutually dependent functions,
one being unable to operate in the absence of the other. The reason,
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Cassirer (1944) explains, is that they both derive from differentiating
the actual from the possible:
This interdependence may be proved in an indirect way.
We find that under special conditions in which the function
of symbolic thought is impeded or obscured, the difference
between actuality and possibility also becomes uncertain. It
can no longer be clearly perceived. The pathology of speech
has thrown interesting light on this problem. In cases of
aphasia it has very often been found that the patients had not
only lost the use of special classes of words but at the same
time exhibited a curious deficiency in their general intel-
lectual attitude. Practically speaking, many of these patients
did not deviate very much from the behavior of normal persons.
But when they were confronted with a problem that required a
more abstract mode of thinking, when they had to think of
mere possibilities rather than actualities, they immediately
experienced great difficulty. They could not think or speak
of 'unreal* things. A patient who was suffering from a hemi-
plegia, from a paralysis of his right hand, could not, for
instance, utter the words: 'I can write with my right hand.'
He even refused to repeat these words when they were pronounced
for him by the physician. But he could easily say: 'I can
write with my left hand' because this was to him the statement
of a fact, not of a hypothetical or unreal case (p. 57).
A fuller explanation of the role of symbolization in concep-
tualization may be found in Cassirer's discussion of memory. Cassirer
(1944) maintains that memory, like learning, is not a copy of reality,
which, when recalled, comes to mind like a motion picture. He states
that it involves a process of recognition and identification, an idea-
tional process of a very complex sort. The former impressions must
not only be repeated; they must also be ordered and located, and re-
ferred to different points in time (pp. 50-51).
Cassirer maintains that the complex ideational process which
organizes memory is a creative, constructive process.
In man we cannot describe recollection as a simple return of
an event, as a faint image or copy of former impressions.
It is not simply a repetition but rather a rebirth of the
past,
it implies a creative and constructive process. It is
not
enough to pick up isolated data from our past experience;
we
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muS t really re create them, we must organize and synthesizethem, and assemble them into a focus of thought. It is
this kind of recollection which gives us the characteristichuman shape of memory, and distinguishes it from all other
phenomena in animal or organic life (ibid., p. 51).
This process of reconstruction by which one’s memory is organized is
termed by Cassirer "symbolic memory" (ibid., p. 52). It is symbolic
because the vehicles for organizing and storing memories are symbols:
the mind abstracts elements of experience on the basis of their value
to the purposes of the individual and those abstractions become con-
ceptualizations, or. ideas, of what happened. They are then organized
by being integrated with other memories according to their similarities
and differences, and are stored in the categories the mind has developed.
These categories are identified by symbols—usually verbal—which
represent the central idea or criterial attribute of that scheme or
category.
Langer (1942) explains how symbols are responsible for the
storage and retrieval of memories, and suggests that this function
has been crucial to man’s development of language— the symbol system
she regards as being most centrally involved in memory.
This phenomenon of holding on to the object by means of
its symbol is so elementary that language has grown up on it.
A word fixes something in experience, and makes it the nucleus
of memory, an available conception. Other impressions group
themselves round the denoted thing and are associatively re-
called when it is named. A whole occasion may be retained in
thought by the name of an object or a person that was its
center. The one word ’river’ may bring back the excitement
of a dangerous crossing, a flood, a rescue, or the thought
of building a house at the water's edge. The name of a person,
we all know, brings to mind any number of events in which he
figured. That is to say, a mnemonic word established a context
in which it occurs to us; and in a state of innocence we use it
in the expectation that it will be understood with its con-
text (pp. 120-21).
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Symbolization, then, is crucial to the construction of know-
ledge because it makes it possible for the mind to label and store the
ideas it conceives. In a similar manner, symbolization enables man
to conceptualize the future. Bertalanffy and Hacker explain that sym-
bolization unites the past and future in the universe of human thought:
It is the representative function which creates a 'universe.'
Immediate experience, such as perception of things, feelings,
acts of will, and so forth, is momentary
—dominating con-
sciousness at one moment and gone the next. The past, in
animal experience, consists only of traces left from previous
conditioning, which influence subsequent behavior. Only when
symbolization arises does experience become an organized
universe.
' Only then do past and future exist in their sym-
bolic images, thereby becoming manageable. The past becomes
part of the organized universe; the future can be anticipated
by way of its symbolic stand-ins, and so can determine actual
behavior. Thus, symbolism makes for the consistency of the
universe (Bertalanffy 1965, p. 57).
Economically and instrumentally the most important task of sym-
bols is emancipation and liberation from the immediate experi-
ence of the historical, given moment; symbols also permit con-
templation of and action on objects that do not necessarily
belong to the immediate accessible present. Thus, symbolization
is essentially connected with and constitutes the capacity to
remember and to recall. Symbolization erects the category of
a meaningful past in the same manner as it creates, by antici-
pating symbolic projection, the category of the future (Hacker
1965, pp. 80-81).
But exactly how does symbolization give the past, present and
future its form and substance? What is the psychology of symbolization?
Jordan (1975c) succinctly states:
Man’s capacity to symbolize— to make something stand for some-
thing else—makes him unique among living creatures; it is the
foundation of consciousness and self-awareness. To be con-
scious requires one to compare what is going on in the imme-
diate present with the past in anticipation of the future. There
is no way to make such a comparison unless the past, which is
obviously a time gone by, can have some kind of representation
in the present. For this, symbols are needed. Without them,
memory of things past could not be brought to a level of con-
sciousness in the present and there would be no continuity of
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self-awareness over time. One function of symbol systems is
to sustain consciousness (p. 53).
The point to be emphasized here is that symbols sustain, or
suspend, consciousness. By representing thought or concepts with sym-
bols, the mind may store the symbol and not the actual referent. When
the symbol is brought to mind, its referent is aroused.
The remarkable consciousness suspending function of the sym-
bol unites in man's mind the past, present and future in one stream of
conscious experience. It enables man to sense the infinitude of time,
to feel the interconnectedness of all things, to dwell in that rare-
fied and transcendent state where "past and future are seen as mere
aspects of a wider consciousness—a present, continuous, infinite and
lasting" (Foss 19A9, p. 115). As Leibnitz remarked, for man "the pre-
sent is saturated with the past and pregnant with the future" (quoted
by Dobzhansky 1962, p. 192).
Immanence and Transcendence
Because man is capable of representing both past and future in
his conscious mind, he is immanent and transcendent—immanent in that
within him dwells the history of all his experience; transcendent in
that his consciousness of the future enables him to bring to bear on
the present knowledge of the past in making decisions about how he
should proceed into the future. These basic capacities enable man to
rise above the limitations of his environment and pursue a destiny
which
he himself designs. Cassirer (1944) wrote: "our consciousness
of the
past should not enfeeble or cripple our active powers. If
employed
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in the right way it gives us a freer survey of the present condition
and of the limitations of his past. As Leibnitz used to say: on recede
pour mieux sauter
, one draws back to leap higher" (p. 179).
The interrelationship between immanence and transcendence is
described aptly by Dubos (1968)
:
The response of any given person to an environmental factor
is conditioned both physiologically and psychologically by
his own past experiences; it is therefore highly personal.
The power of the personal past is so great that it can distort
the meaning of any event and magnify trivial happenings into
momentous experiences. Human reactions are so profoundly in-
fluenced by the individual past that they are usually unpre-
dictable and therefore appear completely irrational (p. 105).
The act of bringing memory traces to the surface is just
as important an activity as the storage of information. The
past affects the fate of the organism not because it has
been stored, but because many stimuli bring about its re-
trieval and thus condition all physiological and behavioral
responses. . . . The manner in which we experience the present
is still further complicated by our hopes and conscious antici-
pations of the future. In fact, conscious concern for the
future is one of the most important attributes distinguishing
man from animals . .
. (p. 105).
Immanence, then, may be conceived as the foundation from which
one's transcendence proceeds. It is rooted in man's ability to ab-
stract from concrete experience conceptions about reality and to store
those conceptions in memory. The advancement into the future adds
more to one's immanence, thereby strengthening the basis for further
advancement
.
Man's urge to transcendence is described in biological terms
by Dubos (1968): "One of the most distinctive aspects of human life
is the tendency to transcend simple biological urges; man is prone to
convert ordinary processes of existence into actions, representations,
and aspirations that have no biological necessity and may even be
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inimical to life" (pp. 104-05). In a psychological sense, man's urge
toward transcendence is expressed as a tendency to dwell in the future.
Cassirer- (1944) explains:
In our consciousness of time the future is an indispensable
element. Even in the earliest stages of life this element
begins to play a dominant role. 'It is characteristic of the
whole of early development of the life of ideas,' writes Wil-
liam Stern [1930], 'that they do not appear as much as memories
pointing to something in the past
,
but as expectations directed
to the future—even though only to a future immediately at
hand. We meet here for the first time a general law of
development. Reference to the future is grasped by the con-
sciousness sooner than that to the past.' In our later life
this tendency becomes even more pronounced. We live much
more in our doubts and fears, our anxieties and hopes about
the future, than in our recollections or in our present ex-
periences (p. 53).
The reason why man has the tendency to live more in the future
than in the past is because of the connection between ideas and the ac-
tualizations of potentiality. The consideration of ideas is an act
of abstraction which necessarily involves the consideration of
some ideal state. That state, in turn, presents a gap between itself
and the actual state of the present. Consciousness of that gap exerts
a pressure which actuates the inner yearning for growth. Whitehead
terms this urge "the principle of unrest;" it is the motivating im-
pulse responsible for pushing man to greater heights of achievement.
"Human nature," Whitehead (1964) wrote, "loses its most precious
quality when it is robbed of its sense of things beyond, unexplored,
and yet insistent?' (p. 227).
The future, with which man is faced from the moment he becomes
conscious of himself, is an unknown, and as such is part of the
unknown
environment. Man interacts with the unknown of his future,
which in-
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eludes the unknown of what lies beyond death, by formulating ideals and
beliefs. Ideals are conceptions of perfection; they serve as lures
that pull man forward in his creative advance into novelty. An indivi-
dual's commitment to striving to attain ideals depends on the strength
of his conviction chat they are vital to survival and on his confidence
that he can succeed in his striving. Beliefs are propositions about
unknowable questions of ultimate concern; they are lifted up from the
level of mere hypothesis to the level of certitude through an act
of faith. When an individual's life is dominated by the striving for
ideals and is grounded on beliefs about ultimate concerns, he is said
to be spiritual— spiritual not in a denominational or sectarian sense,
but in a psychological sense. Man's spirituality comes from devoting
himself, by an act of will, to the pursuit of non-material things, to
things which have no actuality apart from man's conception of their
existence and his faith in their ultimate actualization. "It is the
highest glory of man's humanity," Dobzhansky (1967) writes, "that he
is capable of searching for his own meaning and for the meaning of the
Cosmos" (p. 4).
The highest expression of man's transcendent, spiritual nature
is when his striving for ideals and his conviction in his beliefs
causes him to renounce the very things he needs for the maintenance
of life in this world. When this happens, the spiritual triumphs over
the material; by sacrificing mortal concerns man achieves immortal
glory. Dubos (1962) describes this aspect of man's nature in the fol-
lowing terms:
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But for mankind all over the world—including growing chil-dren and young adult males-food and sex and all instinctualhungers commonly take second place to emotions and adveneswhich are meaningless for animals. The universal appeal ofDon Quixote s adventures for young, adult, and old alike
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th±S ,unnatura1 ’ aspect of human nature.Quixote embodies the peculiarly human willingness to riskdanger and hardship for no better reason than achieving some
eat memorable or noble. He is one of the great symbols of
mankind because he stands for the desire to attempt the im-possible for the sake of greatness without any hope of material
reward (p. 135).
Dubos maintains that man's renunciation of material things for
the sake of higher purposes symbolizes his "faith in the transcendental
value of human effort:"
Despite the selfishness of each individual human being,
mankind at large has some deep belief in the symbolic signifi-
cance of sacrifice as shown by the fact that there exists a
sort of universal Golden Book of posterity on which are written
the names of martyrs to noble causes. Generation after genera-
tion, school—children learn the words that Leonidas carved on
the walls of the Termopyles: 'Passerby, go and tell Sparta
that here three hundred Greeks died to obey her laws.' Books
are still being written to memorialize the fact that Socrates
refused the chance to escape death, because he regarded his
ethical integrity and the respect of the laws of Athens as
more important than his very life. A short question that
Leonardo da Vinci scribbled in one of his notebooks has been
quoted time and time again. 'Leonardo, perche tanto peni ?
'
(Why do you take so much trouble for your work?) Leonardo
may not have been able to formulate the answer to his own ques-
tion, yet, to the end of his days, he strove not only for
esthetic perfection but also for scientific knowledge, even
though most of his efforts remained unnoticed during his
lifetime and acquired full significance only after his death.
Implicitly, Leonardo's question symbolizes faith in the
transcendent value of human effort (ibid., p. 135).
Symbolization
It is no coincidence that the highest expression of spirituality-
self-sacrifice for ideals and beliefs—is charged with universal sym-
bolic significance. The reason is that man's conception of the future
70
and of the ideas and beliefs that mediate his interaction with it is
itself a symbolic act: an instance of self-sacrifice reminds those who
share those ideals and beliefs of their own ability to attain that con-
summate level of achievement.
Cassirer (1944) explains how man's awareness of the future,
like his conception of the past, is symbolic:
. . . in human beings the awareness of the future under-
goes the same characteristic change of meaning which we have
noted with regard to the idea of the past. The future is not
only an image; it becomes an 'ideal.' The meaning of this
transformation manifests itself in all the phases of man's
cultural life. So long as he remains entirely absorbed in
his practical activities the difference is not clearly ob-
servable. . . . But the theoretical idea of the future
—
that idea which is a prerequisite of all man's higher cul-
tural activities— is of a quite different sort. It is more
than mere expectation; it becomes an imperative of human
life. And this imperative reaches far beyond the limits of
empirical life. This is man's symbolic future
,
which corre-
sponds to and is in strict analogy with his symbolic past
(ibid., pp. 54-55).
The future is symbolic because it must be represented in some
way for the mind to grasp it. The only way to represent such an in-
tangible thing as the future is for something else—a symbol— to stand
for one’s conception of it (Jordan 1975c). As a suspender of conscious-
ness, symbols enable the mind to live in the abstract realm beyond
the here and now.
Symbolic representations of the future always stand for some
ideal state. The reason why religious symbols are so powerful is be-
cause they represent beliefs about man's ultimate purpose and destiny.
The cross, for example, to a Christian represents more than Christ s
death: it represents the belief in eternal salvation offered to man
by an all-powerful and loving God, if man would, through an act of
will.
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turn his will over to God's will. Christ's sacrifice of His life and
His subsequent reward of eternal life are to the Christian a concrete
example of the salvation that awaits him if he, too, will turn his
life over to God.
Such symbols carry an emotional charge which binds the symbol
to the meaning one attaches to it. When the significance of the mean-
ing is aroused in the mind, the emotion tied to the symbol is released
and floods the individual with a desire to strive for the ideal. The
emotion also triggers a physiological response as well: adrenalin is
released and new energy is available to the body. If given an avenue
for immediate expression, the energy will be put into motion by the
desire to strive. This explains the behavior of the football team
charging out after a pep-talk at half-time determined to win a vic-
tory for their school, a patriot stirred by the passing of his nation's
flag, a mob worked into a frenzy over the violation of a deep-seeded
social code, a political convention roused into a fervor over the
platitudes spoken by their candidate who embodies everything good in
life and all the aspirations they hold for their country.
As these examples suggest, man's capacity to symbolize the
future and to sacrifice comfort and well-being to achieve ideals and
beliefs is not inherently good or bad. It is free of value. Man's
capacity for transcendence can be directed to the noblest or basest
of ends. Only when man's ideals and beliefs are compatible with the
broader purpose of improving the quality of life and creating ever-in-
creasing circles of unity will his capacity for transcendence .lead him
in the direction of the good.
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In summary, man's ability to abstract from concrete experience
conceptions about reality enables him to differentiate himself from
other things and to let something else-the symbol-represent an aspect
of experience. Symbols sustain his consciousness into the past and
future by representing conceptions or ideas he has about them so that
they may be thought about in the present. The relationship between
abstraction and symbolization may be best understood by regarding
symbolization as the tangible act of abstraction. It is a concrete
manifestation of the ability to differentiate the real from the idea,
the knower from the known, the subject from the object. This relation-
ship is one of mutual interdependence: we cannot abstract without
representing the abstraction in some way. Thus, to conceive of ab-
straction without symbolization is untenable. They both are funda-
mental elements of consciousness, without which human life as we know
it is not possible.
The intimate relationship between the symbolization and ab-
straction has caused many authors to eulogize symbolization as the chief
emblem of consciousness. The following are but two passages from a
large number of similar statements:
The principle of symbolism, with its universality,
validity, and general applicability, is the magic word, the
Open Sesame! giving access to the specifically human world,
to the world of human culture. Once man is in possession
of this magic key further progress is assured. Such progress
is evidently not obstructed or made irpossible by any lack
in the sense material. ... As the e of Helen Keller
proves, man can construct his symbol world out of the
poorest and scantiest materials (Cassirer 1944, p. 35).
All culture (civilization) depends upon the symbol.
It was the exercise of the symbolic faculty that brought
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lnt° existence and it is the use of symbols thatmakes the perpetuation of culture possible. Without thesymbol there would be no culture, and man would be merely
an animal, not a human being (White 1949
,
p. 33).
!
CHAPTER IV
A THEORY OF SYMBOLIZATION
The previous chapter discussed in broad outline the nature of
consciousness and the relation of symbolization to it. This chapter
sets forth the basis for a comprehensive theory of symbolization which
elaborates on the function of symbolization in constructing knowledge,
defines terms such as symbol, signal, signs, and symbol systems, dis-
cusses the properties and types of symbolization, and examines the
function of symbols as bearers of meaning. It distinguishes between
logical and aesthetic symbols, discusses the symbol systems of mathe-
matics, language, and the arts, and considers how they mediate man's
interaction with the world. For the sake of a comparative perspective,
the chapter concludes with a brief review of cognition in animals and
their use of signs.
The Functions of Symbolization
Symbolization has been presented as a power of consciousness
that makes it possible for man to represent abstracted conceptions in
concrete terms. As the tangible act of abstraction, symbolization
gives form and substance to consciousness by enabling man to hold in
his mind symbols that stand for crucial aspects of reality so that
those aspects may be manipulated, combined and recombined, compared
and contrasted, integrated into existing conceptions, stored in memory
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for future use, and shared with other people. Symbolization is the
practical act of consciousness, and its tangible manifestations. It
is, for all intents and purposes, synonymous with the power of abstrac-
tion; both symbolization and abstraction, for that matter, are
synonymous with consciousness itself.
Symbolization as presented here may be divided into four sub-
functions: an emancipative function, a binding function, an epis-
temological function, and a communicative function. Each of these
sub-functions contributes to the total act of symbolization and yet
is distinct enough to warrant separate attention.
The Emancipative Function
The emancipative function of symbolization liberates man's
behavior from the limitations of instincts and enables him to soar
in the limitless realm of imagination and thought. Freedom from
instincts and the limitless capacity to learn made possible by the
use of symbols have enabled each individual of the species to express
his unique constellation of characteristics and potentialities and
have enabled mankind to transcend the rigid rule of conformity so
characteristic of life on lower levels.
Whitehead (1927) refers to this function of emancipation as
"a revolt" from the causal obligations of society and states that
symbolization, by making connected thought possible, allows indi-
viduality to come to the fore:
There is a revolt from the mere causal obligations laid upon
individuals by the social character of the environment. The
revolt first takes the form of blind emotional impulse; and
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iZed socletle s. these Impulses are criticizeda d deflected by reason. In any case, there are Individual
springs of action which escape from the obligations of
social conformity. In order to replace this decay of secureinstinctive response, various intricate forms of symbolic
expression of the various purposes of social life have been
ntroduced.
. . . Such symbolism makes connected thought
possible by expressing it, while at the same time it auto-
matically directs action. In the place of the force of
instinct which suppressed individuality, society has gained
the efficacy of symbols, at once preservative of the common-
weal and of the individual standpoint (p. 65).
Hacker (1965) says that the emancipative function frees man
from concrete experience and lifts him into the conceptual realm.
"Economically and instrumentally ," he writes, "the most important
task of symbols is emancipation and liberation from the immediate
experience of the historical, given moment
. .
." (p. 80). "They
accomplish liberation from the slavery of the biologically imposed, and
largely substitute meaning and intentional action for the conditioned
or unconditioned response" (p. 82). The psychological basis of the
emancipative function, Hacker states, is "symbolic distance," termed
by Phenix (see pp. 48-49 and 58) "the dual quality of reflective aware-
ness" which enables one to differentiate knower from known:
Symbolic representations treat, by characteristic sym-
bolic distance, objects, things, issues, relationships, and
circumstances otherwise controlled by and tied to the con-
crete condition of their occurrence. Internal and external
reality can be symbolically reflected, mirrored, kept in
suspense or abeyance, thought over, manipulated by new
assemblage and reassemblage, temporarily disregarded, or
otherwise treated without any direct reference to reality
itself (pp. 80-81).
Referring to the ability to suspend internal or external reality
by adding hew elements to it, Rapoport (1965) explains that "what
makes abstracting via symbols so distinctive is the possibility of
building abstraction upon abstraction, seemingly without end and without
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the necessity of welding each link in the chain by an explicit experi-
ence (e.g., conditioning)" (p. 101). Rapoport refutes the Skinnerian
thesis that thought or ideas merely result from conditioning to con-
crete experience by citing Chomsky’s (1959) example of the man con-
fronted by a robber who demands "Your money or your life!" The man
chooses to give up his money, Chomsky argues, not because he has been
conditioned against the
_s_tate of being dead, but because he is condi-
tioned against the idea
,
thereby proving that man indeed can live in
a conceptual realm. *
S.I. Hayakawa (1965), the semanticist and linguist, asserts
that symbolization brings man the ability to build abstraction upon
abstraction:
Symbols can be about symbols. There are words about words,
and words about words about words. Human beings, in short,
can talk about talking, but dogs cannot bark about barking.
Human symbol systems have in common the characteristic of
operating on many levels of abstraction: just as words can
be about words, a picture can be about a picture, a dance
can be about a dance, and a play can be about a play (a play
within a play) (p. 91).
The consciousness suspending function of symbolization which
frees man from the limitation of the present moment and of concrete
reality gives man autonomy. However, this autonomy, Hacker points
out, is a double-edged sword: its positive side is emancipation, its
negative side is alienation. He maintains that both are consequences
of rising above "the harmless naturalness of ’just living’" to the
conceptual level where one grapples with higher meanings. The threat
of alienation and the reward of emancipation are implicit in the
human condition:
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. . . alienation ... is not a pathological phenomenon,
but simply denotes symbolic distance as the very basis of
autonomy which, in certain contexts, means estrangement
from the sources. Distance and removal from origins is a
necessary accompaniment
—in fact, a definitional description
—
of symbolic autonomy, which at the same time is a condition
of the independence, novelty, and free use of symbols. Psy-
chologically, alienation is experienced as confusing, un-
pleasant, and anxiety-producing. The human capability to
make oneself symbolically the object of inquiry coincides
inevitably with the disappearance of the harmless natural-
ness of 'just living.' Symbols make the confrontation
between the self and the world logically and psychologically
possible—hence, sooner or later, inevitable. Human indi-
viduation means not only the possibility of freedom, but also
separateness and its recognition in alienation. Autonomy is
liberation and alienation
,
implying psychologically anxiety
and such 'existential' manifestations as care, concern, Sorge .
Thus, alienation is neither the effect of a special economic
arrangement, as the Marxists (Mills, 1962) assume; nor neces-
sarily an individual symptom resulting from a disturbance of
the basic oral trust relationship, as Erikson (1950) and
some psychoanalysts would have it; nor even a metaphysical
crisis of confidence as a specifically modern phenomenon.
The paradise of certainty and naivete was lost when man became
man as a conscious and self-conscious symbolic creature (had
it not been lost, would it still be paradise?). That Adam
can be Prometheus is man's accomplishment and punishment for
his symbolic gifts (1965, pp. 83-84).
The Binding Function
The word, "symbol" comes from two Greek words, "sym" (together)
and "bollon" (to throw). Thus, it literally means "throwing together"
or "binding." A symbol, then, binds two things together: the symbol
and the symbolized. The anthropologist, Lloyd Warner (1959), review-
ing the thoughts of other theorists, explains that the binding func-
tion of symbols operates on two levels, emotional and conceptual.
"Evocative" symbols "reinstate" the emotions aroused when one was
first introduced to a symbol, while "referential" symbols call to mind
the characteristics of the situation:
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The semant leans such as Ogden and Richards and Korzybski,
an ogicians such as Frye and Levi, although with differentpurposes in mind, make a similar distinction, saying that
evocative symbols' are likely to 'reinstate* the emotions
envoived in the original situation when the symbols wereirst encountered and learned, rather than the situation it-
self, whereas referential symbols are more likely to bringback the characteristics of the original situation or
generalizations about it (p. 450).
0. Hobart Mowrer's "two-factor" learning theory is helpful in
understanding the binding function of symbols on the emotional level.
Mowrer s thesis (1960) is that emotion may be conceived as an axis with
two basic elements at the poles, hope and fear; between them are
varying gradations of each. When an organism undergoes an experience
that reduces drives and brings rewards and pleasure, hopeful emotions
are aroused. When an experience increases drives and brings punishment
and pain, fearful emotions are aroused. The emotions are associated
with the experience and the organism becomes conditioned to being
hopeful or fearful when the experience or a similar experience is
repeated. Thus hope and fear are the mediating factors between the
organism and experience.
Mowrer explains that emotions are able to serve as mediators
between the organism and experience because they have a rudimentary
representational property:
Perhaps the most salient feature of an emotion ... is its
representativeness: for example, the emotion of fear gains
in special biological value from the fact that it can be
experienced, not only in the absence of its adequate (uncon-
ditioned) stimulus, but also without the pain (and biological
danger) occasioned by the latter. In other words, the fear
is a sort of primitive, but very powerful, representation or
'image' of the pain; and hope, by the same token, is an image
of pleasure or gratification (ibid., pp. 258-59).
This representational property explains why certain symbols have
80
such a powerful effect on man: under certain circumstances, a voodoo
doll can terrorize a man to death; a pretty girl can lure people into
buying sun-tan lotion: a movement’s logo can stir its followers to
press on in their struggle to achieve ultimate victory.
Bertalanf fy (1965) elaborates on the way emotions are bound
to symbols in the mind of the subject:
Symbols . . . often enter into intimate connection with
higher emotions or even animal drives. This linkage may
lead to the highest elations of the human mind in artistic,
moral, religious, even in scientific experience. It may
also lead to coupling the symbol with the basest tendencies
of the human animal. The sublime symbols of religion may
be coupled with sexual frustration or aggressive drives,
leading to witch-hunting and liquidation of heretics. . . .
As a matter of fact, such emotional influences are primarily
responsible for making the 'spectacles' of symbolism into
distorting lenses which basically change and falsify man's
outlook on the world—which replace what psychoanalysts call
the reality principle by delusion and illusions that often
approach the schizophrenic level. The animal is safe because
it is living in the innate niche or shell of its instinctive
umwelt; the sage is safe within his universe of freely
created symbols. Between them is the battleground of biology
and psychology where man, owing to his specific endowment,
behaves more beastly than the beasts (pp. 33-34).
Whitehead (1927) explains how emotions associated with words
or music intensify our experience and make us concentrate more fully
on the meaning they represent. He refers to this emotive property of
symbols as an aesthetic feature:
In every effective symbolism there are certain aesthetic
features shared in common. The meaning acquires emotion
and feeling directly excited by the symbol. This is the
whole basis of the art of literature, namely that emotions
and feelings directly excited by the words should fitly inten-
sify our emotions and feelings arising from contemplation of
the meaning. Further in language there is a certain vague-
ness of symbolism. A word has a symbolic association with
its own history, its other meanings, and with its general
status in current literature. Thus a word gathers emotional
signification from its emotional history in the past; and
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h± * transferred symbolically to its meaning in present use.The same principle holds for all the more artificial sortsof human symbolism—for example, in religious art. Music isparticularly adapted for this symbolic transfer of emotions,by reason of the strong emotions which it generates on its own
account. These strong emotions at once overpower any sense
that its own local relations are of any importance. The onlyimportance of the local arrangement of an orchestra is to enable
us to hear the music. We do not listen to the music in order
to gain a just appreciation of how the orchestra is suited.
When we hear the hoot of a motor car, exactly the converse
situation arises. Our only interest in the hoot is to deter-
mine a definite locality as the seat of causal efficacy
determining the future (pp. 83-84).
Emotional responses to symbols are not in any way restricted
to a certain class of evocative" symbols. Symbols vary greatly in
their power to arouse emotions from the highly evocative swastika of
the Third Reich to the neutral figure pointing to a restroom in an
airport.
A fuller understanding of the role emotions play in binding
the symbol with the symbolized may be obtained by considering Carl
Jung’s (1964) concept of numinosity. Numinosity is the psychic energy
which archetypes arouse. Jung posits that the conscious mind makes
deliberations with reason and logic. Actions are prompted on the basis
of past knowledge, which is represented by cultural symbols. The un-
conscious mind makes decisions by instinct and acts on the basis of
emotion. The vehicle for instinctive, unconscious thought is the
archetype. Archetypes are symbols whose form and meaning are rooted
”in the primitive characteristics that formed part of the original mind"
which was dominant in the life of primitive man, whose conscious mind
had yet to evolve much beyond that of the animal. "In many cases they
[archetypes] can still be traced back to their archaic roots i.e.,
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to ideas and images that we meet in the most ancient records and in
primitive societies" (p. 93 ).
Jung maintains that the unconscious mind actively speaks to man
through dreams, the symbolism of which constantly draws upon the charac-
teristics of the original mind, "as if the unconscious sought to bring
back the old things from which the mind freed itself as it evolved
—
illusions, fantasies, archaic thought forms, fundamental instincts, and
so on" (ibid.
,
p. 98)
.
While all humans share in common an unconscious mind which
produces archetypal symbols, the significance of the symbols depends
entirely on the individual. When an archetypal symbol or image strikes
an unconscious cord of significance, emotions are aroused which in turn
unleash psychic energy. Unless the symbol is significant to the indi-
vidual's unconscious, they will be relatively meaningless and will
arouse little or no emotions. Jung explains that archetypes "are
pieces of life itself—images that are integrally connected to the
living individual by the bridge of emotions. That is why it is im-
possible to give an arbitrary (or universal) interpretation of any
archetype. It must be explained in the manner indicated by the whole
life-situation of the particular individual to whom it relates" (ibid.,
p. 96).
Because the power and significance of archetypes inheres in
the bond between the image and emotion, Jung asserts that both elements
must be present:
They [archetypes] are, at the same time, both images and
emotions. One can speak of an archetype only when these
two aspects are simultaneous. When there is merely the
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image, then there is simply a word-picture of little conse-
quence. But by being charged with emotion, the image gains
numinosity (or psychic energy); it becomes dynamic, and
consequences of some kind must flow from it (ibid., p. 96).
Jung states that the specific energy of archetypes is attested
by the peculiar fascination or spell that accompanies them. As an
example, Jung cites the symbolism of the* hero myth:
The universal hero myth, for example, always refers to a
powerful man or god-man who vanquishes evil in the form of
dragons, serpents, monsters, demons, and so on, and who
liberates his people from destruction and death. The nar-
ration of ritual repetition of sacred texts and ceremonies,
and the worship of such a figure with dances, music, hymns,
prayers, and sacrifices, grip and audience with numinous
emotions (as if with magic spells) and exalt the individual
to an identification with the hero (ibid., p. 79).
Archetypes are not the only type of symbols that are ladened
with emotion and psychic energy. Jung also speaks of "cultural symbols"
that express "eternal truths" and that are still used in many religions.
They have gone through many transformations and even a long process of
more or less conscious development, and thus become collective images
accepted by civilized societies. "Such cultural symbols," he reports,
"nevertheless retain much of their original numinosity or 'spell.'
One is aware that they can evoke a deep emotional response in some
individuals, and this psychic charge makes them function in much the
same way as prejudices" (ibid., p. 93). Cultural symbols may function
as prejudices because their heavy emotional base makes them independent
of reason and logic. Thus, one's behavior may be prompted by the
energy released by emotions which are tied to cultural symbols that
may be based on error rather than truth. An example of this phenomenon
is racism: the symbolism of white supremacy is the virgin purity of the
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white woman. If a black man violates that purity by as much as
looking at a white woman, he may pay dearly. So it is, that those
wishing to protest or subvert the social order attack the order’s
symbols: they burn flags, desecrate graves, destroy statues and monu-
ments, and adopt a style of dress and habits of living which are in
opposition to those of society.
Jung s view of the intimate relation between symbols and
emotion can be of great use to educators. It suggests that helping
children have positive ("hopeful," in Mowrer's terms) experiences in
their first encounters with things necessary to the release of their
potentialities, like reading, math, the arts, and formal learning in
general, is of crucial importance. If children have negative (fearful)
experiences with these things, their emotions will be organized in ways
that cause them to react with fear and resentment when they come in
contact with things associated with them, like school and learning.
Negative attitudes and values are formed about school and learning
which are cemented in the child’s character by the bond formed between
the child’s emotions and the experiences that aroused them. The
emotions then become bound to the things which symbolize those experi-
ences and a block to learning is formed which is extremely difficult
to remove. It is because parents and teachers must help children feel
positive and hopeful when they come in contact with school-related
things that Whitehead wrote: "The first thing a teacher has to do when
he enters the classroom is to make his class glad to be there" (1948,
pp. 179-80) and "The process of self-creation is the transformation
of the potential into the actual, and the fact of such transformation
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includes the immediacy of self-enjoyment" (1938, p. 151 ).
Not all symbols, however, are as charged with emotion and
energy as archetypes and cultural symbols. As Warner (1959) states,
referential" symbols are those that primarily call to mind "the
characteristics of the original situation or generalizations about
it (p. 450) . Referential symbols are thus conceptual in nature.
Their bond is not as emotional as it is logical. Examples might be
the logo of a corporation, a symbol in the biological sciences like
2H
2
0 or 2x = y(5-x ), traffic signs, or the words of everyday speech.
While for some individuals symbols such as these may have an emotional
charge, for most their significance stems from the connection between
concept and symbol. The connection is essentially cognitive and
imports little or no emotion.
The Epistemological Function
The function of symbolization as a vehicle through which
experience is transformed into knowledge has already been mentioned
(see pp. 59 to 65). Symbolic representation, Kaplan (1961) explains,
is intimately bound up with conceptions; symbolization cannot be
divorced from the construction of knowledge because without it there
is no way of expressing knowledge. Indeed, there is no way of having
it. Symbols enable the mind to identify and classify aspects of
reality so that they may be subjected to cognitive operations (analysis,
inference, extrapolation, etc.) by which facts are transformed into
knowledge. The psychological basis for symbolization's contribution
to the construction of knowledge stems from the emancipation function
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of suspending consciousness by enabling man to represent a future pos-
sibility in the present through the agency of a symbol.
Foss (1949) writes that "all symbolic thinking has as its
goal the ordering of the world into clear and convenient patterns.
Moreover, he explains that "symbols are tools which make it
possible to organize the machinery of social life and to master the
complexity of our civilization" and that symbolic construction "lifts
men into the cooler sphere of a clear-patterned schematism" (p. 10).
Pattern is the basic unit of identity and thus is part of the sub-
stratum that underlies meaning. Where one finds pattern, one finds
energy and/or matter structured in a particular way. The pattern of
that structure makes up its identity. Once identified, its relation-
ship to other things may be determined. Learning the relationships
among things in turn gives rise to meaning. Thus, the function of
bringing order to the world through the construction of pattern is an
act of extreme importance to the development of knowledge. "The vital
tieup of symbolism with meaning and the intimate relationship of
meaning to motivation and action," Hacker (1965) comments, ". . . is
the important lesson of modern social psychology. . . . the most
important function of the symbol is the creation of meaning and moti-
vation to action" (p. 75).
Symbolization, then, transforms the raw data of concrete
experience into "clear and convenient patterns" on which the cognitive
operations of the mind may operate. It thus contributes directly to
the construction of knowledge. Whitehead (1927), describing this pro
cess, states that "the result of symbolic reference is chat the
actual
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world is for us, as that datum in our experience productive of feelings
,
emotions, satisfactions, and finally as the topics for conscious
recognition when our mentality intervenes with its conceptual analy-
sis" (pp. 18-19).
Langer (1942) describes the way in which symbolization trans-
forms experience into topics for conceptual analysis:
It [symbolization] is the starting point of all intellec-
tion in the human sense, and is more general than thinking,
fancying, or taking action. For the brain is not merely a
giant transmitter, a super—switch—board
; it is better
likened to a great transformer. The current of experience
that passes through it undergoes a change of character,
not through the agency of the sense by which the perception
is entered, but by virtue of a primary use which is made of
it immediately: it is sucked into the stream of symbols
which constitutes a human mind (p. 46).
Langer explains in the following passage how ideas, or concep-
tions, are formed:
Ideas are undoubtedly made out of impressions—out of
sense messages from the special organs of perception, and
the vague visceral reports of feeling. The law by which they
are made, however, is not a law of direct combination. Any
attempt to use such principles as association by contiguity
or similarity soon runs into sheer unintelligible complica-
tion and artifice. Ideation proceeds by a more potent princi-
ple, which seems to be best described as the principle of
symbolization. The material furnished by the senses is
constantly wrought into symbols
,
which are our elementary
ideas. Some of these ideas can be combined and manipulated in
the manner we call 'reasoning.* Others do not lend themselves
to this use, but are naturally telescoped into dreams, or
vapor off in conscious fantasy; and a vast number of them
build the most typical and fundamental edifice of the
human mind—religion (ibid., p. 46).
Langer then makes the connection between the construction of
ideas and action, the connection Hacker called "the intimate relation-
ship of meaning to motivation and action."
The fact that the human brain is constantly carrying on
a process of symbolic transformation of the experiential data
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that comes to It causes it to be a veritable fountain of more
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tralts ln man "hich he does not hold in common
with the other animals—ritual, art, laughter, weeping,
speech, superstition, and scientific genius (ibid., p. 47).
The Communicative Function
The last function to be treated here is by no means the least
important. The communicative function of symbolization is imperative
to the formation of culture and the advancement of civilization.
Through the symbol systems of mathematics, language, and the arts,
knowledge about the world accumulates and passes on from generation
to generation, each generation acquiring more than the one preceeding
it, thereby attaining a greater degree of mastery over the environ-
ment and becoming capable of broadening the circles of unity within
the social structure.
Phenix (1964) speaks of the communicative function as the very
purpose of symbolization: language, mathematics, gestures, and rituals
are "created as instruments for the expression and communication of
any meaning whatsoever. These symbolic systems in one respect con-
stitute the most fundamental of all the realms of meaning in that
they must be employed to express the meanings in each of the other
realms" (such realms include the sciences, aesthetics, history, reli-
gion, and philosophy) (p. 6). He also justly acknowledges the central
role of language in communication. Referring to language as the
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instrument for establishing human relationships, he states that the
urge to learn language is primordial and bound up with the social
nature of man’s reality.
The objective of using language is communication
.
Language is a binding force in society. It is a means
of establishing human relationships. Through language,
communities are created and sustained. The strongest
motive for learning language is the primordial urge to
belong to a community. Perhaps the deepest of all human
needs is to be understood and accepted by others. Such
relationships are also the very ground of a person’s
own selfhood. A language is best learned through partici-
pation in a community whose basis of association is that
of language (ibid., p. 62).
An important aspect of communication germane to our theory of
symbolization is that communication arouses meaning within the mind
rather than transferring it from person to person. Mowrer (1960)
explains
:
... in order for us to communicate effectively with another
person, he must already have the meanings with which we shall
be dealing and that in the communicative act we are, for the
most part, merely changing the signs to which particular
meanings are attached, merely shifting or transferring mean-
ing from one sign to another. One person, by the use of
appropriate words or other signs, can arouse, or ’call up,'
particular meanings in the mind of another person; but he
does not ’transfer’ or implant them there. The communicative
act, in its most salient aspect, lies rather in the combina-
tion, juxtaposition, or association of the meanings thus
aroused in novel, 'informative' ways (p. 139).
The view of symbols as arousers and not transformers of meaning under-
lies the notion that they are neutral entities without intrinsic value
of their own.
The communicative function goes hand in hand with the epis-
temological function. It is the overt manifestation of the process of
ideation and the power which endows it with usefulness. Termed by
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Langer "the sheer expression of ideas," it unites all mankind in a
single web of meaning. It enables one to share with others the wonder
of his own concresence and helps him forge new pathways to human
corporate action.
The four functions of symbolization
—emancipative, binding,
epistemological, and communicative
—combine to make symbolization of
crucial survival value to man. "Symbols can and do serve a survival
function, Hacker (1965) writes. "They may in fact, constitute the
essence of man’s survival techniques" (p. 78). Man's great challenge
is to put symbolization to use in ways that lead to extending unity
throughout the world and improving the quality of life.
Definitions
Definitions are essential to any theory. If a theory is to
fulfill its purpose of enabling people to predict what will happen
when certain phenomena operate in particular ways, the theory must
contain clear-cut definitions which specify what the basic phenomena
under consideration are. If definitions are inadequate, thought will
be vague and conceptual incoherence is inevitable.
In constructing a theory of symbolization, I wish to attempt
to define as precisely as possible the key terms required to explain
the phenomena of symbolization. Such terms are symbolization, signs,
symbols, signals, and symbol systems. While precise definitions are
essential to sound theory, it should be remembered that definitions
are made for the sake of theory; thus "None of the sharp divisions
between sign, signal, and symbol, and between discursive and nondis-
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cursive
.
.
, conscious and unconscious, and so on, symbols is con-
vincing unless these terms are understood as ideal limits rather than
as strict dichotomies" (Bertalanffy 1965, p. 74).
Each definition is followed by an elaboration of the meaning
of the term. Fuller discussion of certain issues is undertaken in
subsequent sections of the chapter.
Symbolization
Symbolization U> the capacity to oie ewUttu (symbol6) to
h.epn.2Aent abAtAaCstconA [concepttonA on. meantng^j. These entities are
usually perceived by sight, hearing or touch and are used to communi-
cate those conceptions to others. Symbolization always involves an
act of abstraction: the symbol (a word, number, painting, or flag, for
example) is used to represent an idea or conception. The conception may
be of a tangible thing, like a tree or a person, or it may be of some-
thing intangible, such as beauty. Symbolization is the concrete mani-
festation of the power of abstraction in that it gives thought—an
intangible process—a definite form, a symbolic representation in the
form of words, numbers, music, paintings, and so on. Symbolization
comprises the emancipative, binding, epistemological, and communicative
functions which, together with the underlying power of abstraction,
endow man with consciousness.
Symbolization has two basic modes, logical and aesthetic,
through which experience is represented. Logical symbolization com-
prises the basic symbol systems of mathematics and language. Mathe-
matics is primarily used by man to mediate his interaction with the
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physical environment. Language is primarily used to mediate interac-
tion with the human environment. Aesthetic symbolization comprises
music, dance, drama, architecture, and the visual arts (painting,
sculpture, the plastic arts, and design)~art forms used to mediate
man's interaction with the unknown environment. (The term symbol
-
-^
stem is defined below in this section; a fuller discussion of the
aesthetic and logical modes of symbolization appears in a subsequent
section of this chapter.)
Signs
A AXgn U> any vc.hXcle. o & meaning, wheXhcn signal on symbol.
A* a gencAtc tcnm, the mnd sign denotes AomcXhXng that a AXgnal,
symptom, on ab-iXnacX nQ.pnuc.nXaXA.on ofa 6omcXhXng cXac.. a sign may or
may not be intrinsically connected to its referent (e.g., red spots
are symptoms of measels and are part of the disease; a ring around
the moon signalizes rain and is one of a number of natural signals
foreshadowing a general weather condition; and word "elephant" has no
intrinsic connection to elephants and thus is a symbol) (Langer 1942,
pp. v-vi; Bertalanffy 1965, p. 35).
In the preface to the 1951 edition of Philosophy in a New
Key
,
Langer (1942) institutes a change of terminology. She tells her
readers that she finds Charles Morris's (1946) use of the term signal
in his book Signs, Language, and Behavior preferable to the term
sign, which she uses throughout Philosophy in a New Key . Morris uses
the word signal to refer to those connections between two related
events that are intrinsically related and sign to refer to both signals
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and symbols. "The great advantage of Morris’s usage," Langer writes,
"is that ±t: leaves us the ™rd ’sign’ to denote any vehicle of meaning,
signal or symbol, whereas in my own vocabulary there was no generic
term, and the need for it was sometimes obvious" (p. vi) . The dis-
tinction between signs, signals, and symbols is also made by Berta-
lanffy (1965) and has been adopted here because of its clarity and
precision.
Signals
A signal aj> an object on. event that indicates the exintence--
pa6t, pn.etent, on. fiutuAe o{> a thing, event, on. condition thn.ou.gh an
intntnnic connection between itself and that which it ^igni^iu
(Langer 1942, p. 58)
.
The important factor in the definition of a signal is the
intrinsic connection between the signal and its referent: "they are
associated, somehow, to form a pair. To each sign[al] there corres-
ponds one definite item which is its object, the thing (or condition
or event) signified" (ibid., p. 58). Examples of natural signals are:
1. Wet streets signalize that it has rained.
2. A patter on the roof is a signal that it is raining.
3. A drop in the barometer indicates it will rain.
4. Smoke signifies the presence of fire.
5. The dawn heralds the sunrise.
Langer points out that the difference between the signal and
the signalized lies in the mind of the subject, who "must find one more
interesting than the other, and the latter more easily available than
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the former. ... A ring around the moon, or 'mares' tails' in the sky,
are not important in themselves; but as visible, present items coupled
with something important but not yet present, they have 'meaning.'"
(1942, p. 59).
Just as there are natural signals, so there are signals
allied with their meaning through social convention. Thus a whistle
means a train is about to start, a gun begins a race, the raised arm
of the mailbox tells the postman mail needs to be picked up.
Symbol
A symbol aj> an objuct on dwtuty that nzpnuintA an td&a, condt-
tton, qualtty, on tho, ab&tnactzd naaJLcty oft a pennon on object, it is
usually a concrete entity that is insignificant in itself, like a
spoken or written word or number, a flag, or a painting. The images
of dreams and thought have no physical substance but are still con-
sidered symbols. The referent of the symbol is a concept—an abstrac-
tion. The concept can be of something tangible, like a tree, or of
something intangible, like the ideal of justice. Symbols are used in
two basic ways, denotatively and connotatively . Denotation occurs
when a symbol is used to name something. Thus the word tree is used
to represent a particular tree that stands outside the window. The
word actually stands for the concept of treeness but is used as a
short cut to stand for the particular tree itself. In denotative mean-
ing, symbols come to embody the meaning of the concept for which they
stand. Connotation is the abstracted conception that the symbol repre-
sents and is considered in the absence of the object of its denotation.
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(Denotation and connotation are discussed later in the chapter.)
Logical symbols, like words and numbers, have explicit meanings
and are arranged systematically to yield an explicit and logical body
of meaning.
Aesthetic symbols depict insights into subjective, ineffable
experience. A painting, a symphony, or a sculpture are symbolic forms
best characterized as particular sensory objectifications of subjective
states; " the meaning they represent is implicit, as opposed to the
explicit meaning of mathematical or linguistic symbols, and is expressed
"in unified patterns of sense perception" (Phenix 1964, pp. 82-83).
Symbols have a number of properties which will be discussed later in
the chapter.
The Difference Between Signals and Symbols
Bertalanf fy (1965) points out that unlike symbols, which are
learned conceptually, signals are learned through conditioning: after
repeated trials the subject learns that the signal (a bell, for exam-
ple) is paired with an event (the presentation of food) . Thus the
signal takes on the meaning of its referent (p. 35).
Because signals operate on the level of conditioning, they may
be easily learned by animals. As Langer (1942) suggests, learning
them is the chief task of an animal’s intellect:
The interpretation of sign[al]s is the basis of animal
intelligence. Animals presumably do not distinguish between
natural signs and artificial or fortuitous signs; but they
use both kinds to guide their practical activities (p. 59).
For animals, then, signals are always context-bound. They must be
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closely associated with their referent in time and space. Thus, if we
punish a dog for barking half an hour after he barked, he will never
cease to- bark because he cannot know why he was punished. Man, how-
ever, is able to represent past actions through symbols and therefore
is not context-bound. A man may be punished for something he did hours,
days, or even years earlier, and he can still associate the punishment
with the crime.
Mowrer explains the difference between signals and symbols by
referring to the symbol as 'an abstracted sign." This view is in exact
agreement with the view of symbolization presented earlier. Mowrer
(1960), however, maintains that the abstraction is due to a separation
or abstraction of motives from the referent, rather than being due to
a conceptual act based on the ability to distinguish the actual from
the ideal:
. . . it is suggested that animals cannot 'abstract' in the
sense of making or reacting to a sign when they have no
interest in the significate. In other words, they cannot
separate or detach the sign and employ it for reasons which
are motivationally unrelated to the object or event which the
sign represents. Thus, we may say, a symbol is an abstracted
sign. And here, perhaps, lies one of the reasons why its
precise identification and definition has been so difficult:
a symbol is not distinguishable from an ordinary sign in
terms of its form
;
it is only when the motivation behind its
usage is taken into account that the difference clearly
emerges. When a thirsty child cries, 'Water, water!' he is
using a sign, in much the same way that lower animals do; but,
when not thirsty himself but instead questioned by a playmate,
he says, 'Water is in the pitcher,' he is using a symbol. Here
the child's motivation is quite unrelated to personal thirst.
This is not to say that in using words symbolically human
beings are un-motivated ; they are rather behaving in response
to motives which are separated, abstracted from the referents
themselves (p. 161).
Langer (1942) also addresses the distinction between abstracted
signs and signals:
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lke &
}X °ther animals ’ uses ’signs’ not only to indi-cate things, but to represent them. To a clever dog the
name of a person is a signal that the person is present; yousay the name, he pricks up his ears and looks for its object.If you say dinner, he becomes restive, expecting food. Youcannot make any communication to him that is not taken as a
signal of something forthcoming. His mind is a simple anddirect transmitter of messages from the world to his motor
centers. With man it is different. We use certain 'signs’
among ourselves that do not point to anything in our actual
surroundings. Most of our words are not signs in the sense of
signals. They are used to talk about things, not to direct our
eyes and ears and noses toward them. Instead of announcers of
things, they are reminders. They have been called 'substitute
signs,' for in our present experience they take the place of
things we have perceived in the past, or even things that we
can merely imagine by combining memories, things that might be
in past or future experience. Of course such 'signs' do not
usually serve as vicarious stimuli to actions that would be
appropriate to their meanings; where the objects are quite
normally not present, that would result in a complete chaos of
behavior. They serve, rather, to let us develop a character-
istic attitude towards objects in absentia
,
which is called
'thinking of' or 'referring to' what is not here. 'Signs'
used in this capacity are not symptoms of things, but symbols
(p. 37).
Symbol Systems
A Aymbol AyAtm Ia a Aet ofa AlgnA with conceptual Ae^eaentA;
the AlgnA aAe a/on.anged In patteAnA accoAdlng to commonly undeAAtood AuleA
oa methodA. The patteAn that emeAgcA fiAom the aAAangement o & the AlgnA
conveyA a meaning that Ia dlfifieAent {,Aom and taanAcendA the ImpoAt o{,
ItA Individual unllA. Symbol AyAtemA aAe uAed to mediate man' A InteA-
actlon ivllh the envlAonment and expAeAA the meaning that aruAeA fiAom
that InteAactlon.
The Anisa Model identifies three basic symbol systems, each of
which is the primary mediator of man's interaction with one of the
three environments. Mathematics is the symbol system that is used
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primarily to mediate interaction with the physical environment, language
with the human environment, and the arts with the unknown environment.
Math and. language are part of the logical mode of symbolization and
stand in contrast with the artistic systems of the aesthetic mode
(music, dance, drama, architecture, and the visual arts which comprise
painting, sculpture, design, and the plastic arts). Literature, par-
ticularly poetry, is an art form whose symbol system is language but
whose mode of expression is aesthetic. Thus language reaches into both
the logical and aesthetic modes. As the most versatile of the symbol
systems, language can be used to formulate precise scientific defini-
tions about physical and human phenomena and to express subjective
feelings about life’s ineffable experiences.
The basic unit of the systems of the logical mode is the symbol;
each symbol represents a meaning the definition of which is recognized
by convention. The symbols are ordered to create meaning (semantic)
according to universally recognized rules (syntax). The method of
presentation of the logical symbol systems is discursive, the symbols
being strung together in series. Their semantic is objective,
explicit, and logical.
The aesthetic mode of symbolization, unlike the logical mode,
has no basic unit other than the work itself. (Music is an exception;
its basic unit is pitch, but even pitch is variable.) The aesthetic
mode backs a well-defined set of symbols with universally recognized
meaning and a syntax that governs how the material with which one works
is uniformally transformed into meaning. The aesthetic mode, however,
does have a definite semantic, which is subjective, implicit, and,
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while not logical, is not necessarily irrational and therefore can
also be conceptual. The subject matter of the aesthetic mode's
semantic, are the artist's insights into ineffable realities. They are
conveyed through the creation of forms presented holistically rather
than discursively, with the exception of poetry. The symbol of the
aesthetic mode is the overall presentation created by the harmonious
combining and contrasting of the elements of the medium (i.e., harmony,
rhythm, and meter in music; line and shape in sculpture; line, color,
and shadow in the visual arts)
.
!
Since the symbol is an object through which meaning is expressed,
a fuller discussion of the nature of the symbol is necessary. Properties
and types of symbols are two broad aspects the elaboration of which can
illumine our understanding of symbols and their function. The next two
sections are devoted to a discussion of these topics.
Properties of Symbols
Symbols are freely created, representative, transmitted by
learning, autonomous, and insignificant in themselves. Two general
trends in the evolution of the use of symbols that merit mention are
the shift from uniformity to versatility of usage and the move from
culture-boundedness to universality of application. The first three
of these properties (freely-created, representative, and transmitted
by learning) are discussed by Bertalanffy (1965) , who sees them as
the criteria which, when combined, differentiate the symbols used by
humans from the signals used by animals.
1. Symbols are freely created . By "freely created," Berta-
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lanffy means that "there are no biologically enforced connections be-
tween the sign and the thing connoted" (p. 30). This property is
perhaps the most difficult and complex aspect of symbols. The dif-
ficulty lies in the meaning of "biologically enforced connections."
Bertalanf fy states this condition as a means of distinguishing symbols
that are learned conceptually from signals that are conditioned reac-
tions in which "the connection between the signal and thing signaled
is imposed from outside" (p. 30). A biologically enforced connection
may be either natural or imposed from without. For example, a natural
signal is the sight of a flame which motivates a child to back away
because he was burned by one earlier; a signal imposed from without is
the bell to which the dog salivates in the classical conditioning
paradigm, the dog, who is biologically programmed to salivate in response
to the smell of food, salivates to the ringing of the bell after
repeatedly hearing the bell ring before he smells food.
The distinction holds up well when most words, mathematical
and scientific symbols are considered. Symbols like the word box,
the number
_5, and the formula C + 0^ —> CO^ clearly have no intrinsic
relation between themselves and their meaning. In such cases the con-
nection between symbol and referent is entirely arbitrary.
The distinction becomes less clear with aesthetic symbols
and archetypes. There are definite features of music that make it
suitable for putting babies to sleep and other features that make it
suitable for arousing a crowd, or accompanying a suspenseful movie.
According to Jung, archetypes spring from the ancient wells of man's
collective unconscious. Some words ( crinkle , boom , and whisper ) are
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onomatopoetic, and some (mama and papa ) seem to emerge out of the
baby's babbling. Are the meanings of such symbols biologically imposed?
Bertalanffy does not deny that "there are connections between
the biological and symbolic, sub-human and human levels" (ibid., p. 32).
Indeed, such connections, in view of the evolution of man's intellect
from its primitive state where signals were dominant over symbols, are
to be expected. He also states that "freely created does not imply
'voluntary, arbitrary, consciously, or rationally produced,' although
some of these characteristics do apply to some symbolic activities"
(ibid.). The point is that there is no biological force that binds a
symbol to its referent. The meaning of the symbol is bestowed upon it
through an act of abstraction and in this sense is "freely created."
2. Symools are representative
. The representative property
refers to the function of symbols to stand for a certain meaning. This
property is true of language, for example, but also of a stone repre-
senting a god in primitive religion, of a small plastic card represent-
ing credit, or of a flag representing a country (Bertalanf fy 1965, p. 30).
The significance of the representational property is that it
distinguishes human symbolization from the expressiveness of animal
communicat ion
:
'Language of expression' is not a specifically human
phenomenon. For example, a bird's song certainly ex-
presses and communicates to his mate a certainly logical
and, we may be sure, psychological state; but it does not
connote a thing. Language as 'appeal' or command is
also not specifically human. Certain gregarious animals
by acoustic utterances warn the herd of an impending dan-
ger; this is of the same nature as the officer's command,
'Attention, ' which does not communicate a content but asks
for a certain action. Again, the representative aspect is
lacking. The barking of a dog warns of some danger, but it
102
does not communicate what the danger is, whether an intrudingburgiar or just the neighbor's cat. In contrast, human
?
guage and symbolism in general— is 'representative.'This (neglecting for the present certain precursors andtransitions! makes for the hiatus between man’s symbolic
activities and activities found at the subhuman level (and,
o course, persistently in man) such as expression, appeal,
memesis
,
point at (sign language), etc. (ibid., pp. 30-31).
3 * Symb °:Ls are transmitted by learning
. This property also
distinguishes human language from the "language" of animals. "For
example," Bertalanffy (1965) explains, "the language of the bees
studied by von Frisch certainly is 'representative;' by means of
intricate dances, bees do communicate to their colleagues where and
what food can be found. However, this language, innate and instinctive,
does not fulfill the criterion of transmission by learning. We can
teach a dog all sorts of tricks but we have never heard that a par-
ticularly clever dog has taught her puppies to do them" (p. 31).
The important point here is that truly representative symbols
that are freely created have to be transmitted by learning. There is
no biological means by which the acquisition of particular symbolic
representations are guaranteed. While symbolization of course has a
biological basis, unless the potential for acquiring and using symbols
is actualized with the assistance of a teacher, whether a model or
instructor, the symbol systems will not be acquired. A child who
grows up in isolation will not learn language; one not taught mathe-
matics will never discover it; one not given the opportunity to draw
will never become a painter. Put differently, the accumulated knowl-
edge of the symbol system, acquired throughout history, cannot be
transmitted to the individual biologically but instead must be trans-
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mitted by a teacher; such knowledge can only be acquired by learning
and is not part of the child’s innate endowment.
S^ols are autojiomous
. Symbols are autonomous in that
they have a life of their own which evolves and functions according to
their own laws and not those of other classes of phenomena. Berta-
lanffy (1965) explains:
. . . symbolic universes follow autonomous laws, i.e., laws
of their own which are not identical with or reducible to
the laws of biology, psychology, sociology, and so on. The
evolution of Renaissance painting from Giotto to Tintoretto,
or music from Gluck to Wagner, or the Roman law have, as it
were, a logic or life of their own, transcending the psychology
of the human individuals who created them. This is what Hegel
meant by 'objective spirit' and its evolution. Sometimes it
is possible to formulate definite laws of the evolution of
symbolic systems, for example, Grimm's law of the successive
changes of consonants in linguistic development (p. 33).
Complementing Bertalanf fy
' s description of the autonomy of
symbolization is Hacker's (1965) statement about "symbolic lawfulness."
Although they are no longer bound by narrow instinctual gratification
routes or by the structural limitation of reflex arcs,". . . Hacker
comments, "symbols do not behave in a random, idiosyncratic, or arbi-
trary fashion" (p. 82). Hacker asserts that the laws by which symbols
operate "are imposed by the symbolic universe itself." The laws
derive from a "love of perfection" and are "objective requirements of
culture or art, and so on" (ibid.). While Hacker does not elaborate
on what he means by "love of perfection" and "the objective requirements
of culture," we may infer he means that the use of symbols is deter-
mined by rules which are an inherent part of the symbol system. The
rules of mathematics, language, and, to a lesser degree, the arts,
determine how the symbols will be arranged to convey meaning. Since
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rules are determiners of pattern and order. It stands to reason that
they would create the type of order most conducive to the expression
of meaning according to the purposes of the symbol system. Thus
mathematics, language, and the arts are each governed by rules which
facilitate the achievement of their respective purposes.
5. Symbols are insignificant in themselves
. Langer (1942)
asserts that "the more barren and indifferent the symbol, the greater
its semantic power" (p. 73). This maxim derives from a symbol’s pur-
pose as a conveyer of meaning. The symbol is a more proficient conveyer
of meaning if one is not distracted by the conveyer itself. The most
effective symbols, Langer explains, are those which are in themselves
the most insignificant. "A symbol which interests us also as an object
is distracting. It does not convey its meaning without obstruction"
(ibid.).
The property of insignificance is most characteristic of
language
:
Vocables in themselves are so worthless that we cease to
be aware of their physical presence at all, and become
conscious only of their connotations, denotations, or other
meanings. Our conceptual activity seems to glow through
them, rather than merely to accompany them, as it accompanies
other experiences that we endow with significance. They
fail to impress us as 'experiences' in their own right,
unless we have difficulty in using them as words, as we do
with a foreign language or a technical jargon until we have
mastered it (ibid.).
The property of insignificance has recently been consciously
applied in the field of advertising, most notably in the creation of
the logos of corporations. A number of firms have simplified their
symbols. Two examples are the change from the sweeping script in
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which Coca-Cola was written to the simple bold-faced type of COKE
.
Likewise, the American Express Company has terminated its use of a
rather intricate symbol that featured the profile of a Roman soldier
inset against a black and yellow shield with the Company’s name written
in black across the top of the yellow portion of the shield above the
head of the soldier, and has replaced it with the very abstract and
simplified three diagonal lines in seriated shades of blue which
appear in the upperleft hand corner of the document on which it appears
6 * Symbols evolve from uniformity to versatility
. Cassirer
(1944) states that man's use of symbols has evolved from the uniformity
of one-to-one correspondence characteristic of primitive man's mythical
and magical symbolism toward versatility of reference.
Versatility is typified by the existence of homonyms and
synonyms in language. A homonym is a word that sounds and perhaps is
spelled the same way, but which has a different meaning (e.g., read
and reed
,
meat and meet
,
bear and bare ) . A synonym is a word that
has the same meaning as another (e.g., j oyf
u
l and elated, cry and weep,
stny and remain ) . A homonym is a symbol whose relationship to its
referent is one-to-many, whereas the relation of a synonym to its
referent is many-to-one.
Cassirer explains the significance of the trend towards versa-
tility of symbolization to the development of culture:
A genuine human symbol is characterized not by its uniformity
but by its versatility. It is not rigid or inflexible but
mobile. It is true that the full awareness of this mobility
seems to be a rather late development. In primitive mentality
this awareness is very seldom attained. Here the symbol is
still regarded as a property of the thing like other physical
properties. In mythical thought the name of a god is an
106
integral part of the nature of the pnH Tf t i
n
T;,
then the spefl «
”
rite »'=
The same holds good for symbolizations. A religious
v«iaM. a®: mUSt alWayS be Perf°rmed in the same to-
(ibid.!pp?
y
36-37)!
6 Sa,"e °rder i£ U 1S t0 ha™ affect
Just as the development of versatility has characterized the
development of culture, so it characterizes the development of the
individual. Cassirer comments that children are often confused when
they learn that not every name of an object is a "proper name," and
that the same thing may have different names or the same word may have
different meanings. "They tend to think that a thing 'is' what it is
called," he remarks. "But this is only a first step. Every normal
child will learn very soon that it can use various symbols to express
the same wish or thought" (ibid., p. 37).
Both Cassirer and Bertalanffy conclude that the versatility
of symbols is a property unique to man. "For this variability and
mobility there is apparently no parallel in the animal world" (ibid.).
Likewise, Bertalanffy (1965) states that versatility "appears to be an
important characteristic of symbolism, a development which (considering
the fixity of ’schemata* in animal behavior) has hardly a parallel or
precursor in the subhuman world" (p. 47).
7 . Symbols evolve from culture-boundedness to universality .
Since knowing a symbol depends on having been taught it, the symbols
used by one's culture would be the ones most likely to be transmitted.
Until the beginning of the Twentieth Century, rare indeed was the man
who learned the symbols of a culture other than his own. And when
they were learned, they were regarded as objects of study and not as
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instruments necessary for survival within a culture. However, during
the last 75 years, as the world has shrunk into a neighborhood, symbol
systems once restricted to a given culture have been adopted for use on
a world-wide basis.
The trend toward universality of usage is most evident in the
symbols of math and science. Because the physical sciences have been
the first to develop and spread throughout the world, the symbols used
by math and science have been universally adopted. The arabic
numerals are almost universally used, and algebra, geometry, and
calculus are the international "languages" of science. Scientists
have their own language—Latin—with which to classify the living
world, as well as a universal set of symbols to describe chemical
phenomena. The metric system continues to spread and undoubtedly will
soon become a universal system of weights and measures.
The trend toward the universal use of common symbols has also
progressed from symbols pertaining to the physical environment to
symbols of the human environment. The emergence of Chinese, English,
French, Arabic, Portuguese, Spanish, and Russian from among the world's
hundreds of languages as the seven most dominant languages is evidence
of this trend. The interdependence of nations on communication brought
about through increasing international travel and trade has elevated
English and French to a position as auxiliary languages, both being
used as languages of diplomacy, of the air, of the sea, and of the
world's postal systems. Indeed, some linguists maintain that this
trend will find its natural culmination in the selection of a universal
auxiliary language that augments each mother tongue (Jesperson 1928;
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Pei 1968; Zamenoff 1887).
Symbols and Meaning
Now that the terms central to our theory of symbolization have
been defined, we may look more closely at the role symbols play as
bearers of meaning. Such a discussion must first begin by examining
meaning itself, and then proceed to an elaboration of logical and
aesthetic modes of symbolization and a review of how symbols are used
to mediate man's relation to the physical, human, and unknown environ-
ments .
Symbolization and a Philosophy of Meaning
In Realms of Meaning
,
Phenix (1964) reviews the classic
philosophical view of man as "a rational animal," whose "unique property
is the ability to reason," and whose "distinctive quality is the life
of the mind."
According to this view, each of the aspects of man described
by the various specialists [biologists, psychologists, soci-
ologists, economists, anthropologists, artists, historians,
theologians, etc.] is a manifestation of the life of the
mind. Even as a matter and energy system, man is a peculiar
sort, determined by the power of thought. His organic
adaptations are based on thought. His social and cultural
forms are expressions of reason. His arts, his individuality,
his morality, his history, his worship—all are embodiments
of reason. This power of thought distinguishes man from
everything else in the creation. In human nature reason is
of the essence (pp. 20-27).
Phenix maintains that this view of man is too narrow. It
suffers, he explains, "from the limitation that such ideas as ration
ality, reason, and mind tend to be too narrowly construed as referring
to the processes of logical thinking." The view neglects "the life of
feeling, conscience, imagination, and other processes that are not
rational in the strict sense ..." (ibid., p. 21).
Phen^x proposes that the difficulty may be avoided by replacing
rationality as the basic feature of mind with the concept of meaning—
a unifying concept that expresses the broader connotations of the idea
of reason and that "expresses different meanings contained in activities
of organic adjustment, in perception, in logical thinking, in social
organization, in speech, in artistic creation, in self-awareness, in
purposive decision, in moral judgement, in the consciousness of time,
and in the activity of worship. All these distinctive human functions,"
he explains, "are varieties of meaning, and all of them together
—
along with others that might be described—comprise the life of meaning,
which is the essence of the life of man" (ibid., p. 21).
Lloyd Warner, Langer, and Vygotsky support Phenix's position.
Warner (1959) states that "meaning is the central fact of human life"
and "the common denominator of all of man's experience" (p. 451).
Langer (1942) goes beyond Warner's enunciation of the impor-
tance of meaning to an analysis of it. She maintains that meaning is
not just sensing the relation among things. It is the function of a
terra which stands (or mediates) between the things being related and
the subject. The term discloses a pattern of relationships which cen-
ters around the key term. "The meaning of a term is, likewise, a
function; it rests on a pattern, in which the term itself holds the
key position" (p. 56). Langer points out that for meaning to occur
there must be at least two things related to each other by a term—
"an
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object that Is ’meant,' and a subject who uses the term" (pp. 56-57).
Vygotsky (1962) also claims that meaning is borne by terras.
His analysis of the relationship between thought and language led him
to conclude that the basic unit of verbal thought is a function of the
meaning of the word. Vygotsky maintains that while "meaning is an act
of thought in the full sense of the term," it is at the same time "an
inalienable part of word as such, and thus it belongs in the realm of
language as much as in the realm of thought" (p. 5). The word thus
stands between one’s thought and his expression of it and is at the
same time the bearer and transformer of thought.
There are two classes of terms which point out the relations
among things and which thus function as carriers of meaning: signals
and symbols . Signals are signs that tie together two aspects of a
pair of intrinsically related phenomena. The relation may be either
natural or imposed. (An example of a natural relation between a pair
of intrinsically related phenomena is the wild, erratic behavior of
animals foreboding an earthquake; an example of an imposed relation
is a red flashing light signaling to us to stop.)
The type of meaning carried by signals is called signification .
Discussing the nature of the relation between the pair of things in-
volved in signification, Langer (1942) says that if it were not for
the subject interpreting them, they would be interchangeable. "Thunder
may just as well be a sign that there has been lightening, as lighten-
ing may signify that there has been thunder. In themselves they are
merely correlated. It is only when one is perceptible and the other
(harder or impossible to perceive) is interesting that we actually have
Ill
a case of signification belonging to a term" (p. 59).
Langer explains that in gratification, there are three essen-
tial terms, the subject, the sign, and the object (John, the lightening,
and the thunder). Signification is "the mere correlation of trivial
events within important ones” and is the basis of animal intelligence"
(ibid.). "It is the most elementary and most tangible sort of intel-
lection; the kind of knowledge that we share with animals, that we
acquire entirely by experience, that has obvious biological uses"
(ibid., p. 60).
Symbols, the other class of terms which indicate the relations
among things, carry meaning that is denotative or connotative.
Denotation is the meaning carried by a symbol that names some-
thing. The most basic form of denotation is a proper name. While a
proper name stands for a conception of a person, for example, it also
names the person. The proof that denotation differs from signification
is given by Langer (1942) :
If you say 'James' to a dog whose master bears that name,
the dog will interpret the sound as a sign, and look for
James. Say it to a person who knows someone called thus,
and he will ask: 'What about James?' That simple question
is forever beyond the dog; signification is the only meaning
a name can have for him—a meaning which his master's name
shares with his master's smell, with his footfall, and his
characteristic ring of the doorbell. In a human being, how-
ever, the name evokes the conception of a certain man so
called, and prepares the mind for further conceptions in
which the notion of that man figures; therefore the human
being naturally asks: 'What about James?' (p. 62),
A name, then, denotes the relationship between the symbol and
its object—James, for example—and stands for a conception of the
object (who James is) which "fits” the object. Thus the relation between
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a symbol and its object is more complex than the relation between the
signal and its object. Whereas the signal and its object is a simple
two-termed relation (subject and object joined by the sign), denota-
tion involves a subject, a symbol, the conception, and the object. The
close correlation between the symbol and the object enables denota-
tion to become "a short-cut" relation between names and things, so that
symbols, especially words, come to embody the meaning of the concept
they stand for (ibid., p. 75). But even though the short-cut between
names and things is taken often, the crucial factor of the concept is
always there. "The radical difference between sign [al] -meaning and
symbol-meaning can therefore be logically exhibited, for it rests on a
difference of pattern, it is strictly a different function" (p. 64).
Beyond denotation stands connotation
. Connotation describes
"the more direct relation of the name, or symbol, to its associated
concept" (ibid.). "The connotation of a word is the conception it
conveys," Langer states. The connotative meaning of a word is divorced
from direct and explicit reference to the word's particular manifesta-
tion (its denotation), and is more general and includes subtle nuances
of meaning and all the associations one has with it. "Because the
connotation remains with the symbol when the object of its denotation
is neither present nor looked for, we are able to think about the object
without reacting to it at all" (ibid.). Connotation, then, is more
abstract than denotation; it operates exclusively in the abstracted
sphere where thought is conducted on a symbolic basis only, without
reference to concrete experience to draw upon.
As has been mentioned earlier and again in the above para-
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graph, symbols represent concepts. A concept, according to Langer,
"is a form that appears in all versions of thought or imagery that can
connote the object in question, a form clothed in different integuments
of sensation for every different mind" (ibid., p. 70). She explains
that whenever we deal with a concept we must have some particular
representation of it, through which we grasp it. This is the function
of the symbol. But just as quickly as the concept is symbolized to
us, she continues, our own imagination dresses it up in private,
personal conception
,
which we can distinguish from the communicable
public concept only by a process of abstraction." This process of
abstraction "goes on all the time in the human mind" and is the process
"of recognizing the concept in any configuration given to experience,
and forming a conception accordingly." Langer asserts that this pro-
cess of forming concepts through symbols and transforming them into
personal conceptions "is the real sense of Aristotle's definition of
man as 'the rational animal' and is "the foundation of our rational-
ity .
.
(ibid.).
Langer 's view of signification, denotation, and connotation
as the three levels of meaning is corroborated by Vygotsky (1962) , who
also maintains that there are three levels on which words may be under-
stood. The first level, the phonetic level, corresponds to Langer 's
level of signification. Children evince a phonetic understanding of
language when they think the word is an intrinsic part of its referent.
The second level is the nominative meaning of a word, which is its
lexical definition (denotation). The third level is termed significative
and refers to abstract meaning independent of explicit reference
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(connotation). That Vygotsky's work in Russia, we may assume, was
performed without knowledge of Langer and Whitehead's work, increases
the credibility of Langer 's thesis.
In sum, signification, denotation, and connotation form the
basis of a "new philosophy of meaning" which "is first of all a logic
of terms of signs and symbols—an analysis of the relational patterns
in which 'meaning' may be sought" (Langer 1942, p. 70). Moreover,
they are the most familiar meanings of the one word, 'meaning,'" and
are equally and perfectly legitimate, but in no possible way inter-
changeable" (p. 64). Her explanation of how meaning is a function of
a term either signal or symbol—illumines one's understanding of
symbolization's epistemological function and shows how symbols serve
as mediators in that they stand in between man's conception of reality
and reality itself. Moreover, her discussion helps one understand why
those concerned with the problem of meaning have turned so often to the
study of semantics for answers.
Langer 's broad and well defined view of meaning expands one's
understanding of rationality so that it embraces the view of meaning
Phenix proposes. For Langer, concepts may be symbolized by artistic
symbols as well as by the logical symbols of mathematics and language.
To restrict rationality to the meaning conveyed by math and language
rules out a large amount of experience which is also conceptual but
not discursive. She explains:
But the symbolism furnished by our purely sensory apprecia-
tion of forms is a non-discursive symbolism , peculiarly well
suited to the expression of ideas that defy linguistic 'pro-
jection.' Its primary function, that of conceptualizing the
flux of sensations, and giving us concrete things in place of
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kaleidoscopic colors or noises, is itself an office thatlanguage-born thought can replace (ibid., p. 86).
no
Rather than calling for a definition of meaning that goes beyond ration-
ality as Phenix does, Langer proposes a view of rationality than en-
compasses all meaning. The view is based squarely on symbolization as
the conveyer of meaning.
The recognition of presentational symbolism as a normal and
prevalent vehicle of meaning widens our conception of ration-
alitY ^ar beyond the traditional boundaries, yet never breaks
faith with logic in the strictest sense. Wherever a symbol
operates, there is meaning; and conversely, different classes
of experience say, reason, intuition, appreciation—corres-
pond to different types of symbolic mediation. No symbol is
exempt from the office of logical formulation, of conceptual-
izing what it conveys; however simple its import, or however
great, this import is a meaning
,
and therefore an element for
understanding. Such reflection invites one to tackle anew,
and with entirely different expectations, the whole problem
of the limits of reason, the much-disputed life of feeling,
and the great controversial topics of fact and truth, knowl-
edge and wisdom, science and art. It brings within the com-
pass of reason much that has been traditionally relegated to
'emotion,' or to that crepuscular depth of the mind where
'intuitions' are supposed to be born, without any midwifery
of symbols, without due process of thought, to fill the gaps
in the edifice of discursive, or 'rational,' judgement (ibid.,
pp. 89-90).
Langer argues that to view the aesthetic side of experience, the side
which comprises intuition, feeling, sensation, emotion, and insight,
as irrational, "vitiates the concept of mind as an organ of under-
standing." Citing J.E. Creighton's (1921) statement that "The power
of reason is simply the power of the whole mind at its fullest stretch
and compass," (p. 469), Langer asserts that "rationality is the essence
of mind, and symbolic transformation its elementary process" and con-
cludes that "it is a fundamental error, therefore, to recognize it
only in the phenomenon of systematic, explicit reasoning' (p. 91).
Summing up her argument for including both logical and aesthetic
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modes of symbolization under the broader rubric of rationality, Langer
comments on the value of a theory that views both as twin approaches
to understanding:
The general theory of symbolism here set forth, which dis-
tinguishes between two symbolic modes rather than restrict-
ing intelligence to discursive forms and relegating all other
conception to some irrational realm of feeling and instinct,
has the great advantage of assimilating all mental activity’
to reason, instead of grafting that strange product upon a
fundamentally unintellectual organism. It accounts for
imagination and dream, myth and ritual, as well as for
practical intelligence. Discursive thought gives rise to
science, and a theory of understanding that naturally cul-
minates in a critique of art. The parent stock of both
conceptual types, of verbal and non-verbal formulation, is
the basic human act of symbolic transformation. The root is
the same, only the flower is different (pp. 126-27).
Logical symbol systems . As has been mentioned previously,
symbolization may be classified into two modes, logical and aesthetic.
These terms have been chosen over the terms "discursive" and "non-
1
discursive" because they are more descriptive of the type of thinking
the modes draw upon and the meaning they represent than the other
terms, which reflect only one aspect of the modes’ characteristics,
namely, their manner of presentation. Also, "logical" and "aesthetic"
are used by Whitehead (1929c) to depict two basic modes of knowing and
thus make our theory of symbolization more congruent with his philosophy.
Moreover, the term "nondiscursive" is objectionable in that it describes
something by telling us what it is not, rather than by telling us what
it is.
Logical symbolization is described by Phenix (1964)
:
To say that ordinary languages are ’discursive* means that
they are used in customary speech for communicating ideas
in a consecutive, connected fashion, following the principles
of common logic. Such discourse is appropriate fot asser-
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t;Lons of fact and other utterances meant to be understoodliterally. It is intended as a means of effective cohesion
and practical action within the community. Similarly,
mathematics is discursive because it is based on logicaldeduction, with arguments moving from premises to conclusionsby consecutive steps. Both kinds of discursive forms are
used for factual statements in the sciences, where rational
order is of the essence (p. 81).
The important points raised by Phenix are that discursive
symbolization may be understood literally and that it follows a
logical order to establish a meaning which is precise and understand-
able by all who use the symbols of the system.
The crucial factor that makes possible literal meaning and
logical order is syntax, or grammar. With language, the rules of
grammar determine the order in which the symbols—words or numbers
—
are to be strung together so that a meaning greater than the sum of
the individual symbols is achieved. Langer (1942) explains that
syntax
. . . ties together several symbols, each with at least a
fragmentary connotation of its own, to make one complex
term, whose meaning is a special constellation of all the
connotations involved. What the special constellation is,
depends on the syntactical relations within the complex
symbol, or proposition (pp. 66-67).
As Langer indicates, the product of language is the proposi-
tion—a unified pattern representing some aspect of experience, or,
as she terms it, "a structure of a state of affairs" (ibid.). Just
as the proposition is a complete unit of meaning, so the structural
unit that corresponds to it— the sentence— is a complete unit of words
strung together to yield a coherent proposition.
The creation of coherence on the propositional and structural
levels is thus a function of syntax. Syntax transforms the intended
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meaning (deep structure) of the speaker into an arrangement of words
(surface structure) which others will understand. Because all the
speakers of a language use the same rules to arrange their words,
they can understand each other. Language, then, has two elements
necessary for the communication of meaning that can be understood
by all the speakers of the language:
1. A vocabulary made up of words (symbols) with fixed
meanings (denotations and connotations).
2. A syntax made up of rules that specify how words are
combined to create a larger meaning that is a unified
whole—that is, something that makes sense (Lancer
1942, p. 87).
Because of these two elements, a dictionary describing the meaning of
words may be written and a grammar may be generated that lists the
rules of syntax. This makes it possible for a non-native speaker to
/
study the language and translate a sentence from one language into
another.
Two other distinctive features of language are its abstract-
ness and its infiniteness of expression. The quality of abstractness
derives from its symbolic role "in the formulation and expression of
conceptions: (ibid., p. 106); infiniteness of expression is also
rooted in its abstractness and is a direct function of syntax, which
enables words to be combined in limitless ways. Chomsky (1968) com-
ments on both these aspects of language, and describes its abstract
nature as being free from stimulus control:
. . .
language is not only innovative and potentially
infinite in scope, but also free from the control of
detectable stimuli, either external or internal. It is
because of this freedom from stimulus control that language
can serve as an instrument of thought and self-expression,
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as it does not only for the exceptionally gifted and
talented, but also, in fact, for every normal human (p. 11).
Phenix (1964) remarks that the quality of abstractness gives language
its power of limitless expression:
The abstractness of language is the source of its power to
express an infinite variety of experience and to represent
the real world in all its depth and complexity. By this
miracle of language the boundless world is opened to shared
understanding (p. 70).
Wilson (1972) also extols language's unlimited power of expression and
shows how syntax is the immediate, or efficient, cause:
What is truly unique is the very large number of such
words and the potential for creating new ones to denote
any number of additional objects and concepts. This
potential is quite literally infinite.
. . . Human beings
utter their words sequentially in phrases and sentences
that generate, according to complex rules also determined
at least partly by the culture, a vastly larger array of
messages' than is provided by the mere summed meanings of
the words themselves (p. 53).
Langer (1942) explains how the abstract qualities of language
combines with its capacity to bear logical, literal meaning—a product
essential to the construction of knowledge:
. . . bare denotative language is a most excellent instru-
ment of exact reason: it is, in fact, the only general
precision instrument the human brain has ever evolved.
Ideas first adumbrated in fantastic form become real
intellectual property only when discursive language rises
to their expression. . . . All detail of knowledge, all
expert distinction, measure, and practical manipulation,
are possible only on a basis of truly abstract concepts,
and a framework of such concepts constitute a philosophy
of nature, literal, denotative, and systematic. Only
language has the power to effect such an analysis of
experience, such a rationalization of knowledge (p. 173).
For Langer, then, language is the means by which the abstracted concepts
of the mind are welded into a larger, integrated framework. She makes
it clear that language functions primarily as a transformer of ideas
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and not as their begetter
c
But it is only where experience is already presented—
through some other formative medium, some vehicle of
apprehension and memory— that the canons of literal
thought have any application. We must have ideas before
we can make literal analyses of them; and really newideas have their own mode of appearance in the un-
predicated mind (ibid., p. 173).
Langer's view of language as the transformer of ideas is
supported by Vygotsky (1962), who explains that thought, as it turns
into speech, undergoes many changes. "It does not merely find expres-
sion in speech; it finds its reality and form" (p. 126).
It is in trying to understand how language transforms thought
into rational, explicit meaning that Vygotsky’s conception of inner
and external speech is so valuable. Vygotsky asserts that inner speech
has a function and form altogether different from external speech.
Inner speech, he writes, "is to a large extent thinking in pure meanings.
It is a dynamic, shifting, unstable thing, fluttering between word and
thought, the two more or less stable, more or less firmly delineated
components of verbal thought" (p. 149). Pure thought "is engendered
by motivation, i.e., by our desires and needs, our interests and
emotions. Behind every thought there is an affective-volitional
tendency, which holds the answer to the last ’why' in the analysis of
meaning" (p. 150). It is the affective-volitional import rooted in
pure thought that Vygotsky says one tries to ferret out in conversa-
tion. He likens a thought to "a cloud shedding a shower of words"
(ibid.). Continuing with the analogy, inner speech is like ice crys-
tals—the first form of precipitation that streams from the cloud. The
crystals then break into many droplets as they enter the atmosphere
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as they become external speech. Because articulated words are the
evidence and embodiment of thought, Vygotsky says that the relation
between thought and word is "a living process; thought is born through
words. A word devoid of thought is a dead thing, and a thought un-
embodied in words remains a shadow" (p. 153).
The view of language as a transformer of ideas and not their
begetter is central to the epistemological function of symbolization.
It allows for the existence of creativity as an independent, abstracted
function of the intellect
,
while showing the close and vital connec-
tion symbolization has to the transformation of raw ideas into rational
form which can be expressed through the symbol systems and can then
become a formal part of man’s world. This point of view is similar
to Eric Lennenberg's (1969), whose work on the biological foundations
of language has been of major significance in helping psycholinguists
and psychologists sort out the relation between language and thought:
Language is to be understood as an operation rather than
a static product of the mind. Its modus operandi reflects
that of human cognition, because language is an intimate
part of cognition. Thus the biological view denies that
language is the cause of cognition, or even its effect,
since language is not an object (like a tool) that exists
apart from a living human brain (p. 640)
.
While language is most ideally suited to serve as the major
vehicle of communication because of its versatility and enormous breadth
of experience it can describe, its ambiguity makes it inadequate as an
expression of absolute precision. The ambiguity of language is
attested by Glucksberg and Danks (1975) , who write that all linguists
"agree that ambiguity is the rule, rather than the exception
1 (p. 50).
They explain that at least fifty percent of a reasonably adequate vocabu-
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lary is 1113(16 UP of either homonymous or polysemous words, homonyms
being words identical in sound but different in meaning; polysemous
being words with multiple meanings. "Most of the words we use," they
comment, "can be interpreted in more than one way and if we include
metaphorical usage, then virtually all words can be interpreted in more
than one way. Any given word, in principle, can be assigned more than
one meaning" (ibid.).
The lexicon is not language's only claim to ambiguity. It is
also ambiguous in its syntax. Consider the following sentence:
They are eating apples.
The sentence has two meaning, depending on whether the stress is placed
on eating or on apples. If the stress is on eating
,
the meaning of the
sentence is, "Those apples are for eating;" if the stress is on apples
,
the sentence means, "Those people are eating apples." But the following
sentence has two meanings which cannot be distinguished by a variation
in stress:
Visiting relatives can be a nuisance.
The ambiguity of language on the lexical and syntactical levels
is a reflection of a fundamental inability to describe thought exactly.
Vygotsky (1962) writes that not all thought can be articulated because
it does not have an automatic counterpart in words. In speech there
is always the "subtext," or the affective-volitional meaning that
stands behind the words. The lack of an exact correspondence between
thought and speech prompts Vygotsky to quote F. Tjutchev's lamentation
about the inexpressibility of his deepest thoughts:
How shall the heart express itself?
How shall another understand?
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The ambiguity of language is avoided by mathematics to a great
extent. Mathematics, while it has its own set of symbols and its own
syntax, is nevertheless considered by most theorists as a sub-set of
language
:
I regard mathematical symbolism as a linguistic form of
expression (Langer 1942, p. 173).
Mathematics is discursive and literal, a specialized and
abbreviated language. It appeals essentially to the eye,
and is therefore most easily 'done on paper,' but all its
symbols have names; a complex like
/>Ja + b
m + n
c
may always be verbally expressed as 'the square root of a-
plus-b^, over £ to the m-plus-nth power (ibid., p. 198).
_
We would tentatively propose to define language in the wide
sense as communicated information which in principle (although
hardly in fact) is measurable in bits. This covers, first,
languages with a vocabulary but no grammar, such as the flag
language (if Paul Revere' s message) or the language of the
African tom-tom, second, propositional languages which not
only have a vocabulary but also a grammar and therefore are
capable of forming the basis of algorithms that permit predic-
tion. The second applies, to a degree, to vernacular language;
it applies in the higher degree to the artificial language of
mathematics (Bertalanffy 1965, p. 38).
Algebra is one chapter in the large technique, which is
language (Whitehead 1948, p. 115).
To view mathematics as a sub-set of language in no way mini-
mizes its distinctive and vital function. The great value of mathematics
is its enormous theoretical power, which derives from its complete
abstraction and precision. These qualities have enabled it to become
"the language of science;" through it, the physical sciences have been
able to construct theories so highly predictable that man is able to
perform such feats as putting himself on the moon, touring the ocean
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floor for days on end, and curing or eliminating diseases. Phenix
(1964) explains this abstract, theoretical power of math as the cause
of its great practical value:
Another way of expressing the essence of mathematics is to
say that it is a language of complete abstraction. Ordinary
language is abstract, too, in the sense that its concepts
refer to classes or kinds of things
-and that its conventional
patterns are types of expression. But ordinary language is
less abstract in the sense that it refers back to actual
things, events, persons, and relations. Mathematics, having
no necessary reference to actuality, is fully abstract. It"
is purely formal, without any necessary anchorage in the
actual world. Interestingly, it is just this complete
abstractedness that makes possible the elaborate developments
of mathematical systems, yielding in the long run the most
practical applications (p. 72).
Phenix' s explanation is compatible with Whitehead's view of the
abstractness of mathematics. Whitehead (1948) explains that the
exactness of mathematics derives directly from its abstractness. While
practical experience is never exact in that lines are never straight,
points are never placed exactly, circles are never perfectly round, and
the molecular composition of physical things is always changing, in
mathematics, actual lines, points, circles, and objects symbolize
abstracted states of perfection. "Any practical experience of
exactness of realization," Whitehead asserts, "is denied to mankind:
Whereas mathematics, and the ideals of perfection, are concerned with
exactness" (p. 112).
Whitehead associates ideals of perfection with mathematics
because both are entirely theoretical. The practical usefulness of
mathematics thus derives from its abstract, theoretical quality.
Whitehead (1929a) explains how the theoretical character of mathematics
enables it to be applied to innumerable occasions:
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The essence of mathematics is perpetually to be discarding
more special ideas in favour of more general ideas, and
special methods in favour of general methods. We express
the conditions of a special problem in the form of an equa-
tion, but that equation will serve for a hundred other
problems, scattered through diverse sciences. The general
reasoning is always the powerful reasoning, because deduc-
tive cogency is the property of abstract form (p. 53).
The abstract quality of mathematics is the underlying cause of
its precision and practical power. The one-to-one correspondence between
mathematical symbols and their referents and math’s entirely logical
and consistent syntax are both man-made constructions entirely based on
abstract, theoretical thought. The precision and logic of mathematics
make it a more reliable tool of logic than language, as Phenix (1964)
explains
:
The symbolic systems of mathematics are designed to achieve
complete precision in meaning and rigor in reasoning.
Ordinary language, by contrast, growing informally out of the
complex experiences of many persons and groups over long
periods of time, is relatively vague and ambiguous, and
ordinary reasoning is usually full of unexamined common-
sense assumptions and inconsistencies. In fact, one of the
two main purposes of using special symbols in mathematics
is to avoid the imprecision of common speech. The other
purpose is to provide symbols which can be more readily
manipulated in reasoning processes than is possible using
the symbols of common language (p. 73).
The theoretical basis of mathematics from which is derived
its practical power and precision is the deliberate creation of man's
conscious mind. Mathematics, unlike language, has no biological basis.
While the rules of language are acquired effortlessly and followed
unconsciously by the vast majority of speakers, and are known only
by those who consciously study them, the rules of mathematics must be
learned and followed consciously. While man has a biological basis for
apprehending relationships among things, he is not biologically pro
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granuned to acquire the use of mathematical symbols. Children do not
babble in numbers, nor do they add and subtract, multiply and divide
merely by being exposed to arithmetic. Man must learn mathematics
by studying it and he must have conscious knowledge of its rules.
Phenix (1964) explains this phenomenon in the following passage:
Knowing ordinary language does not depend on knowing about
it. The same does not hold for mathematics. In mathematics
one really knows the subject only if he knows about the
subject, that is, if he does his mathematics with self-
conscious awareness, examining and justifying each step in
his reasoning in the light of the canons of rigorous proof.
That is why it is not enough to teach students of mathe-
matics how to make calculations and demonstrations skill-
fully and automatically.
. . . The student of mathematics
can be said to know mathematics only if he understands and
can articulate his reasons for each assertion he makes (ibid.).
Mathematics is artificial in the sense that it is created by
man. As a consciously created symbol system, its symbols and operating
principles have been derived by deductive logic, are completely consis-
tent, and have no peculiarities which must be learned as exceptions
to the rule, as does language. Each number stands for one thing:
_9 is
always % + is always +. In this sense they are formal abstractions
and have a purely literal meaning. "The propositions of mathematics,"
Phenix emphasizes, "are formal and abstract in that they do not neces-
sarily refer to the structure of the actual world but comprise a series
of purely abstract formalisms all having in common the one rule of
logical consistency" (ibid.
,
p. 80).
To illustrate the precise and unequivocal nature of mathematics
we will consider the way in which the property of symmetry (or equality)
of relations, the communicative property, and the mutuality of addi-
tion and subtraction operate. The property of symmetry of relations
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states, if a - b, then b = a. The communicative property says, if
a + b = c, then b + a = c, and if a + b = c, then c - b = a. The
mutuality of addition and subtraction says, if x = y - Z) then y =
z + x. These properties, or syntactical features, of math operate in
a precise and unequivocal way, as the equations describing the relations
among the three rectangles pictured belo*w indicates (Nesher 1970).
5 + 3 = 8
3 + 5 = 8
8 = 3 + 5
8 = 5 + 3
8-5 = 3
8-3 = 5
5 = 8-3
3 = 8-5
Basic Equation
C
S
C
MDS
C
S and C
C
NOTE: S = property of symmetry of relations
C = communicative property
MDS = property of the mutuality of addition and subtrac-
tion.
These are the only formulations to be derived from the basic equations
and they express all the relations the three boxes can have to each
other. For each relation there is but one equation. But if trans-
lated into language, each equation could be written in a number of
different ways, as the following example indicates:
5 + 3 = 8
Five plus three equals eight.
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Five added to three is eight.
Five when added to three yields the sum of eight.
Five and three are eight.
Five combined with three is equivalent to eight.
In short, the list is as long as the number of synonyms for add
and equals . But in the language of math there are no synonyms; there
is a one-to-one correspondence between surface structure (the symbol)
and deep structure (the meaning) (Nesher 1970).
The exact correspondence between symbol and meaning, together
with the simple formula for creating new symbols (N + 1) unite all
mathematical formulas in a common bond which, Cassirer (1944) claims,
gives it a power of classification that language does not possess:
Number is one of the fundamental functions of human knowl-
edge, a necessary step in the great process of objectification.
This process begins in language, but in science it assumes an
entirely new shape. Further symbolism of number is quite a
different logical type from the symbolism of speech. In
language we find the first efforts of classification, but
these are still uncoordinated. They cannot lead to a true
systematization. For the symbols of language themselves
have no systematic order. . . . This state of affairs is
completely changed as soon as we enter into the realm of number.
We cannot speak of single or isolated numbers. The essence of
number is always relative, not absolute. . . . What we find
here is limitation by virtue of an intrinsic logical principle.
All the terms are bound together by a common bond. They
originate in one and the same generative relation, that
relation which connects a number n with its immediate suc-
cessor (n + 1). From this very simple relation we can derive
all the properties of the integer numbers. This distinctive
mark and the greatest logical principle of this system is
its complete transparency. In our modern theories— in the
theories of Frege and Russell, of Peano and Dedekind—number
has lost all its ontological secrets. We conceive it as a new
and powerful symbolism which, for all scientific purposes, is
infinitely superior to the symbolism of speech. For what we
find here are no longer detached words but terms that proceed
according to one and the same fundamental plan and that, there-
fore, show us a clear and definite structural law (pp. 211-21.0.
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The abstractness of mathematical symbols, their entirely
logical structure, and their one-to-one correspondence with meaning,
make mathematics an entirely explicit mode of symbolization. Its
expression is its content, its content is its expression. In this
sense, it is an entirely self-contained symbol system.
Mathematical symbolisms occupy an independent, self-con-
tained world of thought. They need not stand for actual
things or classes of actual things, as the symbols of
ordinary language do. Mathematics occupies a world of its
own. Its realm is that of ’pure’ symbolic forms, the
application of which, no matter how useful, are secondary
and incidental to the essential symbolic meanings (Phenix
1964, p. 71).
Because of mathematic’s purely symbolic meaning, it is possible for
those who are highly skilled in it to rise to the level where they
think in the medium in which they work. Einstein, for example, is
said to have thought primarily in visual imagery and mathematical
symbols (Glucksberg 1966)
.
Aesthetic symbol systems . Where mathematics and language are
explicit in the presentation of meaning, the arts are implicit. Where
the logical symbol systems are systematic, uniform and exact, the
arts are diverse and idiosyncratic. "Artist symbols .
.
," Langer
(1942) writes, "are untranslatable; their sense is bound to the par-
ticular form which it has taken. It is always implicit, and cannot
be explicated by an interpretation" (p. 220).
Phenix (1964) describes the difference between the two modes
of symbolization in terms of their manner of presentation:
The language of science is discursive, aiming at precise
literal descriptions organized according to the principles
of ordinary logic and reaching perfection in the formulas
of mathematics. The language of art, on the other hand, is
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non discursive, symbolical, and metaphorical, and is~
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Phenix elaborates on the different ways in which the two modes express
their respective interpretations of experience:
Knowledge in language is primarily of general patterns of
expression, which may be used in a great variety ofparticular contexts. Knowledge in science is ideally ofgeneral laws and theories, connected with observable par-ticulars by way of prediction and verification. In the
esthetic realm, on the other hand, the object of knowledge
is the singular form. The primary concern is not with types
of things—
-not with kinds and classes of things—but with
unique individual objects. Essentially, every esthetic
object is incomparable. To classify it is to engage in an
activity which is empirical, or perhaps philosophical, rather
than properly aesthetic (ibid., p. 141-42).
Langer (1942) points out that a more profound difference between
logical and aesthetic symbol systems lies in the way they approach
experience. Both modes have characteristic ways of acting on, or
transforming, reality. "Every object that emerges into the focus of
attention, she relates, 'has meaning beyond the 'fact* in which it
figures. It serves by turns, and sometimes even at once, for insight
and theory and behavior, in non-discursive knowledge and discursive
reason, in wishful fancy or as a sign eliciting conditioned-reflex
action" (p. 240). Each new datum of experience, she goes on to explain,
is subjected to "a complex of mental functions." Perception organizes
the sensory information and, as the mind abstracts particular features
from the organized perceptual pattern, the process of symbolization
transforms it and a definite conception is formed.
Symbolization may act either through the logical or
aesthetic mode:
131
Non-discursive intelligence, reading emotive import intothe concrete form, meets it with purely sensitive
appreciation; and even more promptly, the language-habit
sive
e
?r
US aSS“llate “ to some literal concept andg it a place in discursive thought (ibid., p. 240).
The sensitive appreciation of aesthetic intelligence depends
on regarding the datum as a representative of a universe of meaning; it
treats it as a springboard from which the mind leaps to broad generali-
ties of meaning. Logical intelligence, on the other hand, creates the
generality. It constructs a universe of knowledge, a theoretical
framework about the world and how it operates. It regards the datum
of experience as a specific piece of information to be incorporated
into the general scheme already constructed.
Here is a crossing of the two activities: for discursive
symbolism is always general, and requires application to
,
the concrete datum, whereas non-discursive symbolism is
specific, is the 'given' itself, and invites us to read
the more general meaning out of the case. Hence the
exciting back-and-forth of real mental life, of living by
symbols (ibid., p. 240).
The following examples demonstrate the difference between the
two modes. An atom, to the nuclear physicist, is a fundamental
particle of matter which behaves in predictable ways according to
the laws of physics. If subjected to the proper environmental
conditions, the energy within the atom can be released and harnessed
for man's use. To the poet or painter, the atom is a miniature sun
and reflects in its structure the order and harmony of the universe.
The poet's perspective moved the prophet Muhammad to write: "Split
the atom's heart, and lo! within it thou wilt find a sun" (Qur'an, 67:3).
To the ecologist, scattered cans along the road are objects for re-
cycling. To the artist tin cans are doorways to a deeper and richer
appreciation of the wonders of life, as the words of the abstract
painter, Mark Tobey, attest:
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X feel drawn to leprous walls, drawn to bend down and pick
up tin cans from American streets, rubbish thrown away,driven over by countless motorists, motorists who had not
the least idea that by simply driving over these cans that
they had pressed them into new magic forms and that they
had then made their contribution to my sharing in and
appreciating these objects in a new significance (cited by
M. Knoedler & Co., Inc. 1976, p. 6).
As Mark Tobey s description of his aesthetic experience
suggests, the symbolism of art lies in the forms created by the artist
and perceived by the viewer or listener. Herein lies a major difference
the manner of symbolization between the logical and aesthetic modes.
Logical symbolism is presented in series form according to explicit
rules that determine the order of the series; aesthetic symbolism is
presented in holistic form. Since aesthetic symbolism is holistic and
immediate, it has no sequential order and thus lacks explicit rules.
Alfred North Whitehead and Suzanne Langer have defined
the contrast between the discursive and non-discursive
by means of the concept of presentational immediacy . In
the discursive forms meanings unfold in sequential
argument. In the non-discursive forms meanings are pre-
sented in a unitary vision, i.e., in direct or immediate
insight. In the former, meaning is attained at the end of
a demonstration (whether explicit or implicit), while in
the latter, meaning is grasped all at once, as an imme-
diate presentation (Phenix 1964, p. 82).
Langer (1942) herself writes that "the very functioning" of aesthetic
symbols depends on the fact that they are involved in a simultaneous,
integral presentation. This kind of semantic may be called "presenta-
tional symbolism" to characterize its essential distinction from dis-
cursive symbolism of "language" proper (p. 89).
Langer maintains that while aesthetic symbolism has no sequential
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order, it does have a presentational order. The presentational order is
the fundamental perceptual forms which "furnish the elementary abstrac-
tions in terms of which ordinary sense-experience is understood." This
abstract understanding, "is directly reflected in the pattern of
physical reaction
,
impulse and instinct," a condition which leads her
to suggest that the order in which the elements that make up the per-
ceptual forms are symbolic of our "conception, expression, and apprehen-
sion, of impulsive, instinctive, and sentient life" (ibid., p. 90).
The perceptual elements that symbolize our inner experience
are visual and auditory. Visual forms are made of line, color, propor-
tion, shadow, contrast, etc., while auditory forms are made of harmony,
meter, rhythm, and timbre. While each art form reflects a definite
technique which governs how the elements are combined, the technique
cannot be regarded as a syntax. The proof of this is that each artist
has his own technique, his own way of ordering the elements to make
up the form. Thus the work of each artist is incomparable. It reflects
his own interpretation of experience, colored by his own sentient life
and expressive of his own subjective reactions to his work during the
act of creation. The individuality of each work of art is exemplified
by Ludwig Richter's report of an experiment he and three friends under-
took when they were young. They set out to paint the same landscape,
all firmly resolved to reproduce what they saw as accurately as pos-
sible. "The result," Cassirer (1944) writes, "was four totally dif-
ferent pictures, as different from one another as the personalities of
the artists." From this experience Richter concluded that there was no
such thing as objective vision, and that "form and color are always
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apprehended according to individual temperament" (p. 45 ).
The fruit of aesthetic symbolization, then, is what Cassirer
referred to as the externalization of feeling, "the highest and most
characteristic power of artistic imagination."
Externalization means visible or tangible embodiment not
simply in a particular material medium— in clay, bronze,
or marble--but in sensuous forms, in rhythms, in color
pattern, in lines and design, in plastic shapes. It is
the structure, the balance, and order, of these forms
which affects us in the work of art (ibid., p. 154).
Langer, Phenix, Bertalanffy, and Cassirer adamantly maintain
that the externalization of sensuous forms yields more than feeling
or impression, that it yields understanding comparable in its signifi-
cance to the understanding of logical symbolization. Phenix (1964),
reviewing Langer' s "particularly cogent case for the distinctly
esthetic mode of understanding presented in Philosophy in a New Key ,"
writes
:
She denies that a work of art is only an expression of
the artist's personal feelings and argues that artistic
import has its characteristic logical forms. She insists
that significance is not limited to the literal meanings
of factual statements, but extends also to the art
symbols objectifying the patterns of feeling found in man's
inner life (p. 42).
Phenix clearly and directly states his own views on the ques-
tion of aesthetic knowledge and concludes that the broader concept of
understanding may be more descriptive:
One may raise the question whether esthetic meanings really
deserve the name of knowledge at all. This is a matter on
which opinions differ. Some prefer to limit the term
’knowledge' to the strictly discursive and cognitive fields
(i.e., mathematics and empirical science) . Others prefer
a wider reference, comprising meanings in the other realms,
including the esthetic. The question is not of much impor-
tance. What is important is that by whatever name they are
called, the distinctive meanings in each of the realms be
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acknowledged and understood. If the narrower interpretationthe term knowledge' is preferred, a broader concept such
as understanding' may be used for the arts and other non-empirical fields (ibid., p. 142).
Cassirer (1944) echoes these thoughts in the following passage
in which he explains that the intuitive, holistic form of a work of
art originates in the understanding:
Every work of art has an intuitive structure, and that means
a character of rationality. Every single element must be
felt as part of a comprehensive whole. If in a rhythm, we
are in danger of destroying the specific tone and charm of
the poem. Art is not fettered to the rationality of things
or events. It may infringe all those laws of probability
5
which classical aestheticians declared to be the constitu-
tional laws of art. It may give us the most bizarre and
grotesque vision, and yet retain a rationality of its own
—
the rationality of form
. We may in this way interpret a say-
ing of Goethe's which at first sight looks paradoxical: 'Art:
a second nature; mysterious too, but more understandable, for
it originates in the understanding' (pp. 167-68).
Cassirer points out that both logical and aesthetic modes of
knowing lead man to contrasting, but not conflicting, forms of truth,
science seeking out the efficient causes of reality and art its
formal structure.
There is a conceptual depth as well as a purely visual depth.
The first is discovered by science; the second is revealed in
art. The first aids us in understanding the reasons of things;
the second in seeking their forms. In science we try to trace
phenomena back to their first causes, and to general laws and
principles. In art we are not concerned with the uniformity
of laws but with the multiformity and diversity of intuitions.
Even art may be described as knowledge, but art is knowledge of
a peculiar and specific kind. We may well subscribe to the
observation of Shaftesbury that 'all beauty is truth.' But
the truth of beauty does not consist in a theoretical des-
cription or explanation of things; it consists rather in the
'sympathetic vision' of things.
The two views of truth are in contrast with one another,
but not in conflict or contradiction. Since art and science
move in entirely different planes, they cannot contradict or
thwart one another. The conceptual interpretation of science
does not preclude the intuitive interpretation of art. Each
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Wn perspefive and > so to speak, its own angle ofraction.
.
. . Art
. . . teaches us to visualize, not
merely to conceptualize or utilize, things. Art gives us
a richer more vivid and colorful image of reality, and a
more profound insight into its formal structure. It is
characteristic of the nature of man that he is not limitedto one specific and single approach to reality but can choosehis point of view and so pass from one aspect of things to
another (ibid., pp. 169-70).
Paul Tillich (1957) propounds a similar argument and describes
more fully the nature of aesthetic understanding. He says that it
is the opening of new depths of our own being:
All arts create symbols for a level of reality which cannot
be reached in any other way. A picture and a poem reveal
elements of reality which cannot be approached scientifically.
In the creative work of art we encounter reality in a dimen-
sion which is closed for us without such works. The [symbol]
. . . not only opens up dimensions of reality which otherwise
would remain unapproachable but also unlocks dimensions and
elements of our soul. ... A great play gives us not only a
new vision of the human scene, but it opens up hidden depths
of our own being. Thus we are able to receive what the play
reveals to us in reality. There are within us dimensions of
which we cannot become aware except through symbols . . .
(p. 43).
Tillich’s view that art "opens up hidden depths of our own
being" provides a perspective that throws light on what we have called
until now the implicit meaning of art that arouses insight into
ineffable experience. "Implicit meaning" and "ineffable experience"
are terms that describe subjective experience. As has been mentioned
earlier in the chapter, artistic symbolic forms are "sensory objecti-
fications of subjective states" (Phenix 1964, p. 82). Phenix also
explains that aesthetic meanings "are concerned with the contemplative
perception of particular significant things as unique objectifications
of ideated subjectivities" (ibid., pp. 6-7).
The subjective states which comprise the meaning of art are
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inner understandings, necessarily fraught with emotion, which affirm
one s own participation in the dynamic process of concresence, a
process in which the whole universe is engaged (see pp. 17-19).
Cassirer describes the awareness of one's own concresence elicited by
aesthetic experience as a transformation from the dormant state in
which we are unaware of our own potentialities to a vital, vibrant
state in which we become conscious of our potentialities and animated
by a desire to actualize them. This awareness is achieved through the
contemplation of our reality and the potentialities that lie enfolded
within it. A great work of art, Cassirer (1944) explains,
... conveys an awareness of human things and human des-
tinies, of human greatness and misery, in comparison to
which our ordinary existence appears poor and trivial. All
of us feel, vaguely and dimly, the infinite potentialities
of life, which silently await the moment when they are called
forth from dormancy into the clear and intense light of
consciousness. It is not the degree of infection but the
degree of intensification and illumination which is the
measure of the excellence of art (pp. 147-48).
Our awareness of our own potentialities becomes conscious
by our undergoing an inner transformation triggered by the trans-
formation the material of the medium goes through from static
actuality to a dynamic, living vibrancy. In a good work of art the
transformation leaps out from the symphony, painting, or play, and
strikes our senses. "A great painter or musician," Cassirer writes,
"is not characterized by his sensitiveness to colors or sounds but
by his power to elicit from this static material a dynamic life of
forms" (p. 160). "Art must always give us tion rather than mere
emotion" (p. 149). This sense of motion is the dynamic process of
life itself— the continuous oscillation between opposite poles, between
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joy and grief, hope and fear, exultation and despair" (pp. U8-49)
.
lo give aesthetic form to our passions," he continues, "is to trans-
form them into a free and active state. In the work of the artist
the power of passion itself has been made a formative power" (p. 149).
The emotions a great work of art evoke are not consuming,
but are seen rather than felt. "Our passions," Cassirer remarks, "are
no longer dark and impenetrable powers; they become, as it were,
transparent. ..." Because of this transparency, "the image of the
passion is not the passion itself" (ibid., p. 147).
At a Shakespeare play we are not infected with the ambition
of Macbeth, with the cruelty of Richard III, or with the
jealousy of Othello. We are not at the mercy of these
emotions; we look through them; we seem to penetrate into
their very nature and essence
. .
.
(ibid.).
The depth of emotion which the aesthetic experience arouses
leads to a fuller realization of our own capacity to draw significance
from experience. The reflective contemplation the aesthetic experience
stimulates is made possible because the emotions that are aroused do
not disturb or obscure contemplating; rather, they leave the mind in
a state of calm so that it may operate in full force:
The highest intensification of our emotional life is
thought of as the same time giving us a sense of repose.
We live through all our passions feeling their full range
and highest tension. But what we leave behind when pass-
ing the threshold of art is hard pressure, the compulsion
of our emotions. The tragic poet is not the slave but the
master of his emotions; and his is able to transfer this
mastery to the spectators. In his work we are not swayed
and carried by our emotions. Aesthetic freedom is not the
absence of passions, not Stoic apathy, but just the contrary.
It means that our emotional life acquires its greatest
strength, and that in this very strength it changes its
form. For here we no longer live in the immediate reality
of things but in a world of pure sensuous forms. In this'
world all our feelings undergo a sort of transubstantiation
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with respect to their essence and their character The
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and rhytl™’ of these motions is not comparableny single state of emotion (ibid., p. 148).
The ability of a work of art to put our inner being to motion
is the test of its worth. True to its symbolic function as an
arouser and not an implanter of meaning, latent emotions must be let
loose within the viewer and are not inherent in the art work itself.
Just as the ability of art to stir one's inner being is a measure of
its worth, so is the ability of an individual to respond to a great
work of art a measure of his aesthetic understanding.
In every great poem— in Shakespeare's plays, in Dante's
Commedia
,
in Goethe s Faus
t
—we must indeed pass through
the whole gamut of human emotions. If we were unable to
grasp the most delicate nuances of the different shades of
feeling, unable to follow the continuous variations in
rhythm and tone, if unmoved by sudden dynamic charges, we
could not understand and feel the poem. We may speak of
the individual temperament of the artist, but the work of
art, as such, has no special temperament. We cannot sub-
sume it under any traditional psychological class concept.
To speak of Mozart's music as cheerful or serene, or
Beethoven's as grave, sombre, or sublime, would betray an
unpenetrating taste (ibid., pp. 149-150).
When our inner being is stirred to emotion by an art work,
we share in a creative process similar to that the artist went through
and undergo self-liberation:
We cannot understand a work of art without, to a certain
degree, repeating and reconstructing the creative process
by which it has come into being. But the nature of this
creative process the passions themselves are turned into
actions. If in real life we had to endure all those emo-
tions through which we live in Sophocles' Oedipus or in
Shakespeare's King Lear we should scarcely survive the shock
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and strain. But art turns all these pains and outragesthese cruelties and atrocities, into a means of self-libera-tion, thus giving us an inner freedom vhich cannot be
attained in any other way (ibid., p. 149).
The inner freedom we feel enables us to see new aspects of
our personal life. "The infinite potentialities of which we had but a
dim and obscure presentiment are brought to light by the lyric poet,
by the novelist, and by the dramatists. Such art is in no sense mere
counterfeit of facsimile, but a genuine manifestation of our inner
life" (ibid., p. 169).
The supreme function of art, then, is to bring to conscious
awareness our own potentialities by stirring within us previously
unfelt emotions which expand our concept of ourselves and open our
minds to envisioning new possibilities for what we may become.
Jordan (1975c) explaining this function of the arts, writes:
The production of works of art means to face unknowns in
such a way that they become known. It is therefore one
important means of rehearsing the self-actualizing process
—
the process of facing what exists in oneself in potentia
(which is always unknown) and bringing it into actuality
(p. 55).
One reason why novels, dramatic plays, and movies exert such
a powerful influence is that the viewer, as he is swept into the emo-
tion of the work, identifies with one or more of the characters.
Their struggles become his struggles, their future becomes his future.
His own view of what he may become is patterned after the qualities
and ideals represented by the character with whom he identifies. As
the character unfolds, new aspects of what he may become unfold. The
viewer is engulfed in a creative process of unusual proportions. In
the broadest sense," Jordan writes, "the arts are the means by which
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man presents to himself visions of possibilities-intimations of what
might be. Art may symbolize many things, but from the Anisa theo-
retical perspective, its chief function is to symbolize potentiality"
(ibid., p. 54).
The aesthetic experience, whether it comes to one as artist
or connoisseur, has a transforming effect because it stimulates a
new ordering of things within the individual that is triggered by the
o^dciiring of elements within the form of the work, itself. In the
following passage Jordan explains how the ordering of elements that
make up the form of an art work influence the psychological change
within the individual:
Form does not refer simply to shape but to relationships
among parts. Discussing parts and wholes is just another
way of discussing differentiations and their integrations.
Integrating or ordering the various parts creates the
form. The form is therefore the embodiment of order. . . .
Thus, the 'visions of possibilities' which works of
art present to us are intimations of new orderings or new
integrations which represent what is to be striven after.
These visions are lures which give order and direction to
the striving. Order is the primary characteristic of
any living organism; when order goes, life is snuffed out.
Therefore, the creation of form as an expression of order
is a symbolic affirmation of life and the prerequisites for
survival (ibid., pp. 54-55).
Because the aesthetic experience is an inner response to an
external form which throws light on new aspects of who we are, it may
be regarded as the subjective form of transcendence which leads to
greater self-discovery and self-mastery. It stands in contrast to
the objective form which is grounded in scientific knowledge and
which leads to greater discovery of the external world and mastery of
the environment. As such, the aesthetic mode of symbolization makes
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it possible for man to be conscious of the concresence taking place
within him-a process which is alive in the world and which only he
is capable of knowing. "Every thinking and feeling being is grounded
in the present of a creative process," Foss (1949) writes. "But it
is in art and poetry that this truth is lifted into the spotlight of
our consciousness.
. . . Therefore," he continues, "art reaches into
depths into which our daily life with its various ritual can scarcely
follow. And therefore art is not a whimsical and arbitrary pastime,
but a fundamental insight" (p. 110).
Other symbol systems
. Earlier in the chapter we defined a
symbol system as a set of signs with conceptual referents arranged in
patterns according to commonly understood rules or methods that bring
order and understanding to man’s interaction with the environment.
While mathematics, language, and the arts are the basic symbol systems
mediating man's interaction with the world, there are other symbol
systems which also have a considerable role to play in human life.
Other symbol systems to be discussed briefly are religious symbols,
archetypes, scientific symbols, and money.
All religions have a set of symbols which are used according
to commonly understood rules and which bring order and understanding
to man’s relationship with the unknown. Warner (1959), in his
anthropological analysis of a New England town, found that one could
not fully understand a culture unless one understood how its people
relate to the unknown environment and that this in turn could not be
known without examining the culture’s religious symbols that mediate
the people's interaction with the unknown.
14 3
Phenix's (1954) discussion of the role of sacred symbols in
religious experience sheds light on their special function. Pher.ix
explains that religious symbols serve as powerful reminders of tie
divine and help make the believer conscious of what his attitudes
towards God and life should be. Dividing religious symbols into
sacred acts and sacred objects, and using Roman Catholicism as an
example, Phenix identifies the sacraments of baptism, conf irmaticn,
the eucharist, ordination, marriage, pennance, and extreme uncticn as
sacred acts. The Bible and the Word of God within it, crosses, cru-
c^^^xes
>
an<3 the object associated with each sacrament are among
Catholicism's sacred objects. Each sacrament and sacred object ''has
a peculiar power of generating the type of religious awareness
appropriate to it" (ibid., p. 185).
Phenix cites the example of baptism to explain how religious
symbols work. The washing of the penitent with water has a special
significance related to the essential purity of the water and its
universal use in eating, healing, and washing. The external act of
cleansing oneself in the sacrament of baptism symbolizes one's com-
mitment to inner purification. "The act is symbolic," Phenix remarks,
"because such purification is vividly seen as the very partial
reflection of what real purification might be. That is, the limitless
possibilities of forgiveness and inner purity are glimpsed in the
moment of receiving the partial and imperfect outward purification by
water" (ibid., p. 186). Other sacraments function in essentially the
same way: the sacred objects of the sacrament and the way they are
used symbolize an ideal of what one's inner attitude ought to be.
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Phenix asserts that the fundamental character of religious
symbols can be misunderstood if two factors are not kept in mind:
(1) the sacredness of the object or acts is not due to their own
intrinsic properties, and (2) the symbols are not merely arbitrary
rites and objects agreed upon by social convention but have a special
power that lies beyond the meaning of the symbols created by man.
Phenix reports that when the first factor is forgotten, as it tends
to be by the conservative element of the Church, the symbolic power
of the sacraments to point to a higher meaning beyond themselves is lost
and the sacrament degenerates into a superstitious fetish. (The reader
will recall from the discussion in Chapter III that this phenomenon
could be described psychologically as the breaking down of the "psychic
distance" between the symbol and its referent, a condition that results
in confusing the symbol with its referent, and is common to young
children, aphasics, and primitive man.) If the second factor is for-
gotten, as it tends to be by the liberal element within the Church,
the mystical meaning that lies behind sacred symbols is thrown out
with the symbols and religion becomes excessively rationalistic. The
balance that comes from keeping both factors in mind is difficult to
strike. The ultimate purpose of religious symbols, Phenix concludes,
is to help one recognize "the whole world as a sacramental uni^ers^, .
Particular symbols serve their true purpose only when they lead out
beyond themselves, not to the momentary vision of the divine, but to
the habitual realization of the religious dimension in every human
experience" (ibid., p. 189).
Archetypes are another type of symbol that fit our
definition
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of a symbol system with the qualification that the meaning of the
symbols is valid for the individual and not for all of society.
According to Jung (1964), each person has a unique archetypal symbol
system the significance of which is specific to him alone. Because
archetypal symbols are part of each person’s unconscious life, they
could be regarded as a universal symbol system. Because the meaning
of an archetype is entirely personal and because they take the form
of images, they fall within the realm of aesthetic symbolization.
Scientific symbols are another viable symbol system. Also
discursive, the symbols that stand for chemicals (l^O, for example)
represent more than the names of the elements that make up a compound:
they exemplify the atomic theory of matter and reflect an analytical
way of looking at the world (Rapoport 1965). As such, scientific
symbols are an abstraction in their own right and not just a short
hand for a recipe.
The language of chemistry comes close to being a code, but,
because it represents a systematic and theoretical approach to concep-
tual reality, may be regarded as a symbol system in its own right. A
code is a system of visual figures, auditory signals, or tactile cues,
arbitrarily devised, that stand in one-to-one correspondence to the
signs of another symbol system, as in the finger alphabet of the deaf,
Morse code, or Braille. A code may also stand for a set of pre-
arranged meanings, as in flag signalling, the lanterns placed by Paul
Revere in the North Church ("one if by land, two if by sea"), or the
innocuous phrase that represents an important message broadcast over
the radio to the underground behind enemy lines (e.g., "When the crow
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strikes, bring in the bacon.").
Money is another system of symbols that fits within the frame-
work of our definition. It consists of a set of symbols (coins azi
bills) that stand for financial values which are recognized withir. a
society as negotiable currency usable as a means of exchange for
material goods and services. Money is a logical symbol system ic that
the signs are based on the mathematical symbols of number. Each has
a numerical value which is endowed with financial value, the financial
value being in one—to—one correspondence with the numerical value.
Rapoport (1965) presents a historical view of the develop-ent
of money as a symbol system which demonstrates its true symbolic value.
Originally, he states, money, as precious metals, had intrinsic worth
and thus was more of a signal than a symbol, for the sign had yet to
be emancipated from its natural referent. Value was in direct corres-
pondence to weight. As time went by, the precious metals were taken
out of circulation, kept in the state treasury, and replaced by coins
of cheap metal and bills of paper. A vestige of the earlier system
still remains, however, "in some countries where the bills of larger
denominations are larger (as if the paper had intrinsic worth)" (p. 101).
Today, currency can be replaced by checks, and credit itself, repre-
sented by a plastic card, has become a negotiable medium. The develop-
ment of money as a symbol system has followed a chain of increasing
abstractions until one’s material wealth may be symbolized by a small
card which gives one the power to buy things equal to, and in some
cases, greater than, money itself.
Symbols as Mediators Between Man
and the Environments
147
As has been discussed previously, symbols are used to mediate
man’s interaction with the world. Elaborating on the work of Warner
(1959, p. 486)
,
Jordan (1973a) divides the world of man's experience
into the physical, human, and unknown environments. The classification
of the world into these three environments is useful in that it makes
possible an orderly classification of information about the world which
culture accumulates. Below is a list of what the environments include
and the bodies of information, or disciplines, that have accrued around
them (Jordan and Streets 1973)
:
Physical Environment Human Environment Unknown Environment
Includes all matter
which comprises the
mineral, vegetable, and
animal levels of phylo-
geny.
Disciplines include the
physical and biological
sciences, technology and
computer science.
Includes all human
beings
.
Disciplines include the
social sciences, his-
tory, communications,
law, human rights, and
ethics
.
Includes the future,
latent potentiali-
ties, the infinitude
of the universe,
death, and all the
undiscovered phe-
nomena of the physi-
cal and human en-
vironments .
Disciplines include
philosophy and
religion.
The differences among the three environments are not hard and
fast. They are closely interrelated. For example, the physical
environment may be said to include the human body which is composed
of matter and is subject to biological and chemical laws. Indeed, the
science of medicine as it exists today is more closely allied to the
physical sciences than the social sciences. Likewise, the human
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environment necessarily includes physical elements because all humans
have bodies and human behavior has definite physiological under-
pinnings; the discipline of physiological psychology has been estab-
lished to examine those underpinnings. Also, the arrangement of the
physical environment has a strong impact on the quality of human life
and therefore the social sciences must concern themselves with ecology
and its implications for the regulation of the environment. Lastly,
the unknown environment encompasses both the physical and human
environment in that each has unknown elements, the discovery of which
is the purpose of the physical and social sciences. Moreover, each
human has unlimited potential—much of which is unknown. In this
sense, the environments are hierarchical, as depicted by the diagram
below:
Unknown
Human —
Physical
This diagram, while it does depict the hierarchical relationship among
the environments, fails to portray adequately the infinitude of the
unknowns that lie within each environment. The infinitude of outer
space, for instance, stands as a lesson to man that even in the
physical environment, knowledge of which is by far more certain than
is knowledge of the human and unknown environments, vast and inex-
haustible phenomena exist which can be pursued throughout eternity.
In addition to the physical, human, and unknown environment,
the Anisa Model identifies the self as a fourth environment, the most
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omnipresent of all environments for a given person. While the 3elf
is not a material entity in the absolute sense, it is housed within
the body and is influenced by the body's condition. Moreover, it is
human and contains innumerable unknowns, and thus may be regarded as
holding within it all three environments.
The dominant characteristic of the self is consciousness.
As was discussed in Chapters II and III, symbolization is the activity
of the mind tnrough which man knows the world. In this sense symboli-
zation functions as a mediator between man and the world.
As has been demonstrated earlier, all abstract knowledge, under-
standing, and thought are achieved through symbolization.
As the diagram on page 148 shows, knowledge of each environ-
ment may be classified according to certain types. While the distinc-
tions between the physical sciences and the social sciences, and between
the social sciences and philosophy and religion are not exact, they
nevertheless are significant enough to warrant classification.
The classes of disciplines which make up what man knows about
the environments not only derive their distinctive characteristics
from their objects of study, but from the method of study as well.
Each discipline is more than a body of information; it also embodies
definite patterns of thinking about the world, patterns which derive
their character from the mode of symbolization used to formulate the
thoughts that lead to the different classes of disciplines. The
product of knowledge and the means by which it is constructed are
fused with the same character. Thus the logical disciplines, such as
the physical and social sciences, and philosophy have as their
object
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scientific knowledge, the construction of which is accomplished through
the mediation of the logical symbol systems, and more precisely, the
physical sciences are based on the laws expressed primarily through
mathematics and the social sciences are based on theories expressed
principally through language. Likewise, the non-logical 1 discipline
of religion has as its object the formation of ideals and the develop-
ment of faith, which are acquired and expressed through the aesthetic
mode of symbolization. Thus, the scheme on p. 151 is proposed. The
following sub—sections discuss the role the symbol systems play in
mediating man's interaction with the environments.
Mathematics and the physical environment
. The goal of science
is to uncover the truth about reality and to explain it in empirical
terms. Whitehead (1933) states that truth is measured by the degree
to which appearance conforms to reality. A lie, for example, is an
appearance which conflicts with reality. The belief in the racial
superiority of whites, based on results of I.Q. tests scores, income
and educational level, is fallacious because appearance, represented
in the criteria, is at variance with reality—what science knows about
the genetic equality of mankind as regards learning potential and
intellectual capacity. The belief that a rain dance will bring rain
is erroneous because the appearance of rain that comes after a dance
is due to coincidence and not a cause-effect relation. A belief
based on coincidence instead of fact is ill-founded.
1
The term non-logical is to be distinguished from illogical .
Religion and faith, while they may transcend logic and reason, must
never oppose it.
CLASSIFICATION
OF
ENVIRONMENTS
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Because the appearance of physical phenomena conforms exactly
to the truth of physical reality, the representation of the phenomena
by symbols that stand in direct correspondence to them will be truth-
ful. Mathematics tries to do just that. It is ideally designed for
representing one aspect of the physical world, namely, the amount of
things and the quantitative aspects of relationships. Each number
is a class whose criterial attribute is the number itself. The
formula for making a new number (n + 1) is entirely systematic and
regular, as are all .mathematical operations. Through mathematics, the
physical world of space and time may be divided into different units
of amounts, such as size (weight, height, width, depth, and length);
duration (seconds, minutes, hours, days, etc.); direction (latitude,
longitude, degrees of a circle); temperature; and distance. It may
also be conceived as relations expressed mathematically as ratios, such
as velocity (distance/time)
; acceleration (the rate of change of
velocity); density (mass/volume); and volume (mass/density). Each of
these phenomena can be quantified and assigned a number which stands
in direct correspondence to it. Because the conformity of appearance
to reality is more or less exact, the numbers assigned to the quanti-
ties are more or less exact representations of reality. Thus the
relations among physical phenomena can be quite accurately described
by mathematics. Mathematics, therefore, has been the system of repre-
sentation used to construct laws that describe with great reliability
how physical phenomena function. Language how much more so the arts
would be grossly inadequate for this function because of the ambiguity
inherent in the symbol system itself.
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In the following passage, Whitehead (1929c) explains that
algebra, one of the forms or modes of mathematics, is the ideal
instrument for representing the physical world, which, he states,
"is infested with quantity."
. . . algebra is the intellectual instrument which has been
created for rendering clear the quantitative aspects of the
world. There is no getting out of it. Through and through
the world is infected with quantity. To talk sense is to
talk in quantities. It is no use saying the nation is large.
How large? It is no use saying that radium is scarce,
—
How scarce? You cannot escape quantity. You may flee to
poetry and to music, and quantity and number will face you
in your rhythms and your octaves (p. 7).
We would expect, then, that mathematics would be the symbol
system to use when trying to ascertain the relations among things in
the physical environment. Mathematics will be useful in representing
human phenomena to the degree that those phenomena are quantifiable.
Because mathematics is the symbol system used by scientists
to discover truth about the physical world, we would also expect the
search for truth and the joy of discovering it through mathematics to
be regarded by some scientists as profoundly spiritual—spiritual in
the sense that man finds himself on the cutting edge of that ever-
ascending arrow that penetrates into the unknown and is propelled by
the scientist’s search for knowledge and devotion to ideals like truth
and order that science upholds. Indeed, numerous scientists, and
mathematicians, Einstein and Whitehead most notably, have extolled the
beauty of mathematics and acknowledge the spiritual feeling they feel
it engenders. Rapoport (1965) argues that mathematic thought may be
as profound an experience as religion:
Without for a moment doubting the intensity and depth of
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religious experience in those who profess to have it I
suggest that the inner experiences associated with
mathematicizing (I do not mean calculations but the
creative use of mathematics, epitomized in the thought-
masterpieces of Newton, Gauss, Ramanujan, Einstein, ’and
on euman, are equally profound. Nevertheless, the pro-ponents of the view that religious symbolism marks thehighest or noblest symbolic experience seldom, if ever,
regard mathematical thought as comparable to it (but
Einstein did) (p. 100).
Language ana the human environment
. The major type of inter-
action mediated by the use of language is human interaction. The
renowned linguist, Edward Sapir, wrote, "language is the communicative
process par excellence in every known society" (cited by Jakobson 1972,
p. 76). He also referred to language as "an essentially perfect means
of expression and communication among every known people" (cited by
Jesperson 1922, p. 413). Vygotsky (1962), describing the role of
speech in mediating human interaction, wrote: "Rational, intentional
conveying of experience and thought to others requires a mediating
system, the prototype of which is human speech . . ." (p. 6).
Language is such an implicit part of human life that it has
been acclaimed by linguists, anthropologists, and psychologists as
the foremost distinguishing attributes of man. It is ideally suited
to be the mediator of human interaction for two major reasons. First,
its biological basis enables all normal people to learn to speak with-
out effort when raised under normal conditions. Second, language is
verbal and leaves the hands—the only other part of the body that
rivals the voice in expressiveness— free to do other things. Because
of these two factors, speech can go on at the same time as other
activities. Man does not need to stop what he is doing to talk. This
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makes human interchange natural and convenient. As a social animal,
man depends on communication for survival. The ease with which he
can communicate with others facilitates orderly and efficient cor-
porate action.
Beyond verbal communication, language is also the primary
instrument for the construction of the social sciences. While less
precise than mathematics, language is more versatile and more capable
of describing the subtleties and complexities of human experience,
which, unlike physical phenomena, operate in more unpredictable ways.
With man the discrepancy between appearance and reality is considerable.
One's actions may not reveal one's motives. Much human behavior is
irrational and without apparent cause. Also, one's immanence and
potential, usually unknown to others, are both important parts of one's
reality. The apparent man is not the real man. Thus, with man the
relation of appearance to reality is inexact, in many cases puzzling,
and often inexplicable. Moreover, because of consciousness, man is
able to control his own life and is not bound to react to natural
forces in prescribed ways, as lower forms of life are. His control of
his own destiny is considerable, and therefore is subject to extreme
variability. So many are the factors that contribute to human behavior
that they cannot be reduced to mathematical formulas. Because of the
wide divergence between appearance and reality, the formulas set forth
by behaviorists like Thorndike (1913) , Hull (1952) , and Spence (1956)
have proven inadequate as theoretical explanations of human behavior.
The proof of their inadequacy is that teachers, counselors, and social
workers can not use them as guides to everyday practice.
Mathematical
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formulas will always fail to predict human behavior because the subjec-
tive factors governing behavior are too great to be accounted for by
mathematics. Another person who understands how the subjective mind
functions is needed to figure out what people will do under certain
circumstances. The instrument best suited for this analysis is logi-
cal thought and language.
Because language is the medium best suited to mediate human
interation, it is also the best medium for instruction. Learning is
a social activity involving in its higher forms an interchange of
thought between people. As such, it cannot be achieved without lan-
guage. If one studies mathematics, he is taught through language.
He cannot learn math or science through math alone. One*s questions
and difficulties in understanding the subject can only be uncovered
and solved through language. And the same is true of the arts. And
thus all texts for science and the arts are in written language and
not in mathematics or aesthetic symbols.
Language, because it is discursive, may also be used to
describe the physical environment. But it yields to mathematics be-
cause it cannot measure. If we want to paint the house, we must
measure the length and height of the walls and compute the total area
to know how much paint to buy.
Language, because of its versatility, is also used in aesthe-
tic symbolization. Literature, whether in the form of poetry, drama,
novels, or short stories, is considered an art form because while its
external form is discursive, its effect is in its impact as a totality.
Moreover, the function of literature is to expose the intensity and
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significance of human struggle in all its dignity and glory, its
abasement and shallowness. Depth of feeling and power of insight into
the human condition is the author's goal. Langer (1942) describes
most clearly how literature serves as an art form in her discussion
of poetry:
The poem as a whole is the bearer of artistic import, as a
painting or a drama is. We may isolate significant lines, as
we may isolate beauties in any work, but if their meaning is
not determined and supported by their context, the entire
then that work is a failure despite the germ of excel-
lence it contains.
. . . 'Artistic truth' does not belong
to statements in the poem or their obvious figurative mean-
ings, but to its figures and meanings as they are used
, by
its statements as they are made
,
its of word—sound and
sequence, rhythm and recurrence and rhyme, color and image
and the speed of their passage— in short, to the poem as
significant form. ' The material of poetry is discursive,
but the product— the artistic phenomenon—is not; its signi-
ficance is purely implicit in the poem as a totality, as a
form compounded of sound and suggestion, statement and reti-
cence, and no translation can reincarnate that. Poetry may
be approximated in other languages and give rise to surpris-
ingly beautiful new versions revealing new possibilities
of its skeletal literal ideas and rhetorical devices; but
the product i^s new, like an orchestral scoring of an organ-
fugue, a piano version of a string quartet, or a photograph
of a painting (pp. 220-21).
The arts and the unknown environment . Because unknowns are not
apparent, the relation between appearance and reality is extremely dif-
ficult to grasp. The future, the behavior of friends and strangers,
questions of ultimate concern, the fate of consciousness after death,
and an infinitude of facts about the physical and human worlds remain
beyond our comprehension. Because so much of life is unknown, man
would be paralyzed if he were to operate solely on the basis of what
he knows.
Man interacts with unknowns on the basis of hypothesis, or,
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to use a more general term, faith; he also forms ideals which serve
as lures, attracting him into the unknown in search of them. With-
out faith, man is unable to activate his will to strive; without
ideals, he has nothing to strive for.
Faith is subjective orientation to the future. Ideals, as
conceptions of perfection, are also subjective conceptions expressed
in the present as attitudes and values. Neither can be quantified
by mathematics nor described by language with scientific precision.
They are best represented symbolically by the arts, which, through
the creation of significant forms, objectify subjective states. Jor-
dan (1975c), in a discussion of the role of the arts in the child's
exploration of unknowns, explains that the arts require an exercise
of faith and how they help us represent ideals:
To approach an unknown requires faith. To work as an
artist is to exercise faith in approaching the unknown,
and if this can be done under benevolent circumstances
where risk levels are tolerable and the resultant anxiety
therefore manageable and even pleasant, so much the better.
When a child places before himself a blank sheet of
paper in preparation for finger painting, he is confronting
an unknown. To place a stroke on the paper is to introduce
an element of differentiation or contrast onto the page.
When a second stroke is placed, further differentiation
occurs but now a relationship has to be considered between
the two marks. As additional patches of color or lines are
placed on the paper, form of some kind emerges. If the form
is characterized by organic unity, if it is not monotonous
or confused, but has variety that is coordinated or unified,
we are apt to say that the painting or sketch is beautiful;
it has order of a certain kind and that order has the power
of a lure. It is attractive.
Thus, the awareness of unknowns and the inner urge to
explore them is an expression of the internal principle of
unrest which nudges us forward. Participation in art activi-
ties feeds this principle of unrest and keeps it alive (p. 55).
The artist, then, is an accomplished explorer of unknowns whose
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experience in creating beautiful and significant forms out of the
crude material with which he works makes him as much a finder as a
seeker.
The urge to penetrate unknown realms, to achieve something
original, may be felt by every one of us now and then; to
that extent, we can all fancy ourselves potential artists
—
mute inglorious Miltons. What sets the real artist apart
is not so much time desire to seek
,
but that mysterious
ability to find which we call talent. We also speak of it
as a gift,' implying that it is a sort of present from some
higher power; or as 'genius,' a term which originally meant
that a ^higher power—a kind of 'good demon'—inhabits the
artist's body and acts through him (Janson 1974, p. 12).
The degree to which the artist creates forms that move the
viewer or listener to empathize with the beauty of his work is the
degree to which he actualizes potentiality, transforming his materials
into beautiful forms, and awakening the dormant emotions of the viewer
and aligning them with the expression of his forms. In so doing he
creates a new vision of reality which gives both himself and the
viewer a vision of new possibilities. Great works of art, Cassirer
(1944) writes,
. . . are not simply a momentary outburst of passionate feel-
ing; they reveal a deep unity and continuity. The great
tragic and comic writers . . . Euripides and Shakespeare,
Cervantes and Moliere—do not entertain us with detached
scenes from the spectacle of life. Taken in themselves these
scenes are but fugitive shadows. But suddenly we begin to
seek behind these shadows and to envisage a new reality.
Through his characters and actions the comic and the tragic
poet reveals his view of human life as a whole, of its great-
ness and weakness, its sublimity and its absurdity. 'Art,'
wrote Goethe, 'does not undertake to emulate nature in its
breadth and depth. It sticks to the surface of natural
phenomena; but it has its own depth, its own power; it
crystallizes the highest moments of these superficial
phenomena by reorganizing in them the character of lawful-
ness, the perfection of harmonious proportion, the summit
of beauty, the dignity of significance, the height of pas-
sion' (Werke, XLV, p. 260). This fixation of the 'highest
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moments of phenomena' is neither an imitation of physicalthings nor a mere overflow of powerful feelings. It is aninterpretation of reality—not by concepts but by intui-
tions; not through the medium of thought but through that
of sensuous forms (p. 146).
Because the arts disclose new visions of reality, they are
the dominant symbol system of religion. The function of religion is
to imbue man with faith in the eternal realities and in his eternal
union with them, and in so doing to renew perpetually his inner life
so that his daily conduct reflects the ideals of order, harmony, and
beauty characteristic of the cosmic order. The arts have a central
role in the process of renewal because they are the physical embodi-
ment of the process and express the ideals that comprise the object
of the process. Throughout history religious leaders have sensed
the power of the arts to stimulate self re-creation and have been
responsible for commissioning much of the world's great art. Indeed,
religions, when at the peak of their influence, have produced works
of incomparable beauty, grace, and purity of feeling.
Foss (1949) asserts that art and religion are interrelated
and that art injects religion with novelty and thus rescues it from
sterility. Discussing what he calls the concept of 'world'—a uni-
versality of vision that sees the world in dynamic progression—he
writes
,
. . . art is interrelated with religion. Not even the
smallest poem can come into existence without a religious
ground. And from time immemorial religion has expressed
itself in the poetical form of hymn and drama. Just because
religion is always in danger of limiting itself to an acci-
dental and expedient system of ritual by which world is
turned into mere environmental organization, it finds its
true life again in the poetic expression of metaphorical
transcendence. Therefore the church has rightly taken
161
refuge in poetry and art in order to counterbalance itstendency to fixation and sterility.
Art . .
. tries to draw the sensuous sphere into theholy realm of creation, sanctifies and atones the mereprofaneness of our daily existence and changes it into
an expression of a spiritual aspiration (pp. 118-19).
Religion is not the only discipline that helps man relate to
the unknown environment. Philosophy's function is to disclose the
nature of reality, especially those abstruse realities which lie
beyond mere appearance. Philosophy, however, is logical and thus
language is its symbol system. Philosophy consists of deductive
propositions that derive from first principles which are expressed
as speculative propositions. It is the highest fruit of man's reason.
The difference between philosophy and religion, Phenix (1964)
explains, is embodied in the difference between their symbol systems.
He argues that the scope of philosophy is limited by its method, which
is logical and which cannot express the realms of meaning that lie
beyond language. The logic of language determines at the same time
philosophy's limits and its strengths.
If philosophy as a synoptic discipline is to provide
a common basis for interpreting the several realms of mean-
ing, then a single language system must be applied to the
entire range of meanings to be interpreted. For this pur-
pose discursive language is the natural choice. It then be-
comes a question, however, whether or not justice can be
done in philosophy to the realms of meaning that are not
expressible in discursive form, and whether or not philo-
sophical discourse is by its expressive structure biased in
favor of discursive meanings to the detriment of non-discur-
sive ones. These considerations suggest that philosophical
commitment to the method of conceptual dialectic may impose
substantial limitations on the adequacy of philosophy as an
interpretive discipline. Yet this limitation seems unavoid-
able, for dialectical examination is inherently discursive.
The process of comparison, correction, and generalization of
ideas that is the essence of interpretive inqui ry could not
be carried out by presentational forms, the essence of which
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is their uniqueness and incomparability. Discursive lan-guage therefore seems to be the only means available for
the work of reflective thought about the meaning of mean-ings (p. 255 ).
Where philosophy’s logical method ends,- religion's intuitive
and supra-rational method begins. In contrast to philosophers, who
build their systems on axioms and deductions from them, religionists
hold that their beliefs are founded on teachings given by charismatic
figures like Moses, Christ, Buddha, and Muhammad, who claim a direct
connection with God. Thus, religionists do not feel bound to human
reason, but believe their views to be supra-rational. Religion, while
it may transcend reason, must never oppose it, lest it degenerate
into superstition. In transcending reason, religion embraces the
full breadth of human experience: the power of emotion, the subtlety
of intuition, the omnipresence of the unconscious. It seeks to
harmonize these aspects of human nature by organizing them around the
central principles of humility before the unknown and faith in the
inscrutable wisdom of the Final Cause, the Source of Sources, the
Hidden and the Manifest. Art sails on religion’s sea, while language
sets the course of philosophy’s argument. While philosophers may wax
poetic, they do it with religious fervor. The line between the two
is thin. When the philosopher approaches it, he drops his pen and
exclaims the wonders of the universe.
Animal Cognition and Use of Signs
Recent interest in the intelligence of primates, most notably
chimpanzees, has sparked extensive research into their ability to learn
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language through the presentation of visual, rather than the verbal,
cues. The literature generated from this research has stimulated a
lively debate between linguists, psychologists, and the researchers
as to whether the animals studied actually show true linguistic—and
symbolic—behavior. A review of this literature from the theoretical
perspective presented here should shed some light on the question
of boundary conditions between man and lower forms of life.
Experiments between 1900 and 1950 to teach primates to learn
language were not encouraging. Attempts were made by Furness in the
early 1900s to teach a female orangutan. The Kellogg’s (1933) raised
a chimp, Gua, with their infant son, hoping that treating the chimp
just like a human baby would yield new information. The Hayes' (1951)
raised Viki. The results were discouraging. No ape had mastered
more than four words. The case against apes learning language
seemed closed.
Amon (1975) reports that Lieberman at the University of Con-
necticut discovered that the lower jaw of the mature chimpanzee was
similar to the lower jaw of a newborn baby. Subsequent exploration
revealed that both apes and infants had vocal tracts quite different
from those of older children and adults. Researchers hypothesized
that the reason chimpanzees cannot talk might be due to an undeveloped
vocal tract and not cognitive deficiency. This hypothesis prompted
a number of efforts to teach apes sign rather than verbal language.
Foremost among these studies are those by Gardner and Gardner (1969)
and Premack (1971).
The Gardners raised the chimp Washoe like a deaf human infant,
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signaling to her with the gestures of American Sign Language. Premack
taught another chimp, Sara, to read and manipulate plastic symbols
placed on a magnetic board. Both were rewarded whenever they used
the signs correctly. Sara was taught under strictly operant condi-
tioning procedures. Whenever she put the symbols in the right order,
she was given a treat. By the time Washoe was four years old, she
could reliably respond to and produce more than 80 signs. She was
able to apply the sign first learned through association with one
thing to things in the same class, thereby displaying an ability
to generalize. "The sign for 'flower' is a particularly good example
of transfer," the Gardners (1969) wrote, "because flowers occur in
so many varieties, indoors and outdoors, and in pictures, yet Washoe
uses the same sign for all" (pp. 670-71). Sara acquired a vocabulary
of similar size, demonstrating the use of over 60 nouns, 20 verbs,
and 30 other words, including adjectives and adverbs. Unlike
Washoe, Sara did not use her signs to communicate with others. Her
use of them was restricted to her magnetic board and the problems
Premack and his associates posed.
To find out whether what the chimps have learned is symbolic,
we will analyze their performance according to the functions (emanci-
patic, binding, epistemological, and communicative) and properties
(freely-creative
,
representational, and learned) presented earlier
in this chapter. We will also look at the question of whether their
use of signs is truly syntactical—a fundamental component of human
language.
Emancipative function . As defined earlier in the chapter,
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the emancipative function of symbolization suspends consciousness
beyond the limits of time and space by representing things in the
past, future, or distant space through symbols. Bronowski and Bellugi
(1970) list three criteria which make up the emancipative function,
referred by them as "disengagement from context." Below the criteria
are listed and followed by a brief commentary discussing how chimpan-
zees meet up to them.
1. A delay between the arrival of the stimulus and the
utterance of the message that it has provoked or between
the receipt of the incoming signal and the sending out of
a signal (ibid., p. 670).
Bronowski and Bellugi report that "there is a wealth of re-
search which connects the increase in the delayed response of primates
with the development of the frontal lobes of the brain (ibid., p. 671).
Glucksberg (1966) reports on delayed alternation, reversal shift, and
delayed response experiments indicate that primates have ability to
store stimulus once and react to them after time has elapsed.
2. The prolongation of reference, namely, the ability to
refer backward and forward in time and to exchange messages
which propose action in the future (Bronowski and Bellugi
1970, p. 670).
Bronowski and Bellugi remark that the chimps and young chil-
dren (2-3 years) are not far different in their ability to refer back-
ward and forward in time. The words of both are almost entirely based
in the present and are usually interpretable only with reference to
the immediate context. Sarah and Washoe do demonstrate rudimentary
reference to situations in the immediate past (all gone iuice ) or the
not present (more cookie ) . Washoe has been observed to sign listen
when an alarm clock stopped ringing and more food when there was no
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food before him. However, the ability to refer to the distant past
or future is clearly beyond them (Amon 1975).
3. The internalization of language, so that it ceases
to be only a means of social communication and becomes
also an instrument of reflection and exploration with
which the speaker constructs hypothetical messages before
he chooses one to utter . .
. (Bronowski and Bellugi 1970,
p. 670).
Washoe and Sarah give little indication that their sign lan-
guage is used as an instrument of reflection. Washoe has been known
to correct her own signing and to sign spontaneously to herself before
a mirror, or in bed at nap time. The Gardners have termed this behav-
ior idle chatter.
Bronowski and Bellugi (1970) compare this behavior to the
tape recordings of the vocal play of Weir's (1962) two and a half
year old son. "The child," they report, "definitely used language
as an instrument of exploration. His monologues show a great deal
of syntactic play, arrangements and rearrangements, transformation
of sentence types, substitution of words in fixed sentence frames, and
so forth. It is not just idle chatter, although it has no social
function, no intent to instruct someone else, and consists in large
part of explorations of structure. It is in fact the extreme form
of that 'distancing from any immediate context'. . . (p. 671). It
would seem then that the chimps do not demonstrate behavior that only
faintly approximates the reflective vocal play of human infants.
In sum, the evidence shows that the chimps demonstrate only
the most rudimentary form of emancipative symbolization. While their
ability is somewhat comparable to the 1^-2-year old, they are com-
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pletely outstripped by the 4-year old.
Binding function
. The binding function of symbols ties to-
gether the referent and the individual with either an emotional or
conceptual bond. But in order for the binding function to occur, one
must first be able to separate the emotional or conceptual meaning
from the symbol. This requires the distance achieved by the emancipa-
tive function. Bronowski and Bellugi (1970) refer to this ability as
the separation of affect or emotional change from the content of the
instruction which a message carries" (p. 670).
Washoe shows some indications of being able to separate
affect from the content of signs. Her spontaneous naming of objects
gives no indication of desire for the object. But her use of signs
seems generally comparable to that of a two year old, whose words stem
from immediate desires and her emotional states (hurry open , gimme
drink )
.
There seems to be a big difference, though, between Washoe
and the three year old child, who "is able to understand and inter-
pret correctly cognitive sentences without emotional charge. He has
mastered the difference between 'I want that* and 'She fed him,' and
can separate out the immediate pleasures and emotional components of
words from their objective meanings in sentences" (ibid., p. 671).
We may conclude that Washoe shows elementary ability to dif-
ferentiate affect from content. But Amon's (1975) report that Washoe
bristled with anger when she saw a picture of a dog in a book indi-
cates that for Washoe the picture was more a signal of the dog than
a symbol of it. This demonstrates a lack of what Langer (1942) called
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"abstractive seeing," an ability which she terms "the foundation of
our rationality" which no other animal shares. She says that dogs
scorn ou,r paintings because they see colored canvases, not pictures
(p. 70). Washoe, while evidently more developed than the dog, none-
theless cannot be said to have achieved true "abstractive seeing."
Epistemological function
. The epistemological function is
the means by which symbols transform the raw data of concrete experi-
ence into knowledge. Bronowski and Bellugi (1970) refer to this
ability as
The structural activity of reconstitution, which consists
of two linked procedures—namely, a procedure of analysis,
by which messages are not treated as inviolate wholes but
are broken down into smaller parts, and a procedure of syn-
thesis by which the parts are rearranged to form the mes-
sages.
. . . This constitutes 'the logical ability of humans
to influence their environment by understanding it; that
is, by analyzing it into parts and then making new combina-
tions from the parts' (p. 670).
The analysis and synthesis of experience and the formation of
messages that express that synthesis finds its structural basis in
the symbolic processes involved in the formation of sentences. It
cannot be viewed apart from syntactical operations that order words
so as to produce coherent meaning. Fodor, Bever, and Garret (1974),
concluding their analysis of the question of Sarah's possession of
syntax, report:
In the data available to us, there is no indication that
Sarah has ever done the most characteristic thing that a
productive syntax permits human speakers to do; namely, use
a sentence of syntactically novel form without being speci-
fically trained on sentences of that form. Productivity in
human languages exploits iterative syntactic mechanisms which
generate novel constituent sequences . If so, it has the
striking consequence that the 'language' that Sarah has
mastered is fundamentally nongenerative ; it specifies only a
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finite number of sentences, which could be exhausted byperforming all the permissible substitutions of lexical
xTy (Z)
in the baSiC Sentences and
Bronowski and Bellugi (1970) maintain that Washoe's "language"
is also not truly grammatical. "The signs for me, you, and tickle
,
for example, have occurred in all possible order in Washoe's signed
sequences. These different orders do not seem to refer to different
situations in any systematic way. For the same situation (requesting
someone to tickle her), Washoe signed you tickle and tickle you .
Washoe signed me tickle for someone tickling her and again me tickle
to indicate that she would tickle someone. Washoe's spontaneous
signed combinations seem so far rather like unordered sequences of
names for various aspects of a situation" (p. 672).
Washoe and Sarah, we may conclude, are unable to combine their
signs in ways that compare to the spontaneous grammatical sentences that
children of 3 or 4 produce. This inability reflects the greater in-
ability to perform the inner analysis and synthesis of concrete ex-
perience which constitutes the specifically human way of analyzing
our experience of the external world. Language, as "a constellation of
general faculties of the human," is an emblem of that process (ibid.).
What the example of the chimps show us, Bronowski and Bellugi conclude,
"is that it is the process of total reconstitution which is the evo-
lutionary hallmark of the human mind, and for which so far we have no
evidence in the mind of the nonhuman primate, even when he is given
the vocabulary ready-made" (ibid.).
Communicative function. Chimpanzees may be said to communi-
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cate insofar as the signs they use are comprehensible to others and
the signs of others are comprehensible to them. Both Sarah and Washoe
are able to do this. But what do they communicate? The evidence
shows that they communicate little else than their immediate needs.
While we might find an exclamation of pleasure after a special treat
has been received, we find no instances of conversation about how
delicious it was, how much less about the beauty of a sunset. Neither
do we find instances of conversation about thought. It seems to be
restricted to the here and now. We may conclude, then, that the chimps
show a modest ability to communicate, but we must side with Bertalanf-
fy's (1965) statement that "apes have nothing to say— they get along
quite well with warning and expressive cries, and without a repre-
sentative language symbolizing particular objects and features in
their umwelt" (p. 65).
Freely- created . Freely created symbols are those that are
the product of creative invention and which have no biological
basis. The signs that Sarah and Washoe use are clearly freely-created,
but they are created by humans and not by the chimps themselves.
Chimps have been known to put together two signs to form a compound
which they apply to a new object (for example, one chimp saw a duck
for the first time and gave the signs for water and bird ) (Amon 1973).
But this example of integration or inference is common among chimps
and some dogs. It is far removed from the creation of symbols. We
must conclude, then, that the chimps' use of signs is devoid of this
property.
Representative . The chimps definitely are able to use signs
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as referents, or names, for things. Moreover, they show the ability
to generalize the names they learn to new things of the same class.
Moreover, we may hypothesize that chimps would be unable to treat
names in the fully abstract manner in which humans do, as is attested
by the existence of homonyms and synonyms in all languages. We would
expect that the chimps' ability to name is confined to a one-to-one
correspondence between symbol and referent, and that the many-to-one
or one-to-many correspondence of synonyms and homonyms would baffle
them. In conclusion we may state that the ability to name is not
specifically human. Bronowski and Bellugi (1970) conclude that this
fact throws serious doubt on any theory of human language which seeks
to explain its uniqueness or its origin in a human ability to name"
(1970, p. 670). Naming, as Bertalanffy would agree, is a necessary
but insufficient criteria for human language.
Acquired by learning . Chimps quite clearly learn their signs;
but again, they learn them from humans and not other chimps. A num-
ber of species have shown the ability to pass on to other members
of the species learned behavior. Among them are the tit, a bird in the
British Isles that has learned to snap off the cardboard lids of milk
bottles to get at the cream (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1970) and a certain
finch in the Galapagos Islands that uses a cactus spine which it
holds in its beak to poke into crevices of tree bark to dislodge worms
on which it feeds (Dubos 1962). But this type of learning is achieved
through example and does not involve the use of symbols. Conclusions
about the ability of chimps to transmit their sign language to their
offspring are premature. More research must be conducted.
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Having reviewed Sarah and Washoe's performance relative to the
criteria for symbolization outlined earlier in this chapter, we may now
draw some final conclusions about whether they demonstrate true sym-
bolic behavior.
The chimps show rudimentary ability to delay their reaction
after the onset of a stimulus. They also show a definite ability to
assign meaning to signs on the basis of one-to-one correspondence and
to communicate with relative accuracy their emotional states and
curiosity in reaction to objects in their presence. But these
abilities alone are insufficient to warrant being called symbolic.
The chimps show neither the ability to abstract nor to create symbols
of their own. Anyone, whether man or animal, bereft of these abili-
ties cannot be said to possess symbolization in the complete sense.
The achievement of Sarah and Washoe seems to demonstrate man’s extra-
ordinary capacity as a teacher more than it demonstrates the chimpan-
zee's capacity for language.
A word more needs to be said about the implications of these
experiments for the existence of boundary conditions between man and
animal. The experiments have been regarded by many as proof that
human language evolved from the primate gestural system. But this
view should be carefully considered. Chomsky (1968), after setting
forth an argument against construing the ability of chimpanzees to
sign as "language" similar to the argument presented here, states that
the studies on animal communication provide little support for the
assumption that human language evolved directly from animal communica-
tion. "Rather, these studies simply bring out even more clearly the
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extent to which human language appears to be a unique phenomena, with-
out significant analogue in the animal world" (p. 59). Language,
he concludes, "is based on entirely different principles."
This, I think, is an important point, often overlooked
by those who approach human language as a natural, biologi-
cal phenomenon; in particular, it seems rather pointless,
for these reasons, to speculate about the evolution of
human language from simpler systems
—
perhaps as absurd as
it would be to speculate about the 'evolution' of atoms
from clouds of elementary particles.
As far as we know, possession of human language is
associated with a specific type of mental organization, not
simply a higher degree of intelligence. There seems to be
no substance to the view that human language is simply a
more complex instance of something to be found elsewhere
in the animal world (ibid., p. 62).
Eric Lenneberg (1967, 1969) builds a similar case. He main-
tains that language, as a profoundly cognitive activity, is species
specific:
Instead of thinking of language as a collection of
separate and mutually independent traits, one comes to
see it as a profoundly integrated activity. Language
is to be understood as an operation rather than a static
product of the mind. Its modus operandi reflects that of
human cognition, because language is an intimate part of
cognition (1969, p. 640).
A brain is an integrated organ, and cognition results
from the integrated operations of all its tissues and sub-
organs. Man's brain is not a chimpanzee's brain plus
added 'association facilities.'. . .
My assumption, therefore, is that man's cognition is
not essentially that of every other primate with merely the
addition of the capacity for language; instead, I propose
that his entire cognitive function, of which his capacity
for language is an integral part, is species-specific
(ibid., p. 642).
Lenneberg and Chomsky's view affirms the existence of a defi-
nite boundary condition between man and the lower primates. White's
(1949) analysis of the limits of animal intelligence, rendered twenty
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years before the new experiments on chimpanzees were reported, ap-
pears to have anticipated the results. "The difference between the
behavior of man and other animals may receive new values, may require
new meaning, but they cannot create and bestow them . ... And this
difference is one of kind, not of degree; a creature can either
'arbitrarily impose signification,' can either create and bestow
values, or he cannot. There are no intermediate stages" (p. 29).
The boundary condition that lies between man and the animals is that
between them lies the gulf of consciousness which, through the act
of symbolization, enables man to endow insignificant lines and sounds
with meaning, to abstract ideas from concrete experience, construct
knowledge, and transmit it to subsequent generations, to plan the
future and draw upon the past to make decisions in the present that
help him achieve his plans, and to bend these powers to the creation
of culture and the advanceemnt of civilization.
A Summary of the Theory of Symbolization
Below is an outline of the basic propositions of the theory of
symbolization presented in this chapter.
I. THE NATURE OF SYMBOLIZATION
Symbolization derives from the power of abstraction— the abil-
ity to differentiate possibility from actuality—and is its
chief means of expression. Symbolization gives form to con-
sciousness by enabling man to hold in his mind symbols that
represent aspects of reality so that those aspects may be
manipulated, combined and recombined, compared and contrasted,
integrated into existing conceptions, stored in memory for
future use, and shared with others. Symbolization is defined
as the capacity to use entities (symbols) to represent ab-
stractions (conceptions or meanings).
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II. THE BASIC FUNCTIONS OF SYMBOLIZATION
A
*
-P-
e emancipative function frees man from the limits of thehere and now, sustains consciousness, and enables him to
think about the past, the future, and things not imme-
diately present.
B * The binding function unites symbols with their referents,
enables symbols to take on the emotion originally associ-
ated with their referents, and gives symbols their energiz-
ing quality.
c * The epistemological function transforms the raw data of
experience into knowledge.
The communicative function enables man to encode and de-
code messages through words, writing, or gestures, and
to transmit knowledge from one generation to the next.
III. DEFINITION OF TERMS
A. Sign is a generic term that embraces both signs and signals.
B. A signal is an object or event that indicates the existence
of something through an intrinsic connection between it-
self and that which it signifies.
C. A symbol is an object or entity which represents an idea,
condition, quality, or the abstracted reality of a person
or object. Symbols, particularly words, can be used
denotatively to represent particular things and thus be-
come a short-cut between the symbol and the thing, the con-
ception of it being implicitly grasped.
D. A symbol system is a set of signs with conceptual referents;
the signs are arranged in patterns according to commonly
understood rules or methods. The pattern that emerges from
the arrangement of the signs conveys a meaning that is dif-
ferent from and transcends the import of its individual
units. Symbol systems ai*e used to mediate man’s interaction
with the world and to express the meaning that arises from
that interaction.
IV. PROPERTIES OF SYMBOLS
Symbols used by man have a number of properties which combine
to differentiate human symbols from the signals animals use.
A. Symbols are freely created in that there is no biologically
enforced connection between them and their referents and in
that their meaning is created by an act of abstraction.
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B. Symbols are representative in that they stand for abstracted
meaning.
C. Symbols are transmitted by learning in that their acquisi-
tion requires environmental assistance and does not depend
on genetic transmission.
D. Symbols are autonomous in that they have a life of their
own which evolves and functions according to their own
laws and not those of other classes of phenomena.
E. Symbols are insignificant in themselves in that their mean-
ing is usually independent of the characteristics of the
symbol itself.
F. Symbols evolve from uniformity to versatility
.
G. Symbols evolve from culture-boundedness to universality
.
V. SYMBOLS AS BEARERS OF MEANING
Meaning is a function of a relation between a sign and its
referent. This relationship may be signific, denotative, or
connotative. Meaning extends beyond the limits of what is
traditionally regarded as reason and rationality, and includes
such phenomena as intuition, feeling, sensation, emotion, and
insight.
A. Signification is the type of meaning that results when
the existence of something is signified by the juxtaposi-
tion of two intrinsically related events or objects, one
of which is a signal.
B. Denotation is the meaning carried by a symbol that names
something. Denotation involves a subject, a symbol, the
conception, and the object denoted.
C. Connotation is the abstract meaning of a symbol freed of
direct reference in time or space to its referent.
VI. SYMBOLIZATION HAS TWO MODES, LOGICAL AND AESTHETIC
A. The logical mode of symbolization conveys literal, explicit
meaning. The logical symbols
1. Are arranged according to a system of rules (syntax)
commonly understood by the users;
2. Represent meaning (semantic) understood by all who use
the symbols of the system; and
3. May be classified into systems, the major examples of
which are mathematics, language, scientific symbols, and
money
.
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B
* Ihe aesthetic mode of symbolization renders meaning that
is implicit and subjective. Its symbols are untranslat-
able, incomparable, metaphorical, and presented in a
single, unitary form. The types of art forms that fall
within the aesthetic mode are the visual arts, dance,
music, literature and poetry, religious symbols, and
archetypes
.
VII. SYMBOL SYSTEMS ARE USED TO MEDIATE MAN'S INTERACTION WITH
THE WORLD
The basic symbol systems of mathematics, language, and the
arts are used as the primary mediators of man's interaction
with the physical, human, and unknown environments, respec-
tively.
A. Mathematics, the most precise of the basic symbol systems,
is ideally suited for representing quantity and thus is
the primary mediator of man's interaction with the physical
environment
.
B. Language, as the most versatile of the symbol systems
and the system most intimately allied with thought, is
ideally suited to be used as the mediator of man's inter-
action with the human environment.
C. The arts, as the symbol system based on the presentation
of significant forms, is ideally suited to mediate man's
interaction with the unknown environment and to portray
the inner life of sentient, emotional, and subjective ex-
perience.
VIII. SYMBOLIZATION—A UNIQUELY HUMAN CAPACITY
Symbolization, as defined here, is a uniquely human capacity
and stands as a boundary condition separating the human and
animal levels of ontology.
CHAPTER V
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SYMBOLIZATION
Theoretical Considerations
If our discussion of the development of symbolization is to be
consistent with the philosophical and theoretical perspective already
established, basic features of the nature of development must first be
considered. To ensure coherence and consistency, the theory of develop-
ment set forth by the Anisa Model has been adopted as a general frame-
work.
As has been mentioned, the Anisa Model defines development as
the translation of potentiality into actuality and asserts that the
translation takes place through interaction with the environment.
Anisa' s theory of development is thus epigenetic, maintaining that
development involves an interplay between genetic and environmental
factors. The epigenetic view settles the nature-nurture controversy
by sharing how both nature and nurture contribute to development. In-
stead of looking to hereditary or environmental factors for the solu-
tion of developmental problems, it focuses attention on the interac-
tion between environment and genetic endowment and holds that the
in-
tensity of environmental pressures on development cannot be
understood
apart from the strength of the organism's genetic
predisposition. Be-
cause development occurs through interaction with the
environment, the
Anisa theory of development places supreme importance
on providing the
178
179
highest quality of interaction with superior environments as the best
way of guaranteeing that the potentialities of the organism will be
actualized to the fullest extent possible (Kalinowski and Jordan 1973).
The Anisa theory of development conceives of human potentiality
in two broad categories
—biological and psychological. The key factor
in the actualization of biological potentialities is nutrition, which
maintains the biological integrity of the body. The key factor in the
actualization of psychological potentialities is learning. The theory
of differentiation, integration, and generalization which underlie
all psychological development.
Differentiation is the ability to break down experience,
whether internal or external, into separate contrastable
elements. Integration is the ability to combine those
elements in a new way thereby providing new information,
new feelings, new skills, and new perceptions which may
or may not become expressed immediately in some form of
overt behavior. Generalization is the ability to utilize
that recombination in other situations (Kalinowski and
Jordan 1973, p. 23).
When the individual gains conscious control over these three processes,
he becomes a competent learner. The conscious ability to learn—re-
ferred to by Waddington as deutero-learning— is the highest form of
learning and is known only to man.
Symbolization as a psychological phenomenon has a biological
substrate. Like all human functions, its psychological basis is tied
to neural functioning. The strength of the biological base may to
some degree be related to language's neural determinants. Researchers
have yet to determine which aspects of language are innately specified
and which are learned. Even greater uncertainty exists concerning the
degree to which symbolization is innately specified. Since the theory
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of symbolization presented here holds that language is part of the larger
function of symbolization, we would hypothesize that symbolization has
a broader, although not necessarily a stronger, biological basis than
language. We can expect, then, that its full development depends on
the presence of nutritional factors necessary for optimal neural devel-
opment and on the necessary environmental stimulation needed for full
neurological functioning. Both nutrition and stimulation are required
during the period critical for neural development, a period which begins
at conception and spans the first 14 years and whose termination coin-
cides with the end of the critical period for language learning (Lenne-
berg 1967; Nash 1970).
While symbolization has definite biological underpinnings, it
has little or no influence on biological maturation. Its relation
to psychological potentialities is far more substantial. The ability
to symbolize is both rooted in psychological structures of human in-
telligence and intrinsically bound up with thought and learning. Its
contribution to the actualization of psychomotor, perceptual, cogni-
tive, affective, and volitional processes—the categories into which
the Anisa theory of development classifies psychological potentialities
is enormous. This chapter examines symbolization's roots in the
psychological structures of intelligence. The next chapter, Chapter
VI, explores the relation of symbolization to learning and the release
of psychomotor, perceptual, cognitive, affective, and volitional poten-
tialities.
A basic proposition of the Anisa theory of development is that
development is marked by sequences defined as "the order of those
changes
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in an organism that yield relatively permanent but novel increments not
only in its structure but in its mode of functioning as well" (Kalinow-
ski and Jordan 1973, p. 22). The progression of sequences is not
merely a unitary function whereby the end is present in the beginning
and simply has to unfold as a flower opens its petals in the morning.
Rather, the progression of sequences is hierarchical. "These
changes, Kalinowski and Jordan explain, "involve passage through
successive stages, each of which presupposes its antecedent and is
in turn a prerequisite to its successor" (ibid., p, 23). In some
cases, the order of stages in a sequence is invariant; in others,
stages vary in order of appearance. "In the actualization of both
biological and psychological potentialities, a stage— the basic unit
of change—consists of differentiation and integration. In psychologi-
cal expressions, a sub-stage, generalization, is added. The most ob-
vious example of this on the biological level is the differentiation
of cells and their integration into particular organs, bones, or tis-
sues" (ibid. )
.
Anisa’s view of development as consisting of sequences of stages
which are hierarchical coincides with the views of Piaget and Werner,
theorists whose contributions to cognitive development have been monu-
mental. Piaget (1973) maintains that development follows a series of
stages which, while not similar in chronology for all people, is in-
variant in sequence. These stages, he states, lead to 'a hierarchy of
structures which are built in a certain order of integration and which
moreover, interestingly enough, appear at senescence to disintegrate
in the reverse order ..." (p. 10). He also subscribes to
the epi-
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genetic view, as his colleague, Sinclair-deZwart (1973), explains:
Piaget qualifies his epistemological theory as interac-
tionist
^
and biological. Knowledge is acquired through the
subject s action upon, and interaction with, people and
things.
. . . Acting upon environment, rather than copying
it or talking about it, is the source of knowledge (p. 13).
Werner and Kaplan (1963 hold the same view:
. . . development is a constitutive moment of organismic
functioning. We assume that organisms are naturally
directed towards a series of transformations—reflecting a
tendency to move from a state of relative globality and un-
dif ferentiatedness toward states of increasing differentia-
tion and hierarchic integration. It is this tendency for-
mulated as ’the orthogenetic principle,' which serves for
us to characterize development as distinct from other types
of change over time (p. 7).
The Anisa theory of development describes the hierarchical nature
of development in the following terms:
Completing one stage prepares the organism for the next stage
in the sequence. Higher units acquire new properties in the
same sense as the combination of hydrogen and oxygen under
certain conditions leads to a new substance, water, with
new properties that were not manifest in either of the
separate constituents (Kalinowski and Jordan 1973, p. 23).
Development is thus a continuous process of transformation and re-
constitution—a view consistent with the basic proposition of our theory
of symbolization which affirms that symbolization transforms experience
and makes the construction of knowledge possible. Anisa’ s theoretical
framework thus accommodates the view that knowledge is not a copy of
reality but rather is a transformation or reconstitution of it.
Another feature of Anisa’ s theory of development is timing.
Because development is process, time is necessarily implicated. The
influence of timing on the actualization or potentialities is variable.
Some potentialities are not closely bound to a particular period of
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development for their actualization; others can be actualized only
during a given period. The Anisa theory of development distinguishes
between .two types of periods crucial to development, sensitive and criti-
cal periods. A sensitive period "is a limited period during which an
organism is particularly amenable to certain experiences that will
usually bring about significant and lasting changes in tissue growth,
physiological functioning, and/or psychological functioning" (Kalinow-
ski and Jordan 1973, p. 24). A period is critical if susceptibility
to a particular acquisition is limited only to the sensitive period
and if acquisition does not occur during the period, chances for
later acquisition are either non-existent or severely diminished (ibid.).
The identification of sensitive and critical periods is an important
task of developmental research. The more educators become aware of
them the more they will be able to give children the environmental
assistance they need to avoid impairment and to emerge from the
period with a new power, fully constituted and integrated with other
powers.
Having thus established the broad theoretical framework
within which our discussion of the development of symbolization may
take place, we may turn to the discussion itself.
Nash (1970) writes that "the ultimate task of the developmental-
ist is explaining how the unaware neonate becomes the self-aware adult
how the self-concept emerges and changes over childhood" (p. 460). In
Chapter III, symbolization was presented as the act of abstraction
that makes it possible for man to look at the world theoretically. Sym
bolization was described as an implicit part of consciousness without
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which consciousness cannot be imagined. Bertalanffy (1965) affirms
the interrelatedness of symbolization and consciousness and explains
that their appearance in the individual* s development (ontogeny) fol-
lows a course similar to their appearance in human evolution (phylo-
geny). Bertalanffy describes the appearance of consciousness as the
differentiation of the I (one's identity), the Thou (Deity in reli-
gious terms, the recognition of the infinitude of the universe and
the omnipotence of its order in psychological terms)
,
and the It (the
independent identity of objects):
. . . the 1
,
the thou
,
and the it_ crystallize out of an
undifferentiated flow of experience, and that this happens
in individual development of awareness of the child as well
as in the biological evolution of man and the cultural
evolution toward individual consciousness. It is not uni-
laterally caused by, but stands in mutual interaction with,
conceptualization and language (pp. 56-57).
Because of the interrelatedness of symbolization and conscious-
ness, we would expect the development of symbolization to have direct
implications for how consciousness develops, or as Nash puts it, "How
the unaware neonate becomes the self-aware adult." While the develop-
ment of consciousness is not the chief concern of this chapter, in
order to maintain a full perspective on the relation of symbolization
to consciousness, it is important to keep in mind the interdependent
relationship between symbolization and consciousness so that in the end
we may draw some conclusions about how consciousness, the larger of the
two phenomena, emerges.
The development of symbolization can also inform us about Intel
lectual development. Glucksberg and Danks (1975) argue that
"the most
important developmental task for children is the construction
of a
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symbolic representation of the world
—
people, events, objects, and
relationships and the ability to operate with and upon those representa-
tions (p. 191). They call this system of symbolic representation
"knowledge of the world"—a view consistent with the proposition of
our theory that symbolization is the feature of the mind that trans-
forms sensory experience into knowledge.
In Chapter II the ability to differentiate the actual from the
possible was presented as the root ability from which symbolization
springs. We stated that this ability makes it possible for one to
differentiate the symbol from its referent. We may expect, then, that
the overarching trend in the development of symbolization is the ac-
quisition of the ability to differentiate the actual from the possible.
Inherent in this ability is the differentiation of the self
from the rest of the world—a process called by Piaget (1962) "decen-
tration" or the diminuation of egocentrism. Only when actuality
and possibility are seen as discrete entities that exist apart from
the individual can they be recognized as having realities of their own.
This means that another feature of the development of symbolization
must be the recognition of the self as an entity separate from the rest
of the world. Moving one step further, the recognition of the self
as an entity distinct from the rest of the world requires the ability
to perceive the existence of objects as discrete entities.
The latter of these acquisitions, the recognition of the inde-
pendent existence of objects, is the first to appear. The other two,
the differentiation of the self from the world of objects (decentra-
tion) and the differentiation of the actual from the
possible, are in-
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terdependent and develop together, each probably relying on the same
cognitive structures for their appearance. Also, the stages are hier-
archical, each being incorporated within the following stage.
Another proposition of our theory of symbolization that has
implications for development is that symbolization and cognition are
extricably bound up with each other. Thus we would expect their devel-
opment to be interrelated and parallel. In the following passage,
Kaplan (1961), applying the developmental view of hierarchical stages
to the development of symbolization, affirms the interdependence of
symbolization and cognition throughout development:
We maintain that there is a sequence of stages in the rela-
tionship between symbolic activity and cognition. In cer-
tain respects there is continuity between the earlier and
the later phases; in other regards there is discontinuity.
Thus, although later stages cannot be reduced to earlier ones,
the earlier phases do not drop out when later modes of sym-
bolic activity come into play; rather the genetically earlier
phases are subordinated to the more advanced forms and inte-
grated within them. Under conditions where the higher modes
of symbolization are impaired or where the normal adult is
directed towards some specialized activity, these earlier
phases of the symbol-cognition relationship become manifest
once again (p. 57).
The broad outline of the development of symbolization just
sketched takes more form when a few commonly known facts of child devel-
opment are considered. It is well known that children begin to speak
at about 10-18 months and that by five or six years they have mastered
virtually all of the phonological features and about 90% of the syn-
tactical features of the language. The acquisition of a richer
vocabulary—an activity many adults pursue throughout their lives
remains the only task required to bring their speech up to adult per-
formance. It is well established that the remarkable progress a child
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makes in acquiring a language during his first five years is due to
genetically determined brain structures for language development which
develop in synchrony with other general processes (Lenneberg 1967).
Language’s biological basis makes it the first of the three
basic symbol systems to appear. While speech follows a similar course
of development in sequence, timing, and the level of mastery for all
normally endowed children raised under normal circumstances and without
overt instruction, ability in mathematics and the arts, as well as in
the language skills of reading and writing, is by no means similar in
timing or level of mastery. As any teacher will attest, children
differ widely in their ability to learn mathematics, the arts, read-
ing, and writing. Some learn to read, for example, with the least
amount of instruction. Mere exposure to the printed word seems suffi-
cient. Others require highly skilled teachers to help them. Indeed,
many never seem to receive the instruction they need and are doomed
to go through life with substandard reading ability. The same holds
true for writing, mathematics, and the arts.
These facts suggest that the acquisition of speech, which is
biologically based and follows a maturational pattern similar to the
physiological changes of puberty (League 1972), requires little in
the way of conscious awareness, whereas mathematics, the arts,
read-
ing, and writing require a considerable degree of consciousness.
Speech,
then, maybe regarded as the developmental forerunner of the
symbol
system and of symbolization itself—a system through which
children
develop basic symbolic skills in anticipation of more
complex and dif-
ficult symbolic tasks that require the will to learn
and the conscious
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ability to do so—tasks which implicate volitional competencies and
the ability to reflect upon oneself abstractly.
Hacker (1965), discussing the nature of symbolic development,
presents a view congruent with the views of Piaget and Werner; he
maintains that symbolic development follows a course of "relatively
fixed schedules" which are "obligatory in their sequence and succes-
sion:"
The statement that the development of symbols is a sym-
bol of development can be validated at many crucial points
though much still remains unclear and unknown. Symbolic
capacity is elementary, whereas specific developmental phases
merge, according to the programming of the organism, fol-
lowing relatively fixed schedules. They are obligatory in
their sequence and succession; every preceding phase is sym-
bolically preserved, lifted, canceled out, and incorporated
by the subsequent phase. Every following stage depends on the
former that had reached a certain level of fruition within a
certain time range. The different forms of organization at
different developmental levels also represent and use cer-
tain definable forms of symbolization which become recog-
nizable and distinguishable in terms of their characteris-
tics of form and content. A definite type of symbol forma-
tion is specific for every developmental phase (p. 77).
Having identified the three general stages in the development
of symbolization and having established that these phases are inter-
connected with the stages of cognitive development, we now turn to an
examination of each stage. Because cognitive and symbolic develop-
ment are parallel, the developmental theory of Piaget has been adopted
as the guiding line along which the course of symbolic development may
be traced. Thus the development of symbolization will be traced as
the child moves through the sensorimotor, preoperatory , concrete, and
formal operational stages depicted by Piaget. Also, the enactive,
iconic, and symbolic stages or modes of representation set forth by
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Bruner et al. (1966) will be discussed as they appear in the course of
development
.
The Recognition of Objects
Before a child can let a symbol stand for an object, he must
first be able to recognize the object itself. This is perhaps the most
elementary act of cognition and is the foundation upon which the entire
edifice of intellectual development is erected. Whitehead (1929a), re-
ferring to this most fundamental acquisition, states:
An infant's first romance is its awakening to the apprehen-
sion of objects and to the appreciation of their connec-
tions. Its growth in mentality takes the exterior form of
occupying itself in the coordination of its perceptions with
its bodily activities (p. 19).
As this statement indicates, the infant apprehends objects and
recognizes their relationships with other objects through the coor-
dination of his perception of and interaction with them. Whitehead's
description of the child's first mental task is in agreement with the
fundamental features of the sensorimotor stage in Piaget's theory of
cognitive development.
The sensorimotor stage, which begins at birth and ends around
one-and-a-half to two years, witnesses the development of the psycho-
motor and perceptual bases, and acquisition of basic notions about
causality, space, and time, the birth of intention, the recognition
of objects (known as object permanence), and the onset of symboliza-
tion in the form of symbolic play and holophrastic speech (Piaget 1952)
.
All of these acquisitions are essential to adult thought. The term,
sensorimotor, describes the principal feature of the stage: the inte-
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gratlon of gross psychomotor and perceptual processes which gives rise
to hand-eye coordination, crawling, and walking. It is also descrip-
tive of the basic form of intelligence that is similar to animal intel-
ligence and that underlies human thought.
Ihe intelligence of the sensorimotor stage is rooted in the
actions the infant performs on the world. It yields a physical kind
of knowing which lacks definite symbolic representation; it is en-
tirely external and has yet to be interiorized through symbolization.
Piaget makes a distinction between sensorimotor intelligence and
thought. Sensorimotor intelligence is used by the child to solve new
problems by coordinating his psychomotor and perceptual systems to act
on the concrete world, whereas thought "is interiorized intelligence
no longer based on direct action but on symbolism, the symbolic evoca-
tion of speech, by mental pictures, and other means, which makes it
possible to represent what the sensorimotor intelligence, on the con-
trary, is going to grasp" (Piaget 1973, p. 11).
Piaget's description of sensorimotor intelligence is similar
to what Bruner calls enactive representation. Enactive knowing refers
to the patterns of habitual action and is typified by the psychomotor
and perceptual skills involved in riding a bicycle, throwing a ball,
and so on. Piaget objects to referring to enactive knowing as repre-
sentation on the grounds that action patterns do not stand for anything
at all (Bruner et al. 1966). Bruner maintains that the representative
properties of enactive knowing are found in the fact that habits are
inscribed or impressed into the organism, are transferable, may be re-
gulated in later stages of development by symbolic activities like lan
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guage, and are capable of guiding behavior. Bruner remarks that "the
idea of enactive representation (rather than simply action) is premised
on the conviction that, insofar as action is flexibly goal-directed and
capable of surpassing detours, it must be based on some form or repre-
sentation that transcends the mere serial linking of stimuli and
response (ibid., p. 11).
We would agree with Piaget that enactive representation is not
symbolic in that it does not involve the emancipative, binding, epistemo-
logical, and communicative functions and the property of bearing mean-
ing. But we would agree with Bruner that the enactive form of knowing
is representative in that it involves memory and the formation of
neural structures in the motor cortex that can be activated (or "re-
called") voluntarily just as one recalls a thought or idea. Because
memory is involved, something must be stored; something must be repre-
sented when the structures are not activated. Otherwise physical
skills like dancing, knitting, or driving a car could not be executed
in the unconscious way that they are by those who have learned them.
During the sensorimotor period the child's reflexive movements
are gradually integrated and structured into habits, or action pat-
terns. The voluntary movements are first undifferentiated in that when
the child makes a movement, all of his body parts move. Involuntary
movements, or innate reflexes, such as the sucking response, the grasp-
ing reflex, the stepping response, and the tonic-neck response, are
differentiated but are unintegrated in that there is no coordination
among them; they are separate reflex actions which have yet to
be or-
ganized in a coherent scheme of unified activity. Moreover,
there is
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no coordination between the sensori or perceptual system and the motor
system; their relationship is basically reflexive.
As the child's interaction with the world extends to a greater
number of objects, the action patterns become increasingly differen-
tiated. As objects are looked at, listened to, and felt by the hands
and mouth, two types of knowledge are constructed. One type is know-
ledge about the objects which arises from the interaction between the
child and the objects; the other is about che child himself, which arises
from the differentiation and integration of the action patterns (Sin-
clair-deZwart 1973).
The milestones in the development of these two aspects of know-
ledge that interest us most in our search for the precursors of sym-
bolization are the recognition of the permanence of objects and of
the body as an independent entity separate from other objects.
Object permanence does not belong to the child of five or six
months. Piaget (1973) explains that a child of this age will become
angry if a favorite object—a bottle or rattle, for example—placed
directly in front of him is hidden from sight by a screen or cloth.
"The outer world," he explains, "is only a series of moving pictures
which appear and disappear, the most interesting of which can reappear
when one knows very well how to manage it (for example crying long enough
if it is a question of someone whose return is desired) . But these are
only moving pictures without substantiality or permanence and, above
all, without localization" (p. 14).
During the next few months, as the child's interaction with
extensive, he discovers the properties of objects,objects becomes more
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which are known in the manner in which they impact on his senses, and
not in the theoretical manner of adult thought. "At first, objects are
not heavy or sharp in the adult sense," Sinclair-deZwart (1973) writes,
"but they are 'hard to lift,' 'hurting,' etc.; and they have these pro-
perties mainly at the moment the child is in contact with them" (p. 22).
The discovery of properties enables the child to grasp them in simple
ways> i*e., those that make noise and those that do not. New dis-
coveries about cause-effect relations are made as the child exercises
his newly found volitional powers by intentionally shaking objects to
see if they make a noise.
By nine or ten months, the child is able to remove the cloth
or screen to find the object hidden behind it. But even now the child
has only acquired semipermanence of objects without localization:
Place the object on the infant's right, then hide it; he
is going to look for it. Then remove it from him, pass it
slowly before his eyes, and place it at his left. (Here
we are talking of an infant of nine or ten months.) After
seeing the object disappear at his left, the infant will at
once look for it at his right where he found it the first
time. Thus here there is only a semi-permanence without
localization. The infant is going to look where the action
of looking proved successful the first time and independently
of the mobility of the object (Piaget 1973, p. 15).
Piaget holds that not until about eighteen months later, at approxi-
mately two years, four months, does the child fully acquire object per-
manence.
The other major milestone, the recognition of the body as an
independent entity parallels the recognition of the permanence of ob-
jects. Piaget explains that the neonate has no notion of space or
spatial relations, and that visual, tactile, and auditory space are
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gradually constructed. Initially, they are centered around the body,
which is the focal point of all experience.
In effect, for the newborn child there is no space that con-
tains objects, since there are no objects (including the
body proper which naturally is not conceived of as an object).
There is a series of spaces differing one from another and
all centered on the body proper.
. . . For a long time the
mouth is the center of the world; Freud has made many remarks
on this point. Then there is visual space; but in addition
to visual space, there is tactile space and auditive space.
And all these spaces are centered in the body proper—the
action of looking, of following with the eyes, the action
of bringing an object to the mouth, etc.—but they lack co-
ordination with each other. Thus there are egocentric spaces,
we might say, not coordinated, and not including the body
itself as an element in a container (ibid.).
As the child's experience in interacting with the world in-
creases, the focal point becomes decentralized until he perceives his
body as just one object among a world of objects, all of which have
permanence and fixed spatial localization in reference to each other
(ibid., p. 16). These two acquisitions, which generally appear in full
form a few months after the second birthday, finally culminate some six
years later when objects attain full substantiality. At this point,
the child acquires conservation— the ability to apprehend the invari-
ance of quantity in spite of a change a substance may undergo in form
or shape (ibid., p. 14).
Eveloff (1971) maintains that the acquisition of object per-
manence and the differentiation of objects from the body is crucial to
the onset of symbolization. "This ability to vaguely
understand sym-
bolic reference to objects," he writes, "is predicated on the increas-
ing ability to differentiate objects from himself . . (p-
1901).
Eveloff also maintains that the child's continued
interaction with ob-
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jects and particularly with his mother, helps him to see things as being
apart from himself. "The child has learned so many facets of the ob-
jects (the most important being mother) with which he has come in con-
tact during the previous months of primitive concrete sensory motor
experimentation (in concert with a maturing central nervous system)
that he arrives at a consideration of them as something apart from
himself (Piaget 1954)" (ibid.).
Once this realization occurs, experimentation with causality
by intentionally acting on the environment to produce a desired effect
begins . The new role of observer makes possible the internalization
of concrete experience in the form of mental images and internal mani-
pulations
—
precursors of symbolization.
Prior to this, objects ceased to exist when not being acted
upon. Now, with this separateness from and internalization
of objects, the child is part of himself; he can experience
actions by observation instead of having to be part of the
action. This ability to internalize images and mentally
manipulate them to solve problems is a forerunner of true
symbolic thinking (Eveloff 1971, p. 1902).
Referring to the relation of object permanence to the onset of
symbolization, Sinclair-deZwart (1973) writes that object permanence
. . . is the culmination of sensorimotor, practical intelli-
gence and at the same time the beginning of representational
intelligence. Representation has several forms—symbolic
play, mental images, imitation, drawing—and in some of them
objects and events are symbolized by something else; it is
likely that this is only possible when objects have acquired
a certain identity of their own, and no longer exist only
when the child acts upon them. To be able to symbolize in
play a car by a pebble, one has to know, to a certain extent,
both cars and pebbles. To progress, intelligence now has to
go behond the hie et nunc ; to do this, representation is neces-
sary for recapitulation and anticipation (pp. 13-14).
Sensorimotor intelligence, then, is the solid substratum out of
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which symbolic representation emerges. Piaget makes it clear that the
child must first master the physical manipulations that give him com-
mand of the external world before he acquires the internal manipula-
tions—carried out symbolically— that open the door to the inner world
of thought.
This is why, Piaget (1973) argues, it takes a year and a half
for speech to begin. If speech were reducible "to a pure system of
conditioning and conditioned reflexes," as some theorists believe,
"an infant would acquire speech as early as the end of the first month
because the first conditioned reflexes already exist at the beginning
of the second month" (ibid., p. 12). However, because speech is sym-
bolic and bound up with thought
,
it presupposes a basic level of
mastery of the physical actions that enable the child to acquire a
physical intelligence of the world.
As for the actions which form thought, these interiorized
actions, one must learn to execute them materially; they
first require a whole system of effective and material ac-
tions. To think, for example, is to classify, to arrange,
to place in correspondence, to collect, to dissociate, etc.
But all these operations must be carried out materially in
actions, in order to be capable afterward of being constructed
in thought. That is why there is such a long sensorimotor
period before speech and why speech is late as compared to
the development [sic] . A long practice of pure action is
needed to construct the substructure of later speech (ibid.,
p. 13).
When the child recognizes the permanence of objects and the dis-
tinctness of his own self, he enters the preoperatory stage. This stage
is characterized by the reconstruction of sensorimotor intelligence
on
the representational level. The period lasts from one-and-a-half
or
to seven or eight years of age; it witnesses the
appearance
two years
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of symbolization and concludes with the acquisition of reversibility—
the capacity to undo mentally what has been done physically—and
therefore of conservation— the ability to realize the invariance of
quantity regardless of changes it may undergo in form or shape (Piaget
1973; Sxnclair-deZwart 1973). Piaget explains that the reason why
these logical structures take so long to develop and why they do not
appear the moment symbolization appears is that the child must entirely
relearn on the level of thought what has already been learned on the
level of action. Actually this interiorization is a new structuration;
it is not simply a translation but a reconstruction with a lag which
takes a considerable time" (Piaget 1973, p. 18).
The first step in the preoperatory stage is the "appearance
of the symbolical function and beginning of the interiorization of
the schemes of action in representations" (ibid., p. 57). Discussing
the forms the appearance of symbolization takes, Piaget writes:
One form of the symbolic function is speech, a system of
social signs as opposed to individual symbols. But simul-
taneous with this speech, there are other manifestations
of the symbolic function. A second form is play which be-
comes symbolical: representing something by means of an ob-
ject or of a gesture. Until then play was only a play of
motor exercises, whereas after about a year and a half, for
example, the child really begins to play. One of my chil-
dren passed around a seashell in a box while saying 'meow'
because a moment earlier he had seen a cat on a wall. In
this case the symbol is obvious, since the child had no
other word at his disposal. What is new, however, is to
represent something with something else.
A third form of symbolism can be a gestural system of
symbolics, for example in the postponed imitation.
A fourth form will be the beginning of the mental pic-
ture or interiorized imitation (ibid., pp. 16-17).
These rudimentary forms of symbolization reflect the first appearance
of thought, which Piaget describes as "a system of interiorized action
198
that leads "to those particular actions which we will call operations
,
reversible actions and actions coordinating one to another into a total
system,"- a system that represents internally all the operations the
child is able to perform on concrete objects (ibid.).
Ihe following example of symbolic play illumines our under-
standing of how symbolized, internal thought first sets in upon the
firmly established action patterns of sensorimotor intelligence.
Piaget describes how his son, at the beginning of the preoperatory
period, manipulated a slightly opened matchbox in which a small toy
was placed. The child felt the box carefully, and then, after ob-
serving the small opening, slipped his finger inside to find the toy.
His exploration of the box and discovery of the hole was accompanied
by a symbolic gesture: "while glancing at the opening he wished to
enlarge, this child opened and closed his mouth several times, not
because the coveted box was to be eaten . . . , but more probably to
symbolize the desired solution (to increase the opening)" (ibid., p.
69). The child's behavior exemplifies the beginning of the interioriza-
tion of external coordinations through the mediation of imitation. The
child, imitating the opening of the box with his mouth, represents by
gesture the solution to the problem. Such gestural imitation, Piaget
claims, marks the transition from sensorimotor intelligence to repre-
sentative thought. It "furnishes to symbolic games (beginning about
the age of one-and-a-half ) their entire gestural symbolism which . . .
forms the point of departure of the mental picture as intenorized imita
tion" (ibid., p. 83). Commenting on the universality of the transition
from sensorimotor intelligence to representational thought
through the
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intermediary step of imitation as evidenced by cross-cultural studies,
Piaget writes:
... in the field of representation and thought, we would
perhaps find the same important date (of appearance) every-
where, that of the construction of the semiotic or symbolic
function, which appears in our milieus between about the
ages of one and two: formation of symbolical play, of mental
pictures, and so forth, and above all language development.
The principle factor which makes this semiotic function
possible seems to be the interiorization of imitation. On
the sensorimotor level, this interiorization already consti-
tutes a kind of representation in action, as a driving copy
of a model, in such a manner that extensions, first in de-
ferred imitation, then in interiorized imitation, allow for
the formation of representation in pictures, and so forth
(ibid.
,
p. 153)
.
Sinclair-deZwart explains in greater detail how symbolization,
in the form of speech, sets in upon sensorimotor structures and how it
initially reflects a way of looking at the world characteristic of
sensorimotor intelligence, thereby indicating that preoperatory sym-
bolization is a restructuring of what was learned in the sensorimotor
stage. Speech begins late in the sensorimotor period, between 10-18
months, with one word utterances or holophrases. These utterances
always refer to an object, event, or desire that is immediately present
and that has a direct relation to the child. To be understood, an
adult must be present to interpret what the child says by observing
how he behaves when he speaks. This is because the word the child
speaks is an entire impression, a global statement, reflecting the un-
differentiated state of sensorimotor intelligence which does not make
a full differentiation between the child and the objects around him
for several months.
The global quality of the child's awareness is reflected
in
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his holophrastic utterances which do not distinguish between subject
and predicate. In the following passage Sinclair-deZwar t (1973)
describes the general character of holophrastic speech and shows the
relation between the subject of the child's speech to object permanence,
the major preoccupation of sensorimotor intelligence at that point
in development
:
In general one can say that these holophrases accompany
in the present an action done by the child or interesting
to the child; or they express a desire for an action the
child wants to perform or to have performed immediately by
someone else. It is only a little later that these
judgements d 1 action get supplemented by jugements de
constation [sic]; that is, descriptions of past events or
of properties of objects or persons (again, obviously,
properties important to the child) . Fille mechant
,
poupee
cassee
,
papa parti belong in this category. It is probably
no coincidence that among the very first universal utter-
ances the indication of disappearance and apparition is so
frequent; one of the first permanent properties of objects
is their very existence (pp. 22-23).
While the onset of holophrastic speech is usually referred to
as the beginning of language, it is important to point out that the
single word utterance has yet to acquire true symbolic properties.
It is more a signal than a symbol . Mowrer (1960) asserts that the one
word utterance is restricted to the here and now and points out tnat
not until speech becomes more complex does it become abstract.
The sign function of holophrastic speech is explained by
Eveloff (1971), who states that the first words of the infant are re-
garded by children as objects and are equated with the referent it-
self, their meaning being imposed on the child by the parent
and not
conceived internally. Glucksberg and Danks (1975) explain
this phenom-
enon in the following terms:
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When a child first learns that things have names, his lan-guage resembles a code. He acts as though there were one-to-one correspondence between things and their names. Eachthing has only one name, and each name refers to just one
thing. For the young child, the name of something seems tobe an integral part of the thing itself. If it had a dif-
ferent name, it would be a different thing. Piaget (1926)
refers to this as NOMINALISM. The three-year-old child
simply cannot imagine that names are arbitrary conventions
and can be changed without changing the essence of the ob-
j ect • ^ i- s asked
,
'Could we call the sun the moon if
we all wanted to?,' he would reply 'No, because it's the
sun!' (p. 198).
Nominalism indicates that holophrastic utterances do not have true
symbolic value; they are signific but not denotative or connotative.
The signific function of holophrastic speech described by
Mowrer, Eveloff, and Glucksberg and Danks is termed by Piaget (1946)
the "index" level of symbolization. " Indexes , " he writes, "are
signifiers that are not differentiated from their significants since
they are part of them or a causal result for example for an infant,
hearing a voice is an index of someone's presence" (p. 717).
The child's movement from holophrastic to two word utterances
follows the acquisitions of object permanence, localization, and
the perception of himself as a separate entity. Sinclair-deZwar
t
(1973) maintains that the close succession of these events is not coin-
cidental. She argues that the acquisition of object permanence, local-
ization, and the differentiation of the self from other objects are
prerequisites for multiple utterances, and explains that the differen-
tiations the child makes in the world of experience are represented
a few months later in speech through the combination of words that
embody the syntactical pattern of subject-predicate.
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At this point the child can express the distinction (which
has already been well-established in his direct dealings
with reality) between himself as an acting and desiring per-
son and other actors or desirers. Finally, this combina-
tion-gives rise to the coordination of Agent + Action
Patient)
,
and again, the new structural pattern goes
together with more refined categorizations; at this point
we might suppose that the pattern NP + VP (with the VP
composed of either only a predicate, or a verb and a noun)
is established concurrently with the functional relation-
ship SV.
nt>
SVO, or SOV (p. 24).
Jakobson (1972) comments on the significance of the appearance
of subject and predicate in the child’s speech and suggests that it
marks the beginning of a truly symbolic function, that of emancipat-
ing the child from the here and now:
When we observe the highly instructive process of a
child’s gradual advance in the acquisition of language,
we see how decisively important the emergence of the sub-
ject-predicate sentence is. It liberates speech from the
here and now and enables the child to treat events distant
in time and space or even fictitious. This capacity, which
mechanists sometimes label 'displaced speech,’ is in fact
the first affirmation of language's autonomy. In sign sys-
tems other than natural or artificial languages there are
no parallels to the formulation of general and particularly
equational propositions, no capacity for building logical
judgements (p. 80).
While the appearance of the subject-predicate distinction does
indicate an important advance in the child's acquisition of symboliza-
tion, it does not throw open the child’s mind in one grand moment to
the world of the past and future and of possibility. These notions
come later. Herriot (1969) has shown that at 3 years children com-
prehend the future, past, and present tenses, but it is not until the
period of formal operations that they are fully able to grasp the
postulation of possibility and theoretical thought. The significance
of the appearance of subject-predicate speech is most likely the
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transition from signific to denotative speech.
Coinciding with the onset of the subject-predicate distinction
is a rapid increase in vocabulary. This occurs roughly between the
ages of two and three years. Children at this point demonstrate a
veritable mania for words, asking what the names of things are, telling
others the names they have learned, and uttering the names of things
when they manipulate them. Bruce and Freeman (1942) report that
between the second and third birthdays, the average vocabulary of
children doubles. Such a change, Cassirer (1944) writes, "would not
be possible were it not for the fact that the name, in the mental
growth of the child, has a function of the first importance to per-
form .
. (p. 132).
By learning to name things a child does not simply add
a list of artificial signs to his previous knowledge of
ready-made empirical objects, to come to terms with the
objective world. Henceforth the child stands on firmer
ground. His vague, uncertain fluctuating perceptions and
his dim feelings begin to assume a new shape. They may
be said to crystallize around the name as a fixed center,
a focus of thought. . . . The first names of which a child
makes conscious use may be compared to a stick by the aid
of which a blind man gropes his way. And language taken
as a whole, becomes the gateway to a new world. All prog-
ress here opens a new perspective and widens and enriches
our concrete experience. Eagerness and enthusiasm to talk
do not originate in a mere desire for learning or using
names; they mark the desire for the detection and conquest
of an objective world (ibid.).
To exemplify the discovery that names stand for concepts Cas-
sirer and Langer cite the example of Helen Keller, who at the
age of
seven learned that the sign for water made in her hand by
her teacher
Anne Sullivan, had connotative, not merely signific,
power. Helen
Keller (1903) describes her experience in the following
passage:
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She brought me my hat, and I knew I was going out into
the warm sunshine. This thought, if a wordless sensation
may be called a thought, made me hop and skip with pleasure.
We walked down the path to the well-house, attracted
by the fragrance of the honeysuckle with which it was
covered. Someone was drawing water and my teacher placed
my hand under the spout. As the cool stream gushed over
one hand she spelled into the other the word water, first
slowly, then rapidly. I stood still, my whole attention
fixed upon the motion of her fingers. Suddenly I felt a
misty consciousness as of something forgotten—a thrill of
returning thought; and somehow the mystery of language was
revealed to me. I knew then that 'w-a-t-e-r' meant the
wonderful cool something that was flowing over my hand. That
living word awakened my soul, gave it light, hope, joy, set
it free!
I left the well-house eager to learn. Everything had
a name, and each name gave birth to a new thought. As we
returned to the house every object which I touched seemed
to quiver with life. That was because I saw everything with
the strange new sight that had come to me (pp. 23-24).
"This passage," Langer (1942) writes, "is the best affidavit
we could hope to find for the genuine difference between sign and sym-
bol" (p. 63). She explains that the hat Miss Sullivan brought Helen
was a signal, instigating her to action, and points out that Miss
Keller describes her apprehension of what the hat signified as "This
thought, if a wordless sensation may be called a thought ," Langer,
Cassirer, and White (1949) assert that this experience marks the
dawning of thought, mediated through the symbolization of language,
in the mind of Helen Keller. "Roughly speaking," Cassirer (1944)
writes, "this change may be described by saying that the child passes
from a more subjective state to an objective state, from a mereiy emo-
tional attitude to a theoretical attitude. The same may be noted in
the life of every child, though in a much less spectacular way" (p.
131).
In Piagetian terms, it seems as though Miss Keller moved in a
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moment from sensorimotor intelligence to the stage of concrete opera-
tions, bypassing the intermediary stage of preoperatory intelligence
during which symbolization is gradually interiorized through speech,
symbolic gestures, and symbolic play. She grasped in that magic
moment the denotative power of language. Cassirer points out that in
normal children the change is not as sensational; nor is it as sudden.
The insatiable thirst for words is in itself not an adequate proof
that the child understands that words have connotative power and that
thought is fully theoretical. The grasp of denotation would be suffi-
cient to stimulate the child to learn names; denotation enables the
child to participate more fully in the world of human discourse and
gives him a sense of mastery over things. Washoe, who gave no evi-
dence of connotation, also underwent a rapid acquisition of words when
she seemed to master denotation (Amon 1975). True connotation, like
theoretical thinking, comes gradually and does not fully appear until
adolescence
.
The sudden burst of linguistic power that comes to the normal
child between his second and third birthdays is described by Vygotsky
(1962) as the time when the child "seems to have discovered the sym-
bolic function of speech" (p. A3). It is at this point that the devel-
opmental course of thought and speech—previously separate—now merge.
Speech now begins to serve the intellect and the egocentric speech of
early childnood becomes increasingly internalized as the process of
decentration continues until it is fully established as inner speech—
the transforming symbolic agent that operates on pure thought
and turns
it into external, verbalized speech. This process,
Vygotsky maintains,
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normally culminates at puberty— the age which he, too, marks as the
onset of full conceptual thought. In a response to Vygotsky's posi-
tion on the transition of egocentric speech to inner speech, a posi-
tion with which Vygotsky believed Piaget's earlier works to be in
conflict, Piaget (1962) asserts his full agreement.
Vygotsky also remarks that at this point speech enters an
intellectual phase and loses its affective overtones, a development
Eveloff (1971) also notes. Whereas words initially served to cement
the bond between mother and child during infancy, they now take on
definite cognitive properties and acquire the functional value of
helping the child interact with the environment.
As the child matures, words slowly assume properties that
transcend (but do not entirely replace) the emotional func-
tions that initially stimulated their acquisition; they in-
creasingly become tools of communication and accommodation
to the environment. . . . In a sense, emotional stimuli
for language development begin to decrease as other, more
cognitive reinforcements increase. Words allow him to
master his environment more efficiently, to obtain objects,
to influence others, to codify and therefore more effi-
ciently explore and master his immediate surroundings. If
the feedback is good, that is, if words serve as efficient
tools with which to adapt to environmental challenges, they
eventually tend to get used without a great deal of deliber-
ate parental reinforcement (ibid., pp. 1903-04).
Around the third year the symbolic properties of words strength-
ens; they serve as mediators of thought in a rudimentary manner by
helping the child direct his attention to things despite distracting
stimuli. Eveloff, summing up results reported by Luria (1959), points
out that a child can now "pay attention to a less interesting toy
farther away from him rather than an interesting toy closer if
he is
directed to do so" with language. Speech has now become
interiorized
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sufficiently so that it forms the basis of thoughtful action.
Now parents, other adults, sibs, peers, and so forth are
increasingly able to help the child perfect the connections
between his desires and the words he uses to satisfy them.
These perfected words can then be reincorporated into the
child's mind to facilitate the organization of his thoughts.
With increasingly efficient symbols of external reality,
he can more accurately manipulate these internal objects
(that is, think) in consonance with his observations, that
is, his thoughts are validated by his perceptions, and vice
versa (p. 1903).
It is important to note that the existence of speech and sym-
bolic gestures at the preoperatory level do not indicate the existence of
theoretical thought. The child may be able to find his way home from
school by forming in his mind mental images of the route, but not
until seven or eight years of age can he represent the route on a
board, symbolizing the streets, houses, and buildings he passes with
objects (Piaget 1973).
During the preoperational stage the child's thought is still
limited to the consideration of things present in the environment.
He is also incapable of performing mentally reversible operations on
objects and thus has yet to acquire conservation. The symbol is
understood on a figurative or perceptual basis and not abstractly.
Piaget (1946) and Piaget and Inhelder (1969) call this level of repre-
sentation "symbolic."'
1
' For Piaget, the symbolic level of representa-
1
It is important to note that Piaget's terminology is quite
different from that of other theorists. Translating Piaget's terms
into terms used in this work, his use of index corresponds to signa_l
,
and sign is equivalent to symbol . Piaget's use of symbol does not
have a corresponding term in the theory presented here. Piaget (1946)
reports that his use of the terms index , symbol , and sign is taken
from deSaussure's terminology, which he finds to be widely used in
linguistics.
208
tion is distinguished from the most abstract level of representation—
the "sign" level. The symbolic level is characterized by symbolic play
and is based on a true differentiation between the symbol or the sym-
bolic act and the referent. The difference between the symbolic level
and the sign level is that there is a perceptual or functional link
between the symbol or symbolic act and its referent, whereas the con-
nection between the sign and its referent is entirely arbitrary. An
example of a symbol is the representation of a house by wooden sticks
or by a drawing. Included in this level is the use of the body in
representing objects or events by imitating their functions, such as
when the child hops like a rabbit, pretends to be a train, or makes
the sound of a truck. An example of a sign is written words or mathe-
matical symbols.
Waite (1975) points out that at the "symbolic level" during
the preoperational stage, the child, while he may be able to recite
numbers in proper sequence, is unable to apprehend the concept of num-
ber because his understanding is bound to the perceptual form of objects;
he has yet to allow symbols (what Piaget calls signs), such as numbers,
to assume full representational properties.
For a child whose reasoning is percept bound , two equivalent
sets of objects (seven each) can become unequal In number
simply by arranging the two sets in parallel rows, one of
which is short and the other long. For the child, the number
of objects in each set is determined by the spatial arrange-
ment, i.e., by the density or amount of area covered (Waite
1975, p. 80).
So gradual is the reconstruction of sensorimotor intelligence
on the representational level that the theoretical and symbolic quality
of ad. thought does not fully appear until the formal operations
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stage which begins around twelve and ends around fourteen or fifteen.
This period is also the end of the critical period for language devel-
opment and marks the full acquisition of all the rules of grammar
(C. Chomsky 1969). Thus, to think there is a sudden transformation to
symbolic thinking, even if it be within the span of a year or two,
is untenable, given the gradual nature of symbolic development. In
Miss Keller's case, because of severe sensory deprivation and the
absence of speech, she missed the stages in the development of sym-
bolization during the preoperatory period that children normally go
through. At the age of seven her mind had reached the stage where it
was ready for thought. However, it lacked symbolization, the vehicle
for it. When symbolization was introduced in the form of tactile
representation, her mind, like a rocket on the launching pad waiting
for the engines to ignite, took off and began to fly at top speed.
For the normal child, however, the process is far more gradual.
Piaget's view of interiorized imitation, which makes possible
representation in the form of pictures and symbolic play, and which
he terms the "symbolic" level of representation, is akin to Bruner's
stage of ikonic representation. This stage, Bruner maintains, emerges
at the end of the first year when the child is able to represent the
world to himself by an image or spatial schema that is relatively in-
dependent of action. Iconic representation assumes full form when the
child is able to grasp the sharp separation between himself and the
world around him. By matching a mental image to something he has en-
countered, he learns to deal with non-sensory ideas—rudimentary con-
ceptions—which enable him to maintain ideas in conscious awareness
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and thereby begin to grasp the relations between things (Bruner et al.
1966). For Bruner and Piaget, representation at this stage is tied to
concrete, experience. "The cognitive operations of imagistic thinking,"
Bruner explains, though serving to preserve past experience, are
dominated by rules of organization that rest upon spatio-temporal-
qualitative properties of experience. Thus the groupings of objects
is carried out by principles of contiguity or on the basis of dominant
perceptual similarity" (ibid., p. 26).
Having discussed in detail the onset of symbolization and its
relation to the recognition of the permanence of objects, we now turn
to the differentiation of the self from the world of objects and the
acquisition of the ability to entertain possibilities which finally
culminates in theoretical thinking—abilities whose development is so
interconnected that they must be treated simultaneously.
Decentration and the Differentiation of
Actuality from Possibility
As the child moves toward abstract, theoretical thought, he
becomes less dependent on environmental cues to present perceptual
images of what he is thinking about. His thought becomes increasingly
internalized and symbolic. "Operational thinking . . . , Waite ( 1975 )
writes, "is characterized by a growing dissociation between the know-
ing acts and its particular external manifestation. By means of func-
tional internalization the knowing circle is closed without external
action" (p. 315). As the child's thought becomes more abstract,
it
also becomes less egocentric and increasingly able to
comprehend the
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viewpoint of others. Thus the process of decentration and the movement
toward theoretical thinking follows the same developmental course and
depends on the same cognitive prerequisites.
Egocentrism, Piaget (1962) explains, "stems from a lack of
differentiation between one's own point of view and the other possible
ones ..." (p. 4). At about 18 months, the child undergoes a shift
of perspective in regard to his perception of space which Piaget
compares to the Copernican revolution. At this point the child's
notion of space changes from the perception of his own body as the
center of the world to a view of space as "a single, homogeneous con-
tainer in which all objects are situated, including one's own body"
(ibid. )
.
While the child's notion of space becomes decentered at
18 months, his ability to take on the perspective of others in his
thinking does not become fully decentered until puberty. Describing
the slow drift from the egocentricity of the senscnmocor stage to
abstract and impersonal adult thought, Waite (1975) writes.
During the sensori-motor stage . . . the child comes to first
recognize an object as existing apart from himself, where
previously no differentiation was made. Once the object
becomes separate, it can have its own identity and, there
fore, become permanent. Egocentric thought continues for
some time, however. Through a gradual process, it is less
centered on self and more on mental images and the figurative
aspects of thought. Finally, when dealing with relations
and
logical thinking, thought is decentered or mobile (p. 81).
Because preoperatory intelligence is dominated by the
imme-
diacy of perceptual stimuli, contiguity in space
and time have
salience over causality (Piaget 1960). Also, because
the child is
percept-bound, he cannot distinguish possibility
from necessity, and
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is unable to grasp impersonal, abstract statements. Werner, describ-
ing the abstractive powers of the preoperatory child, states that at
about A years the child exhibits a primitive form of abstraction which
is quite close to primary sensory organization. At this level, the
child is able to classify only on the basis of one category, either
color or shape, but never both. "Moreover," Werner (1937) writes,
"there is little or no freedom of choice in the grouping. It appears
that the conspicuous properties of objects themselves—color or form
—
quasi-automatically force similar things into groups: blue objects
'come together,' and the same is true of red ones or green ones." To
the child, the primitive groupings seem invariant. Abstraction at this
level, Werner explains, follows what Gestalt Psychology calls the "law
of equality," where "things having equal qualities tend to come to the
fore, organizing themselves into a unit" (p. 357).
Bruner et al. (1966) describe the child's primitive abstrac-
tion at this stage as being essentially egocentric. "At the age of
four the identity of an object is not fully separated from one s own
experiences . . (p. 133). Nash (1970) shows how this egocentricity
is expressed in the child's grasp of social relations by citing the
example of a six year old who, when asked, "If your brother is a year
older than you, how old is he?," protested that he could not answer
the question because he did not have a brother (p. 359).
Robert Selman's (1975) studies on the development of the child's
ability to consider the viewpoint of others also sheds light
on the
child's growing power of abstraction. He explains that
while children
before about A years of age may distinguish themselves
from others on
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a perceptual basis, they are unable to understand that others have sub-
jective viewpoints, or reasons for what they do. Moreover, they have
no apprehension of psychological causation and consequently cannot
comprehend "why questions" that search for motives. He cites the
example of a conversation with his 2^ year old son in which they ex-
change their respective views on whether the boy can go sledding:
Father: No son, you can’t.
Son: Don’t say no, daddy, say yes.
Father: But I don’t want you to go.
Son: (emphatically) Say yes, daddy (p. 129).
Selman remarks that his son's statements indicate that he
thinks that if his father’s words would just change, all would be well;
he is oblivious to an intention or reason behind the words. This in-
terpretation is consistent with what we would expect from a child
at the preoperatory level. He is occupied with representing through
speech and symbolic play the product of sensorimotor intelligence,
which concerns the coordination of his psychomotor and perceptual
skills, and which does not include the awareness of the psychological
states of others or himself. The child's inability to apprehend the
intent of others no doubt has much to do with the obstinacy charac-
teristic of the 2 and 3 year old.
Between 4-6 years the child is able to separate his view from
the view of others. He recognizes, for example, that another may be
sad while he is happy. But he still thinks that others will feel as
he feels in a similar situation. Selman cites the response of Abby,
who, at 5 years, 1 month, was asked whether she thinks
that Tom will
get his friend Mike a new puppy (Mike's puppy died and he is
quite de-
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jected about it)
.
Question: Do you think Tom will get Mike a new puppy?
Abby: Yes. He'll be happy. He's sad now, but he'll
> be happy.
Question: But Mike says he never wants to see another puppy.
Abby: Dogs are fun. I like puppies.
Question: And so why will Tom get him a new puppy?
Abby: Puppies are fun. I like puppies (ibid., p. 130).
Abby s response indicates that she is aware that Mike has a perspective,
but she is not aware that Mike could have a perspective different from
her own.
During the closing years of the preoperational stage, the
child understands that others may hold a view quite different from his
own. He is able to attend to the subjective, psychological state of
another person, as exemplified by the following responses of Brenda,
aged 6 years, 2 months:
Question: Do you think Tom will get him [Mike] a dog?
Brenda: No. If he says he doesn't want a dog, that means
he doesn't want a dog. Just because Tom thinks
he wants a dog doesn't mean Mike wants one.
Question: Will Mike and Tom be friends if Tom gives Mike
a puppy?
Brenda: Well, Mike will be kind of angry; he doesn't want
a dog (ibid., p. 131).
Selman explains that while Brenda would understand that Mike had a
view of his own, her statement that Mike will be angry at Tom shows
that she is unable to understand that Mike might understand that Tom
was thinking about Mike when he bought the puppy. Thus, at the end
of the preoperatory stage the child has progressed to the point where
he realizes that others have views and motives of their own, but their
awareness is limited in that they cannot conceive of two people consi-
dering each other's views at the same time, or that another
wduld con-
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sider their own viewpoint. In short, their ability to take on another’s
view lacks reversibility.
At about seven years the child's thinking reaches a new level,
called by Piaget (1973) the stage of concrete operations. "We'll
call concrete operations those that bear on manipulable objects
(effective or immediately imaginable manipulations), in contrast to
operations bearing on propositions or simple verbal statements (logic
of propositions)" (p. 56). The distinguishing feature of this stage,
which lasts until 11-12 years, is that the child's operations are
reversible
.
About the age of seven, a fundamental turning point is
noted in the child's development. He becomes capable of a
certain logic; he becomes capable of coordinating opera-
tions in the sense of reversibility . . . (ibid., p. 20).
An example of the child's newly found concrete logic is his
ability to understand the reversibility of addition and subtraction
(if 5 + 2 = 7, then 7 - 5 = 2) or that quantity is invariant regard-
less of a change in shape (if two rows containing an equal number of
beads are long and short respectively, the child will realize they
both contain the same number and will not believe that the longer row
has more beads)
.
Werner (1937) asserts that at about seven years of age the
child is able to shift intentionally and spontaneously from one
point
of view to another and, when classifying, from one category
to another
Figures of different sizes, shapes, and colors can now be
classified
on the basis of color, then shape, then size.
Piaget and Inhelder (1951) report that the
concrete opera-
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tional stage also witnesses the onset of the distinction between pos-
sibility and necessity and the appearance of the notion of chance.
This meaijs that the child is able to postulate two alternative possi-
bilities that the present provides, and that he is able to reflect on
the past and realize that what happened could have been different.
The ability to entertain possibilities stems from the same cognitive
structures as the ability to grasp the reversibility of concrete opera-
tions in that they both require that the child understand that two dif-
ferent things may share the same relation to something else. In re-
gard to chance, two things share the same possibility of occurring in
relation to the present; in regard to the conservation of quantity,
the rows of beads of different lengths share the same number; in re-
gard to classification, an array of figures of different sizes, shapes,
and colors may share in common several attributes, not just one. Pos-
sibility, number, and multiple classification are abstractions which
do not exist as entities in the concrete world. Their reality can
only be conceived through an act of abstraction.
The ability to understand that two different things may share
the same relation to something else is expressed in the area of
social
relations by being able to place oneself in another's position.
In
the following passage Selman (1975) explains how the
reversibility
of the concrete operational stage applies to understanding
the per-
spective of others.
The perspectives are now seen to exist in a
state of
reciprocal influence, rather than as independent
assess
ments of objective information in the world. For t e
irs
time the child recognizes that his judgements and acts
a
open to the scrutiny and evaluation of others,
an i
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of others is influenced by the realization that others
(or the self as other) can view the self as a subject
just as the self can view others as a subject . .
. (p. 131).
This is exactly what Brenda was unable to do; she could not
grasp that two people could understand what the other was thinking.
Carl, at eight years, three months, provides us with an example of
reversibility as applied to social relations, as he discusses Mike's
sadness over the loss of his puppy and Tom's dilemma over what to
get Mike:
Carl: Mike doesn't know what he's talking about. He
just says he doesn't want the puppy, but he
doesn't mean it.
Question: How do you know that?
Carl: Well, if I were Mike, I would feel bad too, but
later I'd realize that I really want the new
puppy (ibid.).
Carl shows us that he can treat his own view as if it were
another's. This is true reflection and indicates the emergence of
self-awareness . But this budding consciousness of other's viewpoints
has its limits. While Carl shows the ability to place himself in
Mike's position, he does not understand that Mike and Tom could each
be aware of the other's feelings. Likewise, Nash (1970) reports that
Piaget found that up to the age of ten, three quarters of the chil-
dren examined were unable to grasp the relationships involved in tell-
ing how many brothers and sisters each brother and sister in his
family
had.
Toward the end of the concrete operational stage, between the
ages of 10 and 12, children rise to a new level of awareness
at which
they are simultaneously aware of their own view and the
view of others.
They see interpersonal relations in abstract mutuality
or full reci
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procity, as the example of Alex (11 years, two months) attests:
Question: Will they still be friends if Tom gets Mike
the puppy?
Alex,: Well if Tom gets Mike a puppy and Mike doesn't
like it, Tom still knows that Mike will under-
stand that he was only trying to make Mike happy.
They are good friends and good friends under-
stand each other (ibid., p. 132).
Selman writes that this stage marks the awareness of the infinitude of
views that can exist among people (I know that you know that I know
that you know, etc.), and that each subject can be aware simultaneously
of the other person's thoughts, feelings, and motives.
The ability to understand interpersonal relations in abstract
mutuality coincides with the onset of formal operations. At this
point the child is able to entertain multiple possibilities and can
grasp the notion of probability, that is, that some possibilities have
a greater chance of becoming actualized than others. The stage of
formal operations is characterized by the logic of propositions,
described by Piaget (1973) as "the capacity to study statements and
propositions and no longer only objects placed on the table or imme-
diately represented" (p. 60).
Propositional thought is the ability to reason by hypothesis.
Nash (1970) explains that in previous stages a child asked to respond
to the statement "I am very glad I do not like onions, for if I liked
them I would always be eating them and I hate eating unpleasant things,
would say that onions are unpleasant, or that it is wrong not to like
them. At the formal operations stage, however, children can accept
the statement as a hypothesis and can concentrate on the
contradiction
between "if I like them" and "onions are unpleasant
.
"
There is a tran-
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sition to hypothetical thinking and the appearance of what Piaget
calls "hypothetical-deductive reasoning."
Werner (1937) asserts that thought at this stage has reached
its fully abstract properties. In terms of classification, the 12
year old can look at an array of objects differing in size, shape,
and color and recognize in one act of conception the three categories
into which they can be grouped. Reviewing the entire course of the
development of abstraction, Werner comments on the significance of
the appearance of this ability:
This development does not simply indicate a gradual
growth of a unitary, intellectual function called 'abstrac-
tion.' It involves, to my way of thinking, specific
changes in the process of abstraction itself. He who is
able to shift his point of view during a deliberate group-
ing is no longer passively subject to the forces of sensory
stimulation. Such a person consciously perceives that the
objects have different signs according to which order is
possible. In other words, this development indicates an
immensely important change from abstraction which works
close to sensory organization, to abstraction which is
guided by purposively conceived categories, such as color,
shape, number, size, etc. (p. 358).
An example of how thought at the formal operations stage
has
lost the vestiges of egocentricity and is abstract and
theoretical,
is the performance of 11 and 12 year olds on the
"stack the blocks
game." The game is played by two children who sit
at a table divided
across the middle by a screen that prevents them
from seeing each
other. Each have an identical set of blocks,
about five in number,
with geometric shapes on them and a tall
spike on which the blocks >
be stacked. One child places a block on
the spike and describes to
his partner what the shape on the block
looks like. Nursery school
children are unable to realize that their
partner cannot see their
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block and say, "This one," or tag it with a word which the shape calls
to mind. Their egocentricity prevents them from attending to the needs
of their- partner. The words they use are a private code and not a
publically comprehensible communication. By the age of 11 or 12,
children realize that their partners cannot see the block they have
selected; they describe its features and respond to the questions their
partners ask by giving new clues which match the conception conveyed
in the question (Glucksberg and Danks 1975, pp . 199-203).
Between 12-14 years of age, thought reaches full maturity
and the mind is freed from the limitations of the concrete operational
stage and becomes capable of scientific thinking. Vygotsky (1962)
quotes F. Rimat, who sets the onset of full conceptual thought at
about age 12:
We have definitely established that a sharp increase in the
child’s ability to form, without help, generalized objec-
tive concepts manifests itself only at the close of the
twelfth year. . . . Thought in concepts, emancipated from
perception, puts demands on the child that exceed his mental
possibilities before the age of twelve (p. 54).
Vygotsky concludes from the results of his own studies that the
in-
tellectual functions that in a specific combination form the
psychologi-
cal basis of the process of concept formation ripen,
take shape, and
develop only at puberty" (p. 58).
At this point in development, possibility becomes
salient over
actuality and facts are viewed as being among
that subclass of actual-
ized potentialities that lies within the class
of all potentialities
the significance of which can only be grasped
by understanding the
relation between the two classes and the
conditions which caused the
class of potentialities to be actualized and the other to remain un-
actualized
.
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Finally, in formal thought there is a reversal of the direc-
tion of thinking between reality and possibility in the sub-
ject's method of approach. Possibility no longer appears
merely as an extension of an empirical situation or of ac-
tions actually performed. Instead it is reality that is now
secondary to possibility. Henceforth, they conceive of the
given facts as that sector of possible transformations that
has actually come about; for they are neither explained nor
even regarded as facts until the subject undertakes verifying
procedures that pertain to the entire set of possible hypo-
theses compatible with a given situation (Inhelder and Piaget
1958, p. 251).
At this point, the adolescent is capable of making a sharp distinction
between the actual and the possible. Ideals may be conceived as pro-
jections of the possible
—
goals around which one's aspirations and
energies may be organized.
In regard to social relations, the child, having become an
adolescent, is now capable of maintaining an objective perspective on
his relations with others. Selman (1975) refers to this stage as
"symbolic interaction perspective taking" (p. 128), and states that
the adolescent is now capable of assuming a detached perspective for
the purpose of analyzing interpersonal and social relations. More-
over, he recognizes that one cannot know with absolute certainty the
perspective another has. Jordan (1971b) describes the adolescent
at
this point as being able to "differentiate the form of an
argument
from its empirical content and can use all kinds of
combinatorial
analyses based on logical structures." Such a
perspective, he con-
tinues, enables the adolescent "to become socially
concerned with how
the world might a rather than simply describing
and reacting to the
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way it is. He then can become a critic and social reformer" (pp. 49-
50 ).
At the stage of formal operations, thought may be carried on
entirely through symbolization. Glucksberg and Danks (1975), sum-
marizing Bruner's view of symbolic representation, write:
Symbolic representation ... is in principle independent
of reality. People can imagine or think or believe almost
anything. Normally, symbolic representation frees thought
from the here and now, enabling us to think about the conse-
quences of alternative courses of action and to draw in-
ferences from what is known. In short, symbolic representa-
tion and symbolic activity serve to make conceptual sense of
the world (pp. 192-93).
Bruner et al. (1966) and Nash (1970) maintain that the advent
of theoretical thought marks a wedding between language and thought.
Their relationship becomes fully reciprocal: language expresses
thought and at the same time is a vehicle for expanding thought in an
infinite variety of ways. Language becomes the chief instrument of
thought, Bruner maintains, because its structure is almost identical
to the structure of thought, both sharing properties of productivity,
flexibility, specificity, and transformability , the latter property
being expressed in language in the rules for rewriting (e.g., passive
voice, interrogation, negation, and so on). Whereas thought had
been
limited previously by the constraints of sensorimotor and
concrete
intelligence and, as a number of researchers have demonstrated,
could
not be significantly advanced by language learning
(Inhelder, Sin-
clair and Bovet 1974; Piaget 1973; Waite 1975), it
has now acquired
the propositional and theoretical properties
that enable language to
function with it in full harmony and mutuality.
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While language certainly is important to thought and indeed
is the symbol system most often used for its expression and develop-
ment, it is important to note that mathematics and the arts also func-
tion with equal efficacy in their respective spheres. This fact has
been largely neglected by psychologists, who for the most part are
neither mathematicians nor artists and who thus have not experienced
the transcendent qualities of those symbol systems. Because mathematics
and the arts require special training and are known in their pure and
higher forms to a relative few, little research on their relation to
thought and the development of symbolization has been conducted as
compared to the vast amount of research conducted on language develop-
ment and its relation to cognitive growth.
While thought at the stage of formal operations is fully sym-
bolic, Bruner et al. (1966) explain that it also may at times be enactive
and ikonic. "Each of the three modes of representation," he writes,
"
—enactive, ikonic, and symbolic—has its unique way of representing
events. Each places a powerful impress on the mental life of human
beings at different ages, and their interplay persists as one of the
major features of adult intellectual life" (p. 1). An example of
the interplay between enactive or sensorimotor intelligence and sym
bolic intelligence might be the business executive who drives to
work
and dictates letters at the same time. The car is mostly
driven
through sensorimotor intelligence; the letters are composed
through
symbolic thought. Memory is both ikonic and symbolic . If
we are asked
to recall what lies on the kitchen table at home,
we very likely will
of the table, observe the things on it, and
then
call to mind an image
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supply an answer. But when asked to recall our phone number or the
distributive property (a(b + c) = ab + ac)
,
we find the familiar num-
bers and. letters placed upon our tongues.
Symbolization and the Development of Consciousness
In tracing the course of the development of symbolization we
have viewed the gradual transition, over a series of distinct but
indecisively bound stages, from the unaware neonate altogether lack-
ing in awareness of either external or internal phenomena, to the con-
scious adult whose awareness of the world is capable of the uniquely
human function of reaching into the subjective state of others (Selman
1975, p. 127). As the child goes through this transition, his ability
to allow something to stand for something else grows in direct relation
to his developing cognitive structures—structures which bring him to
the concrete logic that confines his symbolic activity to representing
the operations he performs on the actual world, to the hypothetical
deductive logic that opens his thoughts to the symbolization of pro-
positions and the infinitude of theoretical conceptualizations. Through-
out the process his awareness of himself and his awareness of
others
parallels directly his growing power of abstraction; the more his
understanding turns from the limitations of actuality to the
broaaer
realms of possibility, the more his capacity for empatny
and social
perspective taking increases. Thus we may say that the
development
of consciousness follows hand in hand the development
of symbolization.
As symbolization expands, it allows one to make
himself the object of
his own learning: one’s physiological and
psychological powers may.
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like any other phenomena, be studied, represented in memory, and
applied in the present when making decisions about the future. Sym-
bolization thus mediates one's knowledge of one's self, just as it
mediates knowledge of the physical, human, and unknown environment.
"Awareness," Piaget (1973) writes, "consists of a reconstruction on
an upper level of what is already organized in another manner on a
lower level . . ." (p. 40). The vehicle of that reconstruction is
symbolization. As the act of abstraction that makes thought possible,
symbolization allows us to represent and, therefore, recognize, that
which lies in the unconscious mind or in the undiscovered world of
fact. "Suddenly," Helen Keller wrote, describing the moment she
first grasped the significance of the symbol, "I felt a misty con-
sciousness as of something forgotten. . . ." The symbol brought with
it the dawning of a new thought— the power of language— thus bringing
to a higher level that which lay latent in the physiology of her
brain. Whatever is conscious is made conscious by symbolization;
whatever is unconscious remains unsymbolized. The ultimate function
of the symbol is to bring before the conscious mind aspects of the
unknown, whether internal or external, thereby expanding conscious-
ness and making available to the individual new powers that give
him
increased opportunity for becoming his ideal self.
Critical Periods in the Development of Symbolization
Because of the lack of research on symbolization as
a discrete
aspect of human development, little data are
available on the .existence
of critical and sensitive periods in the
development of symbolization.
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Whatever conclusions are to be drawn, therefore, must remain specula-
tive.
The research on sensitive and critical periods in language
development offers the safest ground for extrapolating on the sensi-
tive and critical periods for symbolization.
Linguists agree that a broad sensitive period for language
learning exists about eight months and puberty. Lenneberg (1967)
suggests that man's ability to adapt and reorganize thought patterns
related to language, skills ends when cerebral lateralization of
function becomes fixed after cerebral growth has stopped. About 60%
of cerebral growth is attained before the onset of patterned speech
at about two years of age, and the sensitive period for language learn-
ing ends when 100% of neural development is reached at puberty. The
hypothesis that puberty marks the termination of language growth is
further substantiated by the fact that when cerebral lateralization
is finally established, symptoms of acquired aphasia tend to become
irreversible within about three to six months after their onset. More-
over, chances for complete recovery rapidly diminish with advancing
age after the early teens. McNeill (1970) states:
The establishment of lateral asymmetry prevents further
linguistic development. The ability to recover from damage
to the left side of the brain declines with age. A new-
born with a damaged left hemisphere develops language nor-
mally with the right hemisphere; a 2- or 3-year old with damage
to the left hemisphere loses language in some degree but then
quickly recovers with the right; beyond puberty, recovery is
always limited or nonexistent. The degree of recovery is
thus correlated with the degree of lateralization before in
jury (p. 139).
Further evidence for the termination of a sensitive period at
puberty
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is that the mentally retarded show slow and modest beginnings in the
acquisition of language comprehension and production skills until
the early teens, when the level of their language ability becomes
permanently consolidated (Lenneberg 1967). Also, after puberty a
foreign language must be learned through conscious effort, not through
mere exposure. Moreover, after puberty it is virtually impossible to
learn a foreign tongue without an accent (Nash 1970).
Evidence for the existence of critical periods within this
broad, sensitive period is not as conclusive. Most researchers con-
cede that a sensitive period where the biological substratum has a
particular sensitivity to psychological events and environmental
input exists between the ages of about two to five. This is the
period of explosive linguistic growth during which 90% of the
phonological and syntactical properties are formed. Van Riper
(1963) lends support to the notion that this may be a sensitive
period by showing that stuttering is most apt to develop at this
time. He maintains that between two and five articulatory errors
become fixed, and the voice begins to assume the characteristics
which will most likely last throughout the child's lifetime. Lenne-
berg (1967) reports that the profoundly deaf must receive sound
train-
ing and prosthetic aid no later than two years of age if
good speech
habits are to develop.
Eveloff (1971) maintains that a critical period for
the devel-
opment of language exists during the first 18 months
and, like Van
Riper, agrees that a sensitive period for language
development in
general extends to age five. The development
of one's ability to com
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municate with others and to be in touch with his inner self rests on
having happy emotional experiences with the parents during this period.
"If this process is seriously flawed," he writes, "it is possible that
it may never be repaired. Certainly, if the child does not develop
a communicative language by the age of 5, the probability of any
further language development is greatly reduced" (p. 1905).
These data convincingly show that a critical period for lan-
guage development exists between the first few months of life and
puberty. Applying these data to the question of a critical period in
the development of symbolization, however, is not easily done. While
there are a few documented cases of children who have been raised
without language under conditions of extreme social deprivation, the
lack of detailed information about how these children perform on sym-
bolic tasks other than language prevents us from drawing definite con-
clusions. (For a review of the literature on children raised in the
wilds or by humans who deprive them of social contact, see Lenneberg
(1967).) Moreover, it seems as if some symbolic tasks are more prone
to being dependent on a certain period for their development than
others. For example, language has a definite critical period,
while
reading, writing, and mathematics do not. There is no evidence
that
suggests that adults have a natural impediment that deters
them from
learning to read or write, or acquire arithmetic skills.
Indeed, the
proliferation of adult education programs over the last
few decades
defies this thesis. Music, on the other hand,
seems to have a sensi-
tive, or quite possibly, a critical, period.
No known concert pianist
for example, has begun playing the piano
after the age of 12. Musical
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ability depends on a close coordination among auditory, visual, and
psychomotor processes. It also requires a highly developed sensitivity
to pitch. The development of these powers may well be tied to neural
development, which terminates at puberty.
In conclusion, we may hypothesize that those symbolic tasks,
like language and music, which have a strong biological base, have
critical periods. Those that are more dependent on conscious learning,
like reading, writing, and mathematics, do not. The distinction is
an important one, for it has strong implications for educational
planning. Much research needs to be conducted to test this hypothesis
and to determine which symbolic tasks are biologically programmed and
which depend on intentional learning.
CHAPTER VI
SYMBOLIZATION AND LEARNING COMPETENCE
Having presented a theory that explains the role of symboliza-
tion in thought and its relation to consciousness, and having examined
in detail the development of symbolization in the young child, it is
timely to discuss the question of the relation between symbolization
and learning. Such a discussion must involve an examination of the
nature of learning and learning competence, and the broad features of
symbolization's relation to them. It must also explain the role of
symbolization in the actualization of psychological potentialities,
its relation to curriculum and curriculum’s twin components, process
and content, and its role in the development of technological, moral,
and philosophical competence—competencies that comprise the hallmark
of learning and that are necessary for survival in the twentieth
century and beyond.
Learning and Learning Competence
Learning is commonly referred to as the process or act by whicn
knowledge and skills are acquired. As one scans the ontogenetic scale,
one finds that organisms undergo a gradual shift from adaptation
to
the environment through instinct, which yields a tendency
toward uni-
formity across the species, to adaptation to the environment
through
learning, which produces a high degree of individuality
across the
species. Gradually the regulation of behavior by
instinct gives way
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to the transmission of information by modeling, until, with man,
several modes of learning appear—apprenticeship
,
rote-learning, and
deutero— learning
,
or learning how to learn. These modes of learning,
discussed in Chapter II, give each member of the species enormous
adaptive power; so great is the power they bestow that man, instead of
adapting himself to the environment, has been able to turn the tables
on nature and adapt the environment to his own needs and purposes.
Throughout man's steady march towards the conquest of the environment,
learning has been the weapon in man's arsenal of potentialities that
has placed him in the forefront of evolutionary forces. It is the
central dynamic that translates potentiality into actuality and pro-
pels him forward in pursuit of his destiny, concresence.
What, then, is learning?
The Anisa Model's theory of development defines learning as
"the ability of the organism to differentiate experience by breaking
it down into contrastable units; to combine or integrate these con-
trastable elements in novel ways thereby generating new patterns of
movement, perception, thoughts, feelings, and intentions, and to gene-
ralize these patterns to new situations (Jordan 1976b, p. 277).
Learning thus consists of three basic elements: differentiation, in-
tegration, and generalization. When one becomes aware of his own
learning and consciously applies the steps of differentiation, inte-
gration, and generalization to learning tasks, he is said to
acquire
learning competence.
The following is an example Jordan (1973a) cites
that demon-
strates how differentiation, integration, and
generalization are m-
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volved in learning. He also uses the example to illustrate how the
conscious application of these steps leads to learning competence:
A simple example of concept formation or classification may
help to make the processes of differentiation, integration,
and generalization clear. Consider the case of a young
child trying to learn what a chair is. To do this he must
differentiate certain attributes of furniture which when in-
tegrated in a certain way make up a chair (that is, consti-
tute ' chairness
'
) : four legs of certain height, seat of parti-
cular size, and back. Having made those differentiations and
that particular integration (which occurs best through inter-
action with real chairs rather than pictures of them)
,
the
child can then appropriately identify on sight chairs that
he has never seen before and distinguish them from 'non-chair'
furniture or other objects which may share some but not all
of the chair's attributes (such as tables, which have legs,
bicycles, which have seats; couches, which have backs, etc.).
Forming concepts reduces the overwhelming complexity of the
environment and makes the child more competent in dealing
with it. In typical programs children are taught various con-
cepts, but not the process of forming them. The Anisa ap-
proach not only teaches the child what a chair is but makes
him aware of how he learns the concept (which involves a
large number of perceptual and psychomotor processes as well).
That makes the learning experience maximally generalizable
or transferable— that is, it helps him not only to recognize
furniture he has never seen before as chairs but it also
helps him to formulate other concepts more easily (p. 88).
Differentiation, integration, and generalization thus consti-
tute the essential characteristics of the translation of potentiality
into actuality. Anything that is actual in the mineral, vegetable,
animal, or human levels must necessarily have passed through at
least
the differentiative and integrative phases. With the animal
and human
levels, where learning becomes a factor in the actualization
of poten-
tial, generalization is involved. With man, consciousness
bestows
the ability to reflect upon and direct learning,
and thus learning
competence emerges.
At first glance the reader familiar with
the voluminods litera
233
ture of learning theory and acquainted with the complex issues with
which learning theorists wrestle might find the brevity and simplicity
of Anisa's definition of learning to be signs of inadequacy. However,
in its brevity and simplicity lie its truth and power. A basic
characteristic of all mathematics formulae and scientific laws is
their simplicity. Their power stems from an ability to define the es-
sential features of a phenomenon and to describe how those features
work together. The Pythagorean theorem, Newton’s laws of motion,
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Archimedes' principle, and Einstein's E = me are examples of such
formulae and laws. It is only when laws reach an ultimate simplicity
that truth and explanatory power emerge.
Anisa's definition of learning competence gives indications
of being a formulation of both practical and theoretical value. It
was formulated after a search through the major learning theories for
the basic features of learning. After reviewing Gagne's Eight Types
of Learning, Walter's brain wave theory, Tolman’s sign theory, Lewin's
field theory, Snygg and Comb's perception theory, Bandura s modeling
theory, Mowrer's two-factor learning theory, Newell and Simon s informa
tion-processing theory, various mediation theories, Piaget s theory,
Miller, Pribram, and Galantar’s TOTE theory, Skinner's work on condi-
tioning, and Harlow's theory of learning sets, Jordan (1971b;
1973b)
proposed the definition stated above.
The definition has proven to be of value in its ability
to
guide teachers in helping children learn-a factor which
many learn-
ing theorists seem to have neglected. Since 1973,
the Anisa theory of
learning has been used in training about 145
teachers in programs
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lasting between one and three years. The teachers trained represent
a broad spectrum of educational personnel (teachers, aides, and ad-
ministrators from the public schools, private day care centers, nur-
sery schools, Head Start programs, and Child Development Centers); the
children taught by these teachers come from families that reflect a
variety of socio-economic levels and ethnic backgrounds (blue collar
workers and farmers from the rural lower and lower-middle class in
Southeastern Ohio and Hampden, Maine; the white collar workers and
industrial farmers from the suburban middle and upper middle class in
Suf field, Connecticut; and the urban poor of Kansas City and Fall
River, Massachusetts. In each locality the teachers have found the
Anisa theory of learning to be effective in helping children learn.
The theory has also been applied to the construction of comprehensive
curricula for teaching mathematics (Streets 1975) and reading (Theroux
and Marks 1975)— curricula which have been enthusiastically implemented
by the teachers in the localities mentioned above and which give pro-
mising signs of being major breakthroughs in math and reading instruc-
tion.
Another factor that makes the Anisa definition of learning
competence a significant contribution to learning theory is the dis-
tinction it makes between learning and learning competence. This dis-
tinction is important because it distinguishes the learning
capacity
of animals from the learning capacity of humans. This
distinction is
especially important to educational philosophy and theory,
whose fore-
most concern is the release of human potential.
It is well established that animals can learn
through condi-
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tioning procedures that require them to differentiate, integrate, and
generalize. Dobzhansky (1962) reviews the capacity of animals for
integration (or insight) andgeneralization in the following passage:
Insight is apprehension of relations; generalization is
derivation of a general principle from particular instances.
These are predominantly and characteristically human facul-
ties, utterly absent in the newborn .and developing only
gradually, usually together with the ability to speak. Their
traces are, nevertheless, observable in some animals. Rensch
and Ducker (1959) trained a civet cat (Viverricula malaccen-
sis ) to choose between a box containing food, marked on the
top with two black circles of unequal size, and a box lacking
a reward, marked by two equal-sized circles. Then thirty
other pairs of marks were used, the unequal pair always mark-
ing a reward and the equal one always empty. The animal even-
tually developed an 'averbal general concept' of oddity vs.
equality and could choose between a box marked with nine un-
equal dots and one with nine equal-sized dots. It was, how-
ever, unable to extend this concept to discriminate between
two similar letters or numerals and two dissimilar ones. The
experiences of 0. Koehler and others (see Thorpe 1956 for
references) have shown that such averbal concepts of number
may be developed in some birds. They can be trained to
locate a reward marked by a certain number of dots of differ-
ent shapes and arrangements (p. 207).
Glucksberg (1966) reports that monkeys even give signs of
deutero-learning . Monkeys were shown two objects differing in color,
size, and shape, with food placed under one of them. After many
trials and many errors, they learned to select the correct object
every time with no further errors. They then were given a new dis-
crimination problem with two new objects. Again, the monkeys took a
fair number of trials, but they learned with fewer errors than
in the
first experiment. The procedure was continued until the
monkeys were
able to solve the problem on the first trial. Glucksberg
concludes
that the monkeys' performance proves that they
"learned something more
than which object was correct in each problem. They
learned to do
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something which enabled them to solve any new discrimination problem
immediately. They had learned how to learn" (p. 4).
While such behavior is evidence that monkeys possess an
ability to learn from experience and apply that learning to new tasks,
it is different from what the Anisa Model means by learning competence.
Learning competence is more than the application of skills acquired
during conditioning to new conditioning situations. It involves a
conscious analysis of one's performance in learning. It requires the
ability to reflect on one's performance and ask, "Have I demonstrated
the ability to apply the principle of differential calculus to a
wide variety of problems? Perhaps I need to test my knowledge by
trying it out on problems in business, economics, physics, and account-
ing." Or, "I seem to be having a hard time grasping this concept.
What have I failed to integrate? I don't seem to know. Perhaps I'd
better hash this over with my teacher." Or, "I'm not getting anywhere
with this. I need some differentiation. What factors can I isolate?
What are their definitions? How are they related? Perhaps I 11 go
to the library and see what other authors have to say about the criti-
cal variables involved in this problem." A competent learner em-
barking on a new learning experience might approach it in this man-
ner:
I've been feeling lousy the last few months. I m gain-
ing weight, sleeping more, and was out of breath when
I
ran 50 yards to catch the bus yesterday. I've
got to
get back in shape.
Tennis! That’s it! It's a sport you can play
into
your 60s and 70s. Let's see. How should I go
about it.
All shots seem to stem from three basic strokes:
the
forehand, the backhand, and the overhand serve.
I 11
start with the forehand. What are the basic
body move-
237
merits? I 11 watch the U.S. Open on TV to see how the pros
do it and then I'll go over to the local courts and watch
how duffers like me do it! Then I'll go over to the gram-
mar school and hit the ball against the wall for a while
to find out where I stand.
I'll have to get into shape gradually so I don't pull
any muscles. I'll also have to practice the basic move-
ments in sports other than tennis if I really want to have
a smooth, integrated stroke. If I don't, it'll be jerky
and splintered. I'll play some tabl.e tennis to sharpen my
reflexes and hand-eye coordination, and paddleball to devel-
op my footwork and stroke. After I get into shape I'll
play basketball once a week to improve my ability to coor-
dinate my arms while running. With tennis once a week and
these other sports sprinkled in on a rotating basis, in
about a year I should have all the basic movements inte-
grated into smooth patterns. By then, I'll be a first rate
novice. Perhaps then I'll drop the other sports, concentrate
on tennis, and take lessons from a good teacher. In a
couple of years I'll be hitting with the best of them.
A person who approaches learning in this way is his own
teacher. He knows that to learn he has to differentiate, integrate,
and generalize, and he searches to find ways of applying these steps
to his own learning. ("All shots seem to stem from three basic
strokes" is an example of differentiation. "I'll have to practice
the basic movements in sports other than tennis if I really want to
have a smooth, integrated stroke," is an example of integration and
generalization.) The competent learner also knows the value of
several important pedagogical principles and can apply them to his
own learning: he knows the need for standards ("I'll see how the
pros
do it"), the need to evaluate how he compares to the
standard ( I 11
watch the duffers ... and hit the ball against the
wall to find
out where I stand"); the importance of assessing his
probable rate
of progress ("in about a year I’ll have all the
basic movements inte-
grated into smooth patterns"); and the need for
humor and forachiev-
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able but challenging goals and subgoals ("In about a year
. . . I'll
be a first-rate novice. . . . In a couple of years I'll be hitting
with the best of them."). Most important, the whole enterprise
is undertaken within the broader context of maintaining biological
integrity, and demonstrates a concern to preserve the quality of
life and a determination to be in charge of his own destiny—moral
and volitional competencies necessary for being a responsible citi-
zen.
Learning competence is more than just a skill to be acquired
and applied in certain situations. Rather, it is a way of life. The
competent learner regards all experience as potentially educative.
He has a positive orientation to life which predisposes him to find
the aspects of experience that leads to new differentiations, inte-
grations, and generalizations, thereby adding to his immanence and
increasing his capacity for transcendence. It is the greatest gift
an educational institution can bestow upon children for it gives them
the tools they need to take charge of their own destinies.
Symbolization and Learning Competence
"Symbolization is an important factor in the attainment of
learning competence," Jordan (1975c) writes, "because as the
Model
defines it, learning competence depends on the conscious
ability to
differentiate, integrate, and generalize experience.
Thus to the ex-
tent that consciousness depends on symbolic activity,
so will the
tainment of learning competence (p. 53).
As we have seen, symbolization and
consciousness are intrinsi
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cally bound up with each other. Thus, symbolization, as the act of
consciousness that makes knowledge possible, must be directly in-
volved in learning competence, which is the conscious ability to
learn. What, then, is symbolization's involvement?
A basic proposition of our theory is that in order to know
something cognitively, that something must be symbolized. It must
be bound to a symbol which can be stored in the mind, recalled, and,
when brought into the spotlight of consciousness, manipulated, con-
trasted, compared, and aligned with other symbols that stand for con-
cepts that relate in some way to the topic being considered. Since
learning competence requires one to make one's own learning the sub-
ject of learning, it requires that the act of learning itself be
symbolized. First and foremost, it requires the ability to differen-
tiate aspects of one's own learning so that they may be recognized,
symbolized, and then compared, contrasted, and integrated with other
thoughts
.
In Piagetian and psychoanalytic terms, learning competence is
an act of self-awareness or self-analysis that brings to the level
of conscious awareness that which previously had been unconscious.
In the previous chapter we cited Piaget's statement that "Awareness
consists of a reconstruction on an upper level of what is already
organized on a lower level . . and explained that
symbolization
is the means by which that reconstruction is carried
out. So it is,
then, that learning, which both animals and man may
do on an uncon-
scious level, can be made conscious in man alone
through the uniquely
human capacities of self-analysis and
symbolization.
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As the examples of learning competence cited throughout this
chapter suggest, language is the symbol system that makes learning
competence possible. Language is best suited for this task because
it is the symbol system that mediates interaction in the human en-
vironment. Reflection on one's own learning is an instance of a human
interacting with himself. Indeed, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to use either mathematics or art to elicit information
about one's progress in learning. The effectiveness of language as
the symbol system of learning competence is due to the intimate rela-
tion between language and thought. Language, the only symbol system
of conscious thought whose appearance is biologically based, is
ideally suited for the expression of human thought; thus it is the
symbol system principally used in psychoanalysis.
Bringing to a conscious level through verbal symbolism the
state of one's progress in learning is an instance of the conscious
mind making conscious something that was unconscious or unknown.
The opposite may also occur. The symbolism of dreams is an instance
of the unconscious mind bringing to consciousness something that was
unconscious. Kekule, for example, credited his discovery of the mole-
cular structure of benzene to a dream he had of a snake with
a tail
in its mouth. He interpreted the dream to mean that
benzene's struc-
ture was a closed-carbon ring (Jung 1964, p. 38). Indeed,
much ar-
tistic creativity may be said to find its origins
in the promptings
of the unconscious.
Learning competence, because it requires
one’s own learning, is a form of self-awareness
one to learn about
whose development is
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based on the same cognitive structures as the development of conscious-
ness. We would then expect that learning competence would not fully
appear until the concrete operational stage when the child becomes
able to reflect on his own thoughts and feelings (Selman 1975). An
example of self-reflection on one's own learning at this stage is
a girl in the second grade (seven or eight years of age) who, as she
passed by a table at which I was working with two boys on word re-
cognition skills, said spiritedly, "I’ve learned how to do that and
now I'm off and running!" She pivoted, tucked two books under her
arm, and headed toward the reading corner, displaying in her stride
the same independence as the business man who strides briskly to the
train station each morning.
The girl's comment shows that she is aware of the doors that
were opened before her when she learned how to recognize letters
and combine them into words. While thrill at learning to read is
based on a rudimentary self-awareness that enables her to realize
the significance of her achievement and to derive joy from it, it is
highly unlikely that she is aware of the process by which she ac-
quired her skill. It is also unlikely that she would be able to
teach someone else how to recognize letters and put them
together,
since that would require an understanding of the process
and an abil-
ity to analyze another's situation, both of which
require a level
of awareness of which she is not yet capable.
Vygotsky’s (1962) studies of the child’s development
of con-
cepts and scientific thinking made him aware
of the importance of
being able to reflect on one’s own learning
and to control and direct
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it. He describes learning competence as the ability to isolate
particular mental acts from one's total mental activity, which brings
us into a new relationship to our thought processes. "In this way,
becoming conscious of our operations and viewing each as a process
of a certain kind—such as remembering or imagining—leads to their
mastery" (pp. 91-92).
Vygotsky found that school instruction was especially effec-
tive in helping the child become aware of his own mental processes.
Scientific concepts, particularly, "with their hierarchical system
of interrelationships, seem to be the medium within which awareness
and mastery first develop, to be transferred later to other concepts
and other areas of thought. Reflective consciousness comes to the
child through the portals of scientific concepts" (ibid., p. 92).
Vygotsky's studies also shed light on the development of
learning competence and support the view that it does not appear
until the stage of formal operations. He maintains that the ability
to direct one's own mental processes with the aid of words or signs
an ability we have already established as a prerequisite for learning
competence—"reaches its full development only in adolescence" (ibid.,
p. 59). He also found that Piaget's conclusions on
the process of
decentration and the emergence of consciousness apply directly
to
learning how to learn. "The school child," he writes,
"though grow-
ing steadily in awareness and mastery, is not
aware of his conceptual
operations. All the basic mental functions become
conscious and
deliberate during school age, exce pt intellect
itself" (ibid., p. 90)
(Placing this comment within the context of
Vigotsky's other state-
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merits on the subject, we assume that school age ends around mid-
adolescence.
While the first signs of learning competence cannot be ex-
pected until the preoperatory stage, important precursors are es-
tablished in infancy and throughout the early years. The child's
emotional bond with his parents, especially the mother, during the
first six to eighteen months has a direct bearing on the way in
which the child relates to the world.
It is these nurturing adults, making regular and gratify-
ing emotional contact, who help the infant overcome an-
xieties that the human organism feels when facing the un-
known (the seemingly chaotic, nonperiodic events that
flood in upon him at birth). These repetitive, predic-
tive encounters with the parents make it possible to ac-
quire a set of individualized, organized, predictive
responses to the environment that increase the probabil-
ity of survival (Eveloff 1971, p. 1905).
If the child is given unconditional love and acceptance dur-
ing the first three years, the emotional substratum that constitutes
the basis of his orientation to unknowns will be positive (Montagu
1970). A positive orientation toward new experience is essential
for learning competence ; without it, one withdraws from experience
and cuts off opportunities for learning.
Also, a child's initial experience with books and school are
crucial precursors to learning competence. If the child's experi-
ences with them are happy and positive, if his efforts to explore
the environment are encouraged, and rewarded, and if the
parents
share in activities with the child related to learning
and formal
education (like reading to the child on a regular basis,
building
things and playing games that draw out his ability
to symbolize
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to imagine, going to the library, playing on the school playgrounds,
and exemplifying positive attitudes about work, school, reading,
mathematics, and the arts, and learning in general), the child's emo-
tions will be organized so that he will be hopeful and happy about
things related to school and learning. Such experiences help es-
tablish a healthy self-concept and prepare him for a successful and
happy experience with learning when he enters school. If happy ex-
periences continue throughout the preoperatory stage, the child will
have a solid emotional foundation upon which learning competence
may emerge. When he enters the preoperatory stage and is ready to
tackle mathematics, reading, and writing on a formal and high-powered
basis, he will be able to reflect positively on his learning and thus
will be able to learn from it just as he is able to learn from the
rest of experience. The development of a positive self-concept is
especially important. Since learning competence requires the abil-
ity to reflect on one's own learning, if the child is basically happy
about himself, he will have no problems directing his attention toward
himself. However, if his self-concept is poor, he will not like
what
he sees and will avoid attending to himself and his own learning.
He will become the worst suppressor o £ his own
potentialities and will
develop a learning disability that will haunt him throughout
his en-
tire life.
Symbolization and the Anisa Theory of Curriculum
As was mentioned in the opening paragraphs
of Chapter V, the
Anisa theory of development classifies
psychological potentialities
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into the five broad categories of psychomotor, perceptual, affective,
cognitive, and volitional development. The classification does not
in any way negate the infinitude of man's potential; it is simply
a means by which potential may be conceived theoretically for the
sake of analysis by those concerned with a scientific approach to
actualizing human potential.
The Anisa theory of curriculum, logically derived from the
theory of development, consists of two distinct and interrelated
components, process and content. Psychological potentialities make
up the process aspect of the theory of curriculum, while information
about the physical, human, and unknown environments make up the con-
tent aspect.
The theory of curriculum thus distinguishes the hows of learn-
ing from the whats . The hows are the intrinsic patterns of function-
ing that underlie behavior. A pattern, or process, is "a patterned
expression of energy utilization that depends on some structure in
the brain that produces the pattern" (Jordan 1976b, p. 275). Pro-
cess is not to be confused with activity; processes make up the psy-
chological substratum of activity. A given activity, then, consists
of psychomotor, perceptual, affective, cognitive, and volitional
processes. Development consists of the gradual accumulation of
these structures and the functions that accompany them. "Generally
speaking, new structures and their integration occur as a
result
of biological maturation on the one hand and learning
on the other
(ibid.). Differentiation and integration constitute the
essential
features of biological maturation. When learning is
present, gene-
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ralization, or the transference of what has been integrated to other
situations, occurs. The psychological processes of development are
genetically programmed for all normally endowed human beings and
thus are universal. Some appear in all people; others depend on in-
teraction with the environment for their actualization. The content
aspect of the curriculum, on the other hand, is determined by the
culture. It consists of the knowledge, customs, values, and beliefs
the culture has accumulated.
By differentiating process and content, the Anisa theory of
curriculum enables teachers to conceive of the child's potentiality
in comprehensive and specific terms. It places curriculum in the
broader context of human development by emphasizing the full devel-
opment of the child's potential rather than the accumulation of facts
or the acquisition of specific skills. The theory is particularly
useful in curriculum planning and the diagnosis of maturational or
learning problems. By using it as a framework for planning, teachers
can create experiences that draw out all of the child's potentiali-
ties; by using it as a framework for diagnosis, teachers can specify
whether a child's problem lies with mastering a body of information
or whether it is rooted more deeply in one of the psychological pro-
cesses that underlie learning.
Because symbolization is a psychological activity, it is in-
volved in both the actualization of psychological potentialities
and
the accumulation of knowledge. Because of its intrinsic relation
to consciousness, we would expect its influence to be less
signifi-
cant in those processes that are the result of
biological maturation
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and most directly felt in those processes that require conscious aware-
ness. Because of its epistemological function crucial to the construc-
tion of knowledge, we would expect symbolization to be directly in-
volved in all aspects of the content curriculum. The purpose of
this section is to discuss symbolization's relation to each of the
categories of the process curriculum and to the construction of knowl-
edge specified by the content curriculum.
Psychomotor Development
Blane and Jordan (1975) define psychomotor competence as:
. . . an inner awareness of all of the muscles (which can
come under voluntary control to whatever degree)
,
all of
the differentiated movements of body parts they are capable
of effecting, and the ability to execute an infinite variety
of combinations (integrations) of such movements into pat-
terns which express purposes of the organism. By 'body
parts' we mean more than head, limbs, and trunk; included
are muscles which control the size of the blood vessels,
muscles which move the eyes, the tongue, the lips, and the
bladder and anal sphincters, the muscles producing speech
sounds, muscles which comprise the genital organs, and the
diaphragm which controls breathing (p. 187).
This broad definition of psychomotor competence incorporates
the following aspects of the body:
Vital function systems , including the respiratory, circula
tory, digestive, and reproductive systems. The movement
patterns of these systems are largely controlled by reflexes
and maturation rather than consciously directed learning.
However, in some instances voluntary control can be acquired,
for example, one can lower or raise one's blood pressure
by
gaining control over the muscles in the walls of the blood
vessels. Also yogis have shown that breathing and other
bodily functions like the heart beat and metabolism can
be
subject to conscious regulation.
Skple tal muscles system , including balance and posture,
loco
motion, and manipulation. Control of the skeletal
muscle-
system leads to what is commonly referred to
as coordina
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tion. All movements of the limbs,
trolled by the skeletal muscles.
torso, and head are con-
_eeech system , including voice inflection or prosody, and
articulation. For the vast majority of people, control
over the speech system comes through maturation and in-
volves little or no conscious effort. Children born with
a speech impediment or who acquire disorder must learn to
compensate for or correct their problem. During the adoles-
cent and adult years, a competent speaker must learn to con-
trol such elements of speech as pitch, volume, timing, and
timbre so that his speech may be maximally effective.
Perceptual systems
,
including the muscles that support
seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling. Again,
conscious control is not a major factor. The senses of
normal, healthy people are regulated by reflexes. Only
in unusual cases, such as the need to strengthen muscles
around the eye, do the muscles of the perceptual systems
need to be exercised consciously.
In the definition of psychomotor competence cited above, Blane
and Jordan (1975) explain that psychomotor competence is an inner
awareness of all the muscles that can come under voluntary control.
This inner awareness would be called by Piaget sensorimotor intelli-
gence and by Bruner enactive representation. The important factor
is not whether the awareness is due to sensation or some rudimentary
form of representation, but that the child, as he matures, must be
given the opportunity first to use and then to exercise consciously
all of his voluntary muscles, regardless of how limited in scope the
effect of the muscles may appear to be, so that he can become aware
of them and capable of bringing them under conscious control. Unless
muscles are exercised they remain unknown. Conscious awareness of
a part of the body comes only when the part is in pain or has become
tense through exercise. How often people say after exercising muscles
during a new sport or activity, "I've used muscles I never knew I
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had!" If children are to develop the inner awareness needed for
psychomotor competence, they must have a comprehensive program that
allows them to learn about all parts of their bodies and how those
parts can be controlled.
Symbolization s biggest contribution to psychomotor develop-
ment comes in learning to control the intricate movements required
for dance and athletics. In diving or gymnastics, for example, an
athlete constructs an image (or ikonic representation) that serves
as a model for the dive or routine he wishes to make. His concen-
tration on the image sends nerve impulses throughout the body which
prepare it for the actual act. After his body has been prepared,
he begins to move and the pathways, nerve endings, and body parts,
now anticipating the arrival of the impulse from the brain, travel
and are received with greater rapidity, thereby enabling the athlete
to perform with greater speed and precision. Forming an image of
the dive or routine is an instance of goal setting and will be dis-
cussed more fully in the section on volitional development.
Perceptual Development
Perceptual competence refers to the capacity to differen-
tiate sensory information and then integrate that informa-
tion into generalizable patterns, which constitute inter-
pretations of reality, that enable the organism to make
meaningful decisions and to act. Interpretation always
concerns the organization of incoming stimuli in terms of
past experience, present needs, and aspirations of inten-
tions which involve the future. Perceptual competence rests
upon an internal structuring which functions as a set of
rules which generate and direct the basic processes of
differentiation, integration, and generalization on which
the interpretation or organization depends (Conway 1974).
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Perception brings to the mind the raw data that is transformed
by symbolization into knowledge. The generalized patterns of per-
ception that constitute interpretations of reality which enable one
to act intelligently are the first fruits, or elementary ideas, of
symbolic transformation. Describing the relationship between percep-
tion and symbolization, Langer (1942) writes:
Ideas are undoubtedly made out of impressions
—out of
sense messages from the special organs of perception, and
vague visceral reports of feeling. The law by which they
are made, however, is not a law of direct combination.
Any attempt to use such principles as association by conti-
guity or similarity soon runs into sheer unintelligible com-
plication and artifice. Ideation proceeds by a more potent
principle, which seems to be best described as a principle
of symbolization. The material furnished by the senses is
constantly wrought into symbols
,
which are our elementary
ideas (ibid., p. 46).
Langer also states that "The fact that the human brain is
constantly carrying on a process of symbolic transformation of the
experiential data that come to it causes it to be a veritable foun-
tain of more or less spontaneous ideas (ibid., p. 47).
While perception has an obvious role to play in symbolization,
does symbolization have a role in perception? Is their relationship
one-sided or reciprocal? The answer comes by asking to what degree
perception is subject to conscious regulation. The instances in which
one consciously chooses to recognize or ignore visual, auditory, ol-
factory, gustatory, or cutaneous stimuli are few, if any. Almost with-
out exception, one is forced to process the sensory data that impinges
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on the senses. However, the unconscious mind may exercise a strong
influence on perception. One’s fears, anxieties, hopes and aspira-
tions influence on a sub-symbolic level the sensory data one differen-
tiates and therefore recognizes, as in the case of a mother who hears
her baby crying when those in her company do not. They can also
predispose one to integrate or generalize the information in parti-
cular ways. This happens to everyone, as in the case of the husband
who fails to hear his wife tell him they will be going out Saturday
night. In some cases it assumes pathological proportions, as in
the schizophrenic who shuts himself off from the world, or the person
who hallucinates (creates his own sensory data) . Thus we may con-
clude. that the relationship between symbolization and perception is
strongly one-sided: perception provides symbolization with a con-
stant stream of data which is differentiated and integrated by the
perceptual system and then generalized by symbolization into ele-
mentary ideas which can be analyzed, compared, contrasted, and mani-
pulated in conjunction with other ideas, and then wrought into struc-
tures that comprise our knowledge of the world.
Affective Development
The Anisa Model defines emotions as subjective, non-verbal
states whose function is to inform the individual of his viability
—
that is, of the degree to which he is actualizing potential and im-
proving the quality of survival for himself and society (Jordan 1976b;
Carney 1976a). Hopeful emotions tell one his condition conduces to
the actualization of potential, while fearful emotions tell one his
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condition threatens his survival or ability to actualize potential.
When a person is able to organize consciously his emotions so that he
feels hopeful when doing things that actualize potential and fearful
when doing things that threaten his survival, he acquires affective
competence.
Because conscious awareness of one's own subjective condition
does not appear until the concrete operational stage, the child's
emotions are organized without conscious control. The manner in
which his emotions are organized depends entirely on the feelings he
associates with the experiences he has. Therefore, it is necessary
that parents, teachers, and others who work with young children be
certain that their hope—related emotions are aroused by experiences
that conduce to the release of their potential and their fear-related
emotions are aroused by experiences that jeopardize their survival.
This is all the more important when one considers the impact emotions
have on the development of all other potentialities. During the early
years, the child's emotions towards one's parents, siblings, and the
world around him are organized. Likewise, during the first few
years of school the child's emotional orientation toward learning
becomes fixed. For example, if a child experiences a series of pain-
ful failures at school, he will begin to loathe school. That fear-
ful feeling will be generalized to the activities and things asso-
ciated with school—bus rides, teachers, books, and exploration with
the unknown. In short, he will come to regard these things as threats
to his survival. To protect himself, he will avoid them and, if
failures persist, come to hate them and will strike out against them.
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He also will probably regard himself as a failure, see himself as a
his viability, and become his own worst enemy. On the other
hand, if the child is set up for guaranteed successes, he will regard
school as a positive and hopeful place, and will seek out opportuni-
ties to become involved in learning. He will also see himself as
successful and will be able to develop a positive orientation toward
himself. He thus can become a releaser of his own potential—a com-
petent learner.
In Chapter IV the binding function of the emotions in symbol-
ization was discussed. Emotions were said to have rudimentary sym-
bolic properties that represent the subjective state associated with
previous experience. Both fear and hope can be experienced in the
absence of the stimuli that originally arouses them. Fear, Mowrer
explains, is a sort of primitive, but very powerful representation
or image of a painful experience, while "hope, by the same token
is an image of pleasure or gratification" ( 1960 , pp. 258-59 ).
Because a child is incapable of consciously controlling the
emotional bonds he forms with experience, affective learning operates
primarily on the basis of conditioning: experiences that reduce
drives and bring rewards and pleasure are hopeful; experiences that
increase drives and bring punishment and pain are fearful. Adults,
however, are capable of transcending the immediate sensations of
drive reduction and increment, of pleasure and pain, and can organize
their emotions on the basis of internal rewards which they define for
themselves. A martyr, for example, endures excruciating pain to
demonstrate his loyalty to the ideals and principles in which he be-
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lieves. His rewards are self-determined and Independent of the
actions or persuasions of others.
lo help children establish internal rewards that enable them
in adolescence to organize their actions on the basis of ideals and
principles and not simply on the basis of sensation, parents and
teachers need to avoid administering rewards and punishments in mate-
rial ways. If rewards and punishments are always material, the child
will become an adult whose energies will be devoted to material gain.
Such a person will be prone to sacrifice social and religious values
for material rewards. On the other hand, if children are raised
with spiritual rewards (praise from parents in the form of affection,
love, and privileges), and if they are taught to endure material
deprivation cheerfully and to find pleasure in the quality of their
relationships with others, their system of rewards will be spiritual;
they will have the strength to sacrifice material rewards and endure
physical hardships for the sake of ideals and principles.
Symbolization plays an important role in affective develop-
ment. Through conditioning, symbols can become endowed with powerful
emotional meaning. If a child has repeated experiences that arouse
intense emotions, the emotions become associated with objects central
to the experience, which, when encountered later, recall the emotions
previously associated with them. If a child, for example, is beaten
up in a bowling alley, the bowling alley will come to symbolize the
beating and when the child sees the bowling alley or even other bowl-
ing alleys, intense fear-related emotions will be aroused. lurther-
more, the fear-related emotions can also be transferred to the words
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bowling alley the symbols that stand for the place where the beating
occurred. Teachers and parents who understand how emotions are
organized around symbols can prevent phobias and emotional blocks
from forming that can cripple aspects of the child’s development.
Affect also has a great influence on symbolization’s develop-
ment. As was mentioned earlier, if the child's initial experiences
with school are failures, he will loathe school. Tragically, this
is the case for millions of children in America. And because sym-
bols mediate the child's interaction with the world and are central
to intellectual development, they often bear the burden of the child's
failures. Because education has yet to become a science, children
are taught mathematics, reading, writing, and the arts on little
better than a hit or miss basis. There exists no school in the
country that can guarantee that each child will leave it with even
average skills in the basic symbol systems. Because of the lack of
professionalism in early childhood education, many children experience
failures which place blocks to learning the symbol systems that are
virtually impossible to break down. A law of development, Jordan
(1976b) maintains, is that it is irreversible. "Development proceeds
irreversibly in one direction. For instance, it is not possible to
'unlearn' something; it is only possible to add additional learning
which may have the effect of altering a behavior that emerged out of
some kind of prior learning" (p. 276). Affective learning is perhaps
the most difficult kind of learning to alter. Emotional bonds are
powerful and independent of reason. Because they are based on in-
tense and direct experience, which the individual subjectively re-
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gards as being bound up with his survival, they are sealed with a con-
viction as strong as mortar. Thus it is vitally important that a
child's initial encounters with the basic symbol systems be positive
and hopeful. Successful experiences can only be guaranteed by
parents and teachers who know the developmental stages the child
traverses in the course of his symbolic development. When the child
is provided with experiences which match his developmental level, he
will feel the excitement of learningand will build up strong, positive
emotional associations with the symbol systems. As he develops he
will regard them as lures for his development and will actively seek
out experiences which involve them. Hopeful emotional bonds with
mathematics, speech, reading, writing, and the arts are essential
prerequisites for acquiring competence in the symbol systems and should
be consciously fostered by parents and teachers during the preopera-
tional years so that when the child enters the concrete stage he can
be "off and running."
Cognitive Development
Cognition refers to the intellectual processes or operations
necessary for thinking and reasoning. Like all other potentialities,
thinking develops through interaction with the environment. "Actually
in order to know objects," Piaget (1970) writes, "the subject must
act upon them and therefore transform them: he must displace, con-
nect, combine, take apart, and reassemble them" (p. 104). Piaget's
statement describes in other words the phases of differentiation ( dis-
place" and "take apart") and integration ("connect," "combine," and
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"reassemble”). Through such mental manipulations, internal structures
develop which form the basis of cognition (Jordan 1976b).
Cognition may be subdivided into a number of distinct but
interrelated processes or operations which constitute different ways
of thinking. Some of the more important processes are analysis,
synthesis, classification, seriation, number relations, deduction, in-
duction, extrapolation, interpolation, implication, conservation,
transitivity, analogy, and metaphor. Cognitive competence is the con-
scious ability to use when needed the processes that comprise cogni-
tion.
While psychomotor, perceptual, and affective potentialities
develop somewhat independently of symbolization, cognitive development
is bound up with it. In the preoperative and concrete operational
stages, cognition sets the pace for symbolic development. The child
represents the cognitive operations that have been acquired in the
preceding stage. During the stage of formal operations, a level of
stabilization is achieved and their relationship becomes reciprocal.
The symbol systems at once give birth to and express thought. The
major difference between the reciprocal relation between symbolization
and cognition and the one-sided relation between symbolization and
psychomotor, perception and affect, is that both symbolization and cog-
nition are both powers of consciousness and thus function interdepen-
dently
.
Evidence for the dependence of cognition on symbolization in
the latter stages of cognitive growth is provided by the cross-cul-
tural studies reported by Bruner et al. (1966), who report on the dif-
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ference between the cognitive growth of unschooled and schooled Wolof
children of Senegal. They conclude that "without school, intellec-
tual development, defined as any_ qualitative change, ceases shortly
after age nine" (p. 234). Children who attended school, however,
exhibited "a pattern of intellectual growth that is strikingly similar
to patterns familiar in Western society."
The Wolof school child is much more akin to the American
school child as far as ideas of equivalence are concerned,
closer than he is to his unschooled cousin in the next
village. The difference lies, at the very least, in the
extent to which, and the manner in which children learn to
use language as an implement of thought. School forces
him to rely on linguistic encoding as a way of communicat-
ing, because by its remoteness from direct action it robs
him of contextual and ostensive reference as a mode of carry-
ing meaning (p. 323)
.
Vygotsky (1962) also provides evidence for the influence of
language on the development of thought. He explains that as ego-
centric speech becomes internalized and welded into inner speech, it
undergoes functional and structural changes that divorce it from
external speech and gradually becomes fused with the basic structures
of thought. Vygotsky maintains that inner speech's fusion with
thought makes language a determining factor in the development of
scientific and theoretical concepts.
Thought development is determined by language, i.e., by
the linguistic tools of thought and by the sociocultural
experience of the child. Essentially, the development of
logic in the child, as Piaget's studies have shown, is a
direct function of his socialized speech. The child's in-
tellectual growth is contingent on his mastering the social
means of thought, that is, language (p. 51).
Vygotsky asserts that the child's acquisition of adult language at
adolescence accounts for the transition from incomplete and percep-
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tually bound complexes and pseudo-complexes of child thought to the
full-fledged concepts of adult thought. "Verbal intercourse with
adults thus becomes a powerful factor in the development of the child's
concepts" (p. 69).
Studies by Furth (1966) and Pettifor (1968) support the
positions of Bruner and Vygotsky, although they indicate that the
influence of linguistic skill on thought is specific to the higher
levels of intellectual functioning. Furth maintains that deficien-
cies of the deaf in. concept formation are not due to linguistic fac-
tors but rather to social reasons and poor language instruction. He
concludes that while one is not justified in explaining that ab-
stract thinking is causally related to linguistic skill, he recog-
nizes that thought with language may be more efficient, more objec-
tive, and more flexible. Pettifor has demonstrated that it is the
higher levels of conceptual thinking that are most influenced by
linguistic deficiencies due to deafness. These findings suggest
that the development of the emancipative function of symbolization,
and particularly of language, is necessary for the development of
conceptual thinking and imply that formal training in the symbol sys-
tems is an important stimulant to cognitive development.
Any educational program that aims to develop the child's
capacity for theoretical thought would be remiss if its curriculum
did not stress mathematics, language and the arts as means for devel-
oping conceptual thought. While much research needs to be conducted
on the relation between symbolization and thought, it is clear that
the more command a person has over the symbol systems, the
more he
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will be able to actualize potentialities. When one attains a certain
level of mastery over a symbol system, the symbols begin to function
as lures that lead him on in search of new realms of meaning that lie
behind the symbols. One is then able to sample the thought of
mathematicians, writers, and authors throughout the ages and wrestle
with the same concepts with which they wrestled, thereby expanding
his immanence and Droadening the basis for his transcendence.
Volitional Development
"Volition," Jordan (1976b) writes, "may be conceived as the
central factor of self-causation or self-actualization of potentiali-
ties. It is intimately connected with one's growing sense of purpose
and the use of goals consistent with the purpose as a general cri-
terion for deciding how to interact with the environment. Thus, the
purposive construction of experience and its role in actualizing poten-
tialities depends upon volitional capacity" (p. 293).
Because learning competence is a conscious determination to
differentiate, integrate, and generalize, it is purposive. Learning
competence thus depends directly on volition— the motive force behind
self-actualization. Because purpose is an implicit part of volition,
volition, like cognition, is intimately bound up with consciousness
and, therefore, symbolization.
The Anisa Model conceives of volition as being made up of at-
tention, goal setting, and will. These three elements are not func-
tionally separable, but rather are closely related aspects of the
stream of volitional activity that has been differentiated for the
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sake of conceptual clarity and curriculum planning. Explaining the
interrelatedness of the three elements, Jordan (1976b) writes, "will
arises o,ut of intention to achieve the goals set, the setting of
goals presupposes attention which in turn presupposes purpose or
interest' (p. 294). This conceptual scheme was developed by Conway's
(1973, 1975) extensive survey of the literature. Each of the pro-
cesses and the relation of symbolization to it is discussed below.
Attention
. Attention is defined as the purposive selection
(differentiation) and organization (integration) of bodily movement,
sensory information, feelings, thought, and memory into a single
focus of conscious experience" (Jordan 1976b, p. 294). Attention thus
unites all other areas of potentiality into a coherent scheme of
conscious, purposive experience.
The key factor in determining what will be attended to is pur-
pose. In animals, purpose is expressed by maintaining biological
integrity and preserving the organism's chances for survival through
instincts. Thus physical drives like hunger, thirst, and sex domi-
nate. Man, however, may displace such drives with higher aspirations;
indeed, if he does not, the quality of survival is jeopardized.
Man's selection of aspects of experience must in some way relate to
his purpose. The more things are seen to be connected and related
to one's purpose, the more things one will be able to attend to.
Thus the differentiation of experience and its integration into a
single focus of experience are direct functions of purpose.
Symbols, because they must be conceived by the mind, can
serve as mediators between the individual and the object of attention.
Eveloff (1971) was cited earlier as saying that words can help children
attend to an object in the background over an object in the foreground
not verbally referred to. Being able to use speech to help direct
a child's attention is one of the more subtle skills of pedagogy.
Advertisers are especially adept at using words and visual symbols
that have a strong claim on the public's attention. Such words as
"new," "improved," "scientifically tested," "better than," "save" and
more for your money" are frequently used in commercials and adver-
tisements. Teachers and advertisers, however, have to be careful of
over-doing it." Too much reliance on the same expression ("Pay at-
tention, please!") lessens their significance and diminishes their
power to hold attention.
Goal setting . Goal setting is the process of planning one's
future
. . . by formulating a vision of a condition or event
toward which one will strive. In Whitehead's terms it
is 'the conceptual anticipation of the future' that be-
comes the purpose around which action can be organized.
It involves differentiating among the possibilities which
may be realized in the future, selecting certain possibili-
ties and rejecting others, and formulating a sequence of
actions that translates the potentialities into actuality
(Conway and McCullough 1975, p. 1).
Goal setting is vital to organizing one's future. Without
goals, one allows the events that happen to him to organize his
future; he is carried into the future like a chip of wood that floats
down a stro
,
buffet here and there by the stones that lie in his
path
.
The most important factors in goal setting are deciding what
goals to pursue and conceptualizing the goal state. To decide to pur-
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sue a goal means deciding not to pursue other goals. It involves dif-
ferentiating among a number of possibilities and selecting one to pur-
sue. The act of selection is determined by purpose and is an affirma-
tion of one s independence, and
,
hopefully, of his responsibility.
While children cannot be expected to be fully able to conceptualize
possibilities until the formal operational stage, they can learn to
make decisions in their preschool years and develop the independence
and responsibility needed for setting important goals in their adoles-
cent and early adult years that will determine the direction their
lives will take.
Conceptualizing the goal state provides one with a vision to
aim for. The clearer one’s conceptualization of the goal, the easier
it is to pursue it. Since conceptualization cannot be done without
symbolization, symbolization is necessarily involved. Goals are
usually represented by ikonic and verbal symbols. Ikonic representa-
tion involves imagining or fantasizing what the goal state and the
path of events leading to it will be like. For some, a tangible sym-
bol may emerge. A gold medal may be a symbol for an olympian, an
office with a degree on the wall may be the symbol of an aspiring
physician. Verbal representation usually accompanies the image of
the goal. Some people write them down and review them periodically.
While verbal symbolization helps one clarify his thoughts and define
his goals more precisely, the image carries more emotional power
and
is directly involved in activating the will. As an actual
picture
of the goal, the image puts one in close touch with the
anticipated
reality and serves as a lure that inspires him to strive
harder and
264
persevere until the goal has been met.
Society also provides individuals with goals that reflect the
public’s- notion of the good. These goals are always tightly bound
to symbols that are transmitted to children before they are capable
of grasping what the symbol actually stands for. Because of the sym-
bol s power, many people adopt society’s goals without much thought.
This phenomenon indicates the importance of helping children develop
the ability to make decisions and acquire a sense of purpose so that
they can make conscious decisions about the direction their lives
will take.
Will » "Will is the realization of an intention or accomplish-
ment of a goal. It is expressed in terms of three subprocesses: self-
initiation, perseverance, and effecting closure" (Jordan 1976b, p. 296).
The strength of one's will is determined by his commitment to
his goals, which in turn is determined by purpose. The symbolic
representation of the goal state thus has a direct bearing on one's
ability to initiate action, persevere in the face of obstacles, and
consummate his aspirations. Fantasized' images of the goal, Jordan
writes, "function as an intrinsic source of motivation to persevere.
They create an inner satisfaction that comes when intentions are con-
summated in accordance with expectations" (ibid., p. 297). The bind-
ing function of symbolization charges the symbols of the goal with
emotion, which, when called to mind, flood one with energy needed
to initiate action, persevere, or effect closure.
In summary, symbols play a crucial role in volition in that
they can help to focus attention and assist one in conceptualizing a
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goal he wishes to achieve. The symbolic function that volition draws
on most heavily is the emancipative function, which frees the mind
from the limitations of the here and now and extends consciousness into
the past and future. This enables the mind to attent to non-material
things, things that are not present, and things that existed in the
past and may exist in the future. This is a vital function, without
which thought itself would not be possible.
The relationship between symbolization and volition, like
symbolization's relationship to cognition, is reciprocal. Symboliza-
tion is necessary for volition, and volition is necessary for learn-
ing symbolization's conscious forms of mathematics, reading, writing,
and the arts. While symbolization and speech have a strong biologi-
cal base and appear regardless of how undeveloped one's volition is,
without the ability to attend to symbols and the rules and techniques
that govern their use, to adopt the goal of learning them, and to
carry out the learning process, one's full potential for symboliza-
tion will not be actualized.
Volition and cognition, the two areas of potentiality that
require conscious awareness, both have reciprocating relationships
with symbolization. As psychological capacities that depend on the
cultivation of the conscious mind for their development, they are in-
timately bound up with each other and serve in mutual dependence the
purposes of the individual.
The content curriculum . As has been mentioned, the Anisa
Model classifies the world into the physical, human, and unknown en-
vironments. Whenever one learns something, he interacts with all
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three environments, his body takes up space in the physical world and
the information he learns comes to him through the senses; he is human
and interacts with other humans either directly or indirectly through
symbolization (reading a book, for example); what he learns was
previously unknown, and thus the gap between the known and the un-
known has to be faced and bridged. Teachers concerned with providing
a student with optimal learning environments must take into account
the way in which the three environments influence the learner and
arrange them in the most suitable way.
As the child interacts with the world, he acquires knowledge
about it that can be classified according to the three environments.
Interaction with the physical world yields knowledge that has evolved
within the theoretical framework of the physical and biological
sciences; interaction with the human world gives us information that
has stimulated the construction of the social sciences; interaction
with the unknowns and unknowables has led to the formation of reli-
gion and philosophy.
The role of symbolization in the construction of knowledge as
it relates to the three environments has been thoroughly discussed
in Chapter IV in the section titled, "Symbols As Mediators Between
Man and the Environments." Symbolization's role in the construction
of knowledge is derived from its emancipative, binding, epistemological
and communicative functions discussed in Chapter IV. As has been em-
phasized throughout the dissertation, symbolization is the act of ab-
straction that makes the construction, storage, and communication of
knowledge possible.
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Symbolization and the Fusion
of Process and Content
As we have seen, symbolization is involved in both the process
and content aspects of learning. In the process aspect, symbolization
helps one bring to the conscious level psychomotor, perceptual, affec-
tive, cognitive, and volitional processes and thus makes it possible
for one to refine his competence and gain mastery over them. In
the content aspect, symbolization helps one construct knowledge by
abstracting distinctive features of experience which can be differen-
tiated, integrated, and generalized to form a theoretical understand-
ing of reality that brings order to the universe by enabling us to
apprehend the patterns of relationships that exist among things. More-
over, by mediating interaction with the self, symbolization makes
the self part of the content curriculum; only by reflecting on the
self as an independent subject of learning can learning competence
emerge. Thus consciousness, and its chief agent, symbolization, are
the vehicles for learning competence.
Symbolization, then, may be seen as a fusion of both process
and content. The key to understanding how symbolization fuses these
two elements of learning lies in its role as the mediator between the
conscious Self and the world, as the diagram below depicts. Psycho-
motor and perception are psychological powers with physiological bases
and receptors which mediate man's physical interaction with the world.
They are ‘ ons of psychological processes and physiological inter-
actions. They bring raw sensory data into the organism where it
is
transformed through symbolization, analyzed conceptually by
cognition,
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and then integrated into the knowledge of the conscious mind. Affec-
tive assessments register one’s subjective feelings about the effects
of the interaction on the organism's ability to survive (or release
potential), while volitional processes regulated by the purposes of
the organism, direct it to seek out those interactions which are
thought to be conducive to self-actualization. Symbolization thus
stands at the crossroads between psychological processes and our con-
ceptual knowledge of the world.
The fusion of content and process in symbolization is best
demonstrated in learning the logical symbol systems. Learning to
read, for example, combines both process and content elements, as the
objectives for letter recognition and recall, the first major stage
in learning to read, attest (Theroux and Marks 1975):
Process
Attend to the critical features
of letters and ignore irrelevant
cues (the volitional process of
attention)
.
Distinguish right from left ("b"
from "d"), up from down ("q"
from "d") (the psychomotor pro-
cesses of laterality and verti-
cally) .
Content
Something (a mark) can represent
something else (a sound).
Speech sounds can be represented
by letters.
All the letters make up the alpha-
bet ,
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Differentiate among the 45 Eng-
lish phonemes and among the words
in a sentence (the perceptual
process of auditory discrimina-
tion) .
Differentiate among the 26
letters of the alphabet and
among the upper and lower case
letters (the perceptual pro-
cess of visual discrimination)
.
Match letters and groups of let-
ters with phonemes (the cogni-
tive process of classification).
There are more sounds than letters.
Several letters can stand for
several sounds.
Letters come in different forms
(upper and lower cases, styles,
and type faces)
.
Letters can be combined to form
words.
As these objectives indicate, the process objectives represent
the necessary psychological structures that must exist for letter
recognition to be learned. The content objectives represent the in-
formation about reading that children have to know if they are to
understand how the symbols work. Thus the symbols themselves become
the content of learning and the object of the child's activity. Like
riding a bike or sewing, reading is an activity that involves pro-
cesses from all areas of potentiality.
Because written symbols are actual entities, they are part of
the physical environment. The child, in his initial interaction with
them, treats them as any other physical object of study. His inter-
action with them is mediated by spoken language: the teacher explains
what letters are and what they stand for through speech. Later,
when reading is an established skill, written letters and words lose
their significance as objects and take on their symbolic function as
barren and indifferent vehicles of meaning. The printed word becomes
a mediator between the individual and the world a substitute
for
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speech. The same holds true for the symbols of mathematics. Ini-
tially, language mediates the child's interaction with numbers and
signs and later they take on their symbolic properties and mediate
interaction with the physical world.
There is, however, a major difference between learning the
symbols of reading and learning the symbols of mathematics. Because
the child has a biological basis for language, he learns to speak
unconsciously. For the child words are an intrinsic part of his
being. Symbols for quantity, however, have no biological basis and
not an intrinsic part of the childj in fact, it is usually ac-
quired at the same time, or later than, the symbols that represent
it. This means that in learning arithmetic, the child has two un-
knowns to master: the concept of quantity and symbols for it. In
reading he only has to deal with the symbols. Therefore, it is es-
pecially important that children not be introduced to the symbols
of mathematics until they have developed the psychological structures
of classification, seriation, and conservation prerequisite to under-
standing the concept of quantity (Streets 1975).
With aesthetic symbols, this problem does not occur. Aesthe-
tic symbols represent implicit, subjective insights into reality,
and not objective fact. Thus there is no explicit body of content
to be learned. Children from the earliest years can represent artis-
tically their subjective experience and their ability to do so
matures as their insights mature. However, the techniques of a given
art form are not innate and must be learned. This means that children
must be instructed in technique as their psychomotor and perceptual
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development progresses. Aesthetic symbolization Is a fusion of content
and process in a manner different than the logical symbol systems in
that its content is subjective and implicit, not objective and explicit.
Symbolization and the Higher
Order Competencies
In the Anisa Model, higher order competencies rest on integrated
sets of attitudes and values defined as relatively enduring patterns
of energy utilization. The higher order competencies are classified
according to the three environments because the differences among them
give rise to the formation of fundamentally different types of values
and competencies. Interaction with the physical environment leads to
the formation of material values and technological competence; inter-
action with the human environment forms social values and moral compe-
tence; interaction with the unknown environment gives rise to religious
values and spiritual competence (Jordan and Streets 1973)
.
Psychological potentialities, in their state of pre-actualiza-
tion, have no intrinsic value. As they become actualized, they take
on a particular form of structure. Over time, a newly acquired power
is integrated with other powers, is used in certain ways, and contri-
butes to one’s overall competence. Behavior represents a patterned
utilization of the energy available to the individual. This patterned
utilization of energy is a relatively enduring structure which the
Anisa Model terms a value because it tells one what the person who
owns the pattern values (Jordan 1976b).
Values are influenced by one’s assessment, whether objective or
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subjective, conscious or unconscious, of the role that particular aspects
of the physical, human, or unknown environment play in increasing the
quality of survival for himself and society. The values one's behav-
ior reflects tell the observer what one's ideals and purposes are. For
example, the man who robs a bank values his own desire for money above
society s need to be free of theft. His behavior suggests that mate-
rial gain is one of his more important ideals. The man who contributes
his time, energy, and money to founding a home for the indigent values
the need of all people to live in security and comfort. His behavior
suggests that service to others is one of his basic ideals. Thus,
values reflect differentiated forms of ideals—aims or purposes a per-
son's energy is used to accomplish. The totality of one's values and
ideals make up his character and identity.
The achievement of technological and moral competence depend
on having sets of material and social values and ideals that enable
one to maintain the balance of the physical and human eco-systems,
thereby preserving the quality of survival.
In the physical environment the balance is preserved by ensur-
ing the continuing operation of the processes and laws that regulate
the natural order of physical phenomena. Material values that underlie
technological competence are patterns of interacting with the physical
environment based on understanding how nature operates and applying
that knowledge in ways that support and serve humanity while still
maintaining the balance of the eco-system. Examples of such values
are appreciation, respect, and care for material things, thrift in the
use of resources, and a desire to keep the physical environment clean
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and orderly.
As these values suggest, technological competence is more than
technological skill. Technological competence depends on regulating
the use of the physical environment according to social values. While
so-called technologically advanced societies have shown a remarkable-
ability to master parts of the physical environment by learning how
physical phenomena operate, they have yet to acquire true technologi-
cal competence because their use of the technology is not determined
by social values that guarantee man's survival.
Symbolization is related to technological competence in that
one's interaction with the physical environment is mediated by the
logical symbol systems of mathematics and language. Being able to
represent the material world through mathematical symbols strengthens
one's understanding of the processes and laws that govern and regu-
late the operation of physical phenomena. Whie mathematical competence
does not necessarily lead to technological competence, it helps one
grasp more clearly the reality of the physical world. Since technologi-
cal competence is based on material values, which in turn are influenced
by one's understanding of the physical environment, mathematics and
language are involved in that they are the bearers of knowledge upon
which one's understanding of the role of natural processes and laws can
emerge.
The balance of the human eco-system is maintained by the promo-
tion of order, unity, and justice. Without these principles, chaos
and destruction ensue. The social values that underlie moral competence
are patterns of human interaction that embody basic principles
related
274
unity, and justice, such as obedience to the law, the oneness
of mankind, fairness, honesty, and cooperation. When these principles
are violated, forms of social pathology like lawlessness, injustice,
poverty, corruption, tyranny, and depravity prevail. When they are
prompted, such time-honored ideals as freedom and equality are attain-
able.
Symbolization is involved in moral competence in that language,
the symbol system that mediates interaction in the human environment,
underlies the attainment of social values. Language is the primary
instrument of human communication and is the vehicle through which
social values are expressed. Language thus has considerable influence
on social relationships; one’s speaking ability, comprising such ele-
ments as fluency, clarity of expression, word use, vocabulary, and,
in some cases, dialect, has a direct influence on the meaning one
wishes to communicate, on one's ability to be understood, and on the
opinions others form about one. Moreover, the outcome of job inter-
views and one’s ability to work with others also depend largely on the
impression one makes and on one's ability to communicate, which in
turn depend on one’s ability to match one's style of speech with the
social context. Furthermore, language is the means by which one ac-
quires the knowledge about the human environment out of which social
values and moral competence are molded. Language is thus inextricably
bound up with social values and, while language competence is not suffi-
cient for moral competence, it nevertheless is a practical necessity.
Unlike the physical and human environments, the unknown/ unknow-
able environment cannot be represented by definite and explicit symbols
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that stand for actual entities. Because unknowns and unknowables con-
front one at every turn, one must interact with them in some way or
face psychological paralysis. Faith makes interaction with the un-
knowns possible. Faith, defined as a positive orientation to the un-
known, enables one to formulate a hypothesis or theory, a belief or
conception, about what unknowns are or might be. Hypotheses, theories,
beliefs, and conceptions are tied to symbolic representations that give
the unknown some kind of reality that makes the unknown known to a
limited degree. Such symbolic representation gives the unknown a more
definite form that enables one to deal with it rather than be confused
or paralyzed by some vague and haunting presence.
Faith in dealing with unknowns in the physical and human en-
vironment is expressed in forming hypotheses and theories about them;
faith in dealing with the future is expressed by making plans based on
ideals of what one can become. As time goes by, hypotheses and theories
are verified or go unsubstantiated; plans are carried out, altered,
or abandoned, and ideals are realized, violated, or modified. As
one contemplates unknowables, such as the condition of one’s being
after death or the nature of God, beliefs are formed that enable one
to resolve questions of ultimate concern which, if unresolved, can un-
hinge one psychologically.
Symbols help one set forth hypotheses and theories by framing
in mathematical or linguistic symbols logical propositions that con-
tain the basic principles of the theory and that describe the phenomena
about which the theory speculates. Symbols help one make plans by
representing an image or clearly articulated conception of the goal
276
state. Religious symbols help one resolve questions of ultimate con-
cern by depicting in concrete terms the hope or belief in the immortal-
ity of the soul or the eternal mercy of God, for example, and thus sus-
tain the believer's faith when no material evidence to substantiate
the belief is available.
Because interaction with the unknown/unknowable environment is
undertaken on the basis of faith, the values that are formed are termed
religious values. Religious values are defined in psychological
rather than denominational terms, since everyone, whether aetheist
or believer, has to deal with them if their psychological integrity
is to be maintained. Because many of the unknowns about which we for-
mulate hypotheses, theories, plans, and beliefs become known over time,
an important part of spiritual competence is being able to change one's
hypotheses, theories, plans, and beliefs in the face of new evidence.
One's ability to change his views on the basis of new information
determines the extent to which he stays in touch with actuality and
survives as a rational being. In sum, spiritual competence thus de-
pends on the ability to formulate hypotheses, theories, plans, and
beliefs about unknowns and unknowables, and to modify them in the face
of new evidence.
Since the environments are hierarchically organized, the values
arising from interaction with them and their associated higher-order
competencies are also hierarchically structured. Thus, religious
values have a determinant effect on both social and material values,
and social values have a determinant effect on material values.
If the
hierarchy is reversed in the organization of a person's value
system,
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and material values become dominant over human and religious values,
there will be little regard for ultimate concerns, for the future, or
for the welfare of others; material concerns will prevail, and the
quality of life will decrease.
In addition to providing the substratum of knowledge out of
which material, social, and religious values are formed, symbolization
plays a crucial role in the application of those values in daily life.
The primary function of values is to help one regulate his behavior.
Unlike animals, whose behavior is governed by instinct, man’s behav-
ior necessarily involves an act of self-reflection: one must examine
his behavior, compare it to the ideal he holds, and, if he finds that
his behavior deviates significantly from the ideal, he must modify it.
Regulating one's own behavior thus requires that one interact with
himself in much the same manner that he interacts with the environ-
ments .
Symbolization mediates one’s interaction with oneself just as
it mediates one’s interaction with the other environments. Most often
that interaction is conducted on the basis of emotions, which take on
rudimentary representational properties that inform one of his viabil-
ity. But emotions often function below the conscious level; they
usually alert one to inner states that need to be reflected upon con-
sciously. In such cases, a conscious mode of symbolization is required.
Language is the symbol system people use to mediate conscious interac-
tion with themselves. It is the symbol system of psychoanalysis and
the symbol system of human understanding. The type of language in
volved is usually what Vygotsky called inner speech. Part of
psycho-
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analysis consists of helping people articulate consciously the thoughts
they have about themselves that lie on the level of inner speech or of
pure thought. When thoughts are made, conscious they can be under-
stood more easily, and thus one can arrive at a fuller understanding
of one's self.
In summary, symbolization is an important vehicle through
which values are formed and applied. While symbolization exerts no
influence of its own on the nature of the values one holds or on the
outcome of one's interaction with oneself, the vital functions of
forming values and regulating one’s behavior would be impossible
without it. Through the acquisition of the symbolic skills of mathe-
matics, speaking, reading, writing, and the arts, one's knowledge of
the physical, human, and unknown environments expands, thereby ex-
posing one to the values of a wider range of individuals, societies,
and cultures, and giving one a greater breadth of experience with
which to judge one's own behavior. Symbolization thus helps one be-
come more conscious of his own values and more aware of his behavior
and its relation to the values and ideals he holds.
CHAPTER VII
EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The intent of this section is to speculate on the implications
for education that our theory of symbolization and our examination of
symbolization's development suggest. The speculation is based on the
theory presented and, wherever possible, will be corroborated by
reference to other authors and to experience. The intent is not to
offer recipes of specific experiences, but to put forth a theoretical
rationale for particular types of experiences that can draw out the
child's budding powers.
Our speculation is based on the principle endorsed by Anisa's
theory of development that development occurs through interaction
with the environment and that the quality of interaction has direct
influence on the quality of development. At this point in the develop-
ment of educational science, theorists have yet to ascertain which
structures are based entirely on biological maturation, and which require
certain experiences. In view of the lack of definitive findings, we
take the position that parents and educators have the moral respon-
sibility to provide children with experiences that strengthen
processes
undergoing actualization. Selman (1975), refuting the argument
made
by some theorists that Piagetian theory has no
implications for edu-
cation, presents the following rationale for the need
for environ-
mental interaction that matches the child’s
development level.
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universality of sequence does not imply biologicallwariance such as a biological theory of intelligence
might. Experience plays a critical part in conceptual stage
velopment. One way to understand educational implications
within a theory of universal stage development is to under-
stand that in theory, certain intellectual and social experi-
ences are also universal, such as the observation that adropped ball falls or that people get angry. Each child
needs to experience' these experiences if he is to develop
through the entire sequence. The number and kind of experi-
ences have a more or less facilitating effect on development.
Second, there is a wide range of individual differences in the
rate of development through the hypothesized invariant sequence
of stages. For example, much research including Inhelder's
monograph, The Diagnosis of the Mentally Retarded, supports
both the hypothesis of universality of the sequence of logical
thought and the hypothesis of fixation or retardation of rate
of stage development in some children. Third
,
even within
the individual there is variability of level of reasoning
depending upon the concept or domain reasoned about. These
aspects of structural developmental theory bear directly on
education (p. 132 ).
Rather than discussing implications for curricula for par-
ticular symbol systems—a task far too large for the scope of this
work the discussion will focus primarily on strengthening the develop-
ment of symbolization itself. Where knowledge of development has
direct implications for facilitating the development of a symbol
system or a particular symbolic activity, like reading or writing,
speculation will be made, particularly when developmental informa-
tion suggests a practice contrary to current habit. Such comments
will be reserved for a separate section.
A word must first be said about the nature of education it-
self and the role of the teacher in guiding the actualization of
potentiality. Since education is synonymous with the actualization of
potential, the teacher's function is to guide the student in trans-
lating potentiality into actuality. But potentialities are not
actualized in a vacuum; they are actualized within an environment thau
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has physical, human and unknown factors. Because some environments
are more conducive to the actualization of potential than others,
teaching may be defined as arranging environments and guiding the
child’s interaction with them to achieve the goals specified by the
curriculum (Streets and Jordan 1973). Any teaching act, then, may be
conceived in terms of: (1) the process and content objectives specified
by the curriculum, which suggest what teachers need to do to actualize
potential; (2) the environmental arrangements necessary for the desired
interaction between the child and the environment; and (3) the inter-
action between the child and the teacher necessary for optimal
learning.
Since curriculum is based on development, our discussion will
review each of the stages in the course of symbolization's development.
The Recognition of Objects
Acquisition: Object permanence and localization.
Recognition of the body as an independent entity.
The child recognizes that objects have an
independent existence. The acquisition of
object permanence is proven by the child's
ability to seek out and find an object that
is hidden from view. Localization is achieved
when the child, observing an object move in and
out of view as it passes from right to left
before him, looks for it at the left and not
the right, where it was first seen.
Age of Onset: 2 years - 2 years, 4 months.
Educational
Implications: Because symbolic play, symbolic gestures, and speech
during the first part of the pre-operatory stage repre-
sent the manipulations the child has learned to perform on the physical
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world during the sensorimotor stage, it is important that the child
have a rich opportunity to manipulate and observe the effects of his
manipulations during the sensorimotor period. This means that the
child needs to have a number of objects of varying sizes, shapes, and
colors, that he can manipulate and observe. Things that make a variety
of sounds when moved strengthen auditory discrimination and auditory
and visual integration. Peek-a-boo games and guided interaction, while
not necessary for acquisition, help the parent feel a part of the child's
development and strengthen communication between them, which is vitally
important during the first 21/2 years.
Because the operations the child performs on objects at the
end of the sensorimotor stage are not interiorized and represented
symbolically until the concrete operational stage, the manipulation
of objects is an essential educational activity that must prevail
until the child has fully demonstrated an ability to think in symbols
without reference to such objects as counters or fingers. Initially,
the manipulation of objects is an activity in itself; later, when
the child has acquired the processes of conservation, classification,
seriation, and transitivity prerequisite to understanding the concept
of number, objects are manipulated in conjunction with numbers so
that the relationship between operation and symbol may be easily
Symbolic Play and Gestures
1 1/2 - 2 years.
Because symbolization is essentially a communicative
apprehended
.
Acquisition:
Age of Onset:
Educational
Implications
:
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act, the child's symbolic play can be strengthened by having
the opportunity to play with children his own age. This is best
done in the presence of the parents (usually the mother)
,
since
the children are still in the critical period during which the
bond between mother and child is being established and separation
can be damaging (Montagu 1970). Also, the presence of the mother
provides a secure environment for the child's initial contact with
other children. In regard to materials, objects which invite repre-
sentation, like dolls, beans, balls, or similar toys a culture com-
monly provides children with are also beneficial.
Acquisition
:
Symbolic Images (Ikonic Representation)
The advent of the preoperatory stage, in addition
to the beginning of symbolic play, also marks the
onset of symbolic images. For the first time the
child is capable of understanding that images and
pictures can represent actuality.
Age of Onset: 1 1/2 - 2 years.
Educational
Implications
:
Picture books with simple drawings, photographs,
and other simple images can reinforce the child's
newly acquired capacity to represent things
ikonically
.
Acquisition
:
Holophrastic Speech (Signific Representation)
Age of Onset: 10 - 18 months.
Acquisition: Multi-Word Utterances (Denotative Representation)
Age of Onset: 2-3 years.
Educational
Implications
:
Eveloff (1971) and other theorists maintain that two
interrelated precursors for the appearance of single
284
word utterances are happy communication between the parents and the
child and the formation of the emotional bond.
Eveloff writes that the parents' eager response to the child's
babbling stimulates further language development. "The parents,
feeling that the child is beginning to talk ('da da, ma ma') enter
into the cycle, repeating over and over again to the child 'mommy'
or daddy' or whatever else the sound approximates as they point to
the object ’named' by the infant" (ibid., pp. 1900-01). Eveloff
remarks that this communication between parent and child "provides the
substrate for the conversion of a nonspecific sign phenomenon (i.e.,
the autistic pleasure of making a sound) to a signal one (the inten-
tional assignment of a sound to an external event or object)" (ibid.,
p. 1901). Eveloff maintains that "constant meaningful communication
with adults is of decisive significance because the acquisition of a
language system involves a continuous organization of all the child's
mental processes in accord with his expanding universe" (ibid., p.
1905).
Jakobson and Glucksberg and Danks echo the importance of
communication between parent and child at this stage of development.
Jakobson (1972) writes that interpersonal communication "is one of
the indispensible preconditions for the infant's access to speech . . ."
(p. 80). Glucksberg and Danks (1975) explain that communication is
a prerequisite for the development of symbolization:
Speech per se is not necessarily crucial to the acquisi-
tion or development of symbolic representation, but
interpersonal communication is (p. 191).
Regarding the emotional bond between parent and child at the
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pre-speech stage and its relation to early language development,
Eveloff (1971) writes:
An optimum emotional climate, which has been important
for language acquisition from the very first days of
life, becomes increasingly significant. If a parent is
not pleased, but bored, angry, punitive, emotionally or
physically absent, then the necessary stimulation from the
environment for the production and shaping of these early
sounds may hamper language development from both a mechani-
cal and an emotional viewpoint (p. 1901).
These views indicate that a loving, warm, and intimate rela-
tionship that gives the child a feeling of complete security is the
optimum condition for the emergence of holophrastic speech— the first
appearance of communication on the level of signification.
Eveloff’ s emphasis on the emotional climate between parent
and child suggests that parental attitudes play an important role in
the development of symbolic language. After reviewing the work of
Ervin-Tripp (1973), Kagan (1968), Brandis and Henderson (1970),
Cazden (1972), McNeill (1970), Bernstein (1967), and Hess and Ship-
man (1965) on the role of parental attitudes on language development
and the type of verbal stimulation most conducive to language develop-
ment, I drew the following conclusions about their findings for
parent training programs and environmental assistance:
1. The parents' attitude toward the child has a significant
effect on his language development. This would lead one
to believe that a parent training program with a coherent
philosophical base that inspires parents to regard their
children as creatures of limitless potentiality could
have a strong effect on enriching the child’s linguistic
development
.
2. A parent training program that makes parents aware of the
basics of language development and the type of speech that
is of optimal educative value promises to have significant
effects on the language development of their children.
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3. Speech communication of optimal educative value is that
which fits the developmental level of the child by being
simplified in structure and referring to objects and
events in the child's immediate environment that engage
his attention (Marks 1975, p. 36).
In regard to the last point, Ervin-Tripp (1973) offers the
following explanation for why speech which is simplified in structure
and which refers to objects and events in the child's immediate en-
vironment is of the greatest educational value:
The recurrence of signals at times of significance to the
child, such as feeding, being changed, being held, being
stimulated visually, may single out that channel, be it
sound or gesture, for special attention.
. . .
A significant portion of speech must refer to those rela-
tions, concrete objects, and events which are already
attended to by the child. . . . Linguists argue that it
is contrast of meaning which identifies which features
of the sounds or of the grammatical patterns are signifi-
cant; without such criteria, the child would have no
clue, except recurrence, to indicate which features must
be stored as critical in absolute identification of
items. . . .
If acoustic input is relatively random in relation to
events of importance to the child, as is the case if it
consists entirely of radio or TV broadcasts, the child
may be unable to uncover its structure. We have observed
hearing children of deaf parents who have learned no
speech from such input (pp. 262-63).
Decentration and the Differentiation
of Actuality from Possibility
Because the decentration of the self, which enables the child
to take on the inner perspective of others, and the acquisition of
theoretical thought, which differentiates actuality from possibility
develop gradually, it is difficult to identify clearly demarcated
stages for which particular educational experiences may be prescribed.
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Thus our speculation will center on types of experiences that can be
provided throughout the preoperatory and concrete operational stages.
Also, because the process of decentration and the movement toward
theoretical thought follow the same developmental course and depend
on the same cognitive structures, the activities suggested will
strengthen both processes. The experiences to be discussed are
fantasy, making choices, social perspective taking, dramatic play,
and exercises in classification, seriation, conservation, and transi-
tivity, and making maps.
Fantasy
The value of fantasy is its ability to help the child dif-
ferentiate actuality from possibility. A theoretical explanation of
the value of fantasy, particularly fairy tales and poetic verse is
offered by Chukovsky (1971), a renowned author of children's litera-
ture in the Soviet Union.
Chukovsky’s thesis is that the child's understanding of
reality is strengthened by fantasy, because fantasy is based on the
comparison of two elementary notions, each of which is essential to
reality, but which when combined, create an unreal situation—
a
fantasy. As an example he cites the following verse (p. 96):
Listen, my children
And I’ll sing you a fiddle-faddle:
'The cow sat on a birch-tree
And nibbled on a pea.
'
Chukovsky argues that the innumerable verses in the children's litera
ture of all cultures testify to the child's inexhaustible need for
the introduction of "nonsense into his small but ordered world,
with
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which he has only recently become acquainted" (ibid.).
Hardly has the child comprehended with certainty whichobjects go together and which do not, when he begins to
reason m a°
•'V6rSeS ° f absurdity* For some mysterious
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?
13 attracted to topsy-turvy worldhere legless men run, water burns, horses gallop astridetheir riders, and cows nibble peas on top of birch trees(.ibid
.
)
.
The first sign of an appreciation for fantasy comes at about
the second birthday—at the end of the sensorimotor stage when the
child has acquired object permanence. At this point he can differen-
tiate the real from the unreal and thus can grasp a simple joke that
contrasts two common realities in an unreal way. As an example
Chukovsky cites the joke his 23 month old daughter brought to him.
She said, "Daddy, doggie—meow! " and then burst into laughter, in-
viting him to participate. Commenting on the significance of her joke,
Chukovsky writes: It was as if she perceived in an instant the basic
element in comedy, resulting from giving simultaneously to a series
of objects an opposite series of manifestations. Realizing the
mechanics of her joke, she wished to enjoy it again and again, think-
ing up more and more odd combinations of animals and animal sounds"
(ibid., p. 98). The fact that the child found such combinations
humorous indicates an awareness of the illusion she constructed.
Such fantasies, Chukovsky points out, are to be contrasted
with symbolic play. The child’s appreciation of fantasy depends on
his awareness of the juxtaposition of the real and unreal, while
symbolic play depends on believing in the illusion his imagination
produces. Symbolic play is an act of symbolization in that it draws
the child into a world whose reality is represented by his actions;
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the reality of the imagined world is attested by his absorption in it.
Fantasy, however, is an exercise of consciousness; it requires an
awareness of the reality from which the fantasy deviates.
Fairy tales also strengthen the child's understanding of
right and wrong. Fairy tales feature characters who embody goodness
and evil and whose behavior thus instructs the child in the difference
between the two: "for every wrong that occurs," Chukovsky writes, "the
child recognizes what is right, and every departure from the normal
strengthens his conception of the normal. Thus he values even more
highly his firm, realistic orientation" (ibid., p. 102).
Such encounters contribute to the development of the child's
self-concept
:
He tests his mental powers and invariably he passes this
test, which appreciably increases his self-esteem as well
as his confidence in his intellectual abilities; this
confidence is most essential to him in order that he may
not become discouraged in his chaotic world. 'I'm not the
kind that burns himself with cold kasha ; I'm not one to
get scared of a snail; I will certainly not look for straw-
berries on the bottom of the sea.' The main importance in
children’s play with topsy-turvies lies in this verifying
and self-examination. This is an additional reason for the
joy in topsy-turvies— they raise the child's self-apprecia-
tion. And this is useful because it is essential for the
child to have a high opinion of himself. Not for nothing
does he show such avidity for praise and approval from
morning till night, as he boasts about his excellent
qualities (ibid., pp. 102-03).
Another aspect of the moral value of fantasy is that it
develops the child's sense of humor, which Chukovsky calls a precious
quality which will increase the child's sense of perspective and his
tolerance, as he grows up, of unpleasant situations, and it will
enable him to rise above pettiness and wrangling" (ibid., pp.-
104-05).
Much of the joy the child finds in fantasy, Chukovsky ex-
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plains, comes from the triumph he feels he has made over chaos:
So much confusing and fragmentary knowledge is heaped upon
the young child daily that if he did not have this fortunate
desire to resolve chaos, he would surely lose his mind by
the age of five. Necessity compels him to conduct a tireless
classification of all phenomena; it is impossible not to be
amazed at the extraordinary skill with which this most dif-
ficult task is accomplished and at the delight the child
feels at his victory over chaos (ibi*d., p. 104).
Chukovsky also maintains that fantasy is crucial to the
development of theoretical and scientific thought.
Without imaginative fantasy there would be complete
stagnation in both physics and chemistry, because the
formulation of new hypotheses, the invention of new imple-
ments, the discovery of new methods of experimental re-
search, the conjecturing of new chemical fusions—all these
are products of imagination and fantasy.
The present belongs to the. sober, the cautious, the
routine-prone, but the future belongs to those who do not
rein in their imagination. Not without reason did the
famous British physicist, John Tindale, champion fantasy:
'Without the participation of fantasy,' he wrote, 'all
knowledge about nature would have been limited merely to the
classification of obvious facts. The relation between cause
and effect and their interaction would have gone unnoticed,
thus stemming the progress of science itself, because it is
the main function of science to establish the link between
the different manifestations of nature, since creative
fantasy is the ability to perceive more and more such links'
(ibid.
,
p. 124)
.
Fantasy's role in developing the imagination links it closely
to the development of transcendence. Fairy tales develop visions of
ultimate possibilities— ideas about honor, integrity, moral rectitude,
and service—which are the seeds that later blossom into ideals.
Ideals are the lures of man's transcendence: they lead man forward
in the pursuit of his destiny. Fairy tales also help the child
align
his emotions with ideals so that he feels happy about things
that lead
to goodness and sad about things that lead to evil.
The emotional
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alignment is the beginning of the development of the attitudes and
values that make up one's character. "Fantasy," Chukovsky adds, "is
the most valuable attribute of the human mind and it should be
diligently nurtured from earliest childhood, as one nurtures musical
sensitivity—and not crushed" (ibid., p. 117) . Fairy tales, he
concludes, are valuable tools "in developing, strengthening, enriching,
and directing children's capacity for creative thinking and imaginative
responses a value that has been tested by classic works produced
over the centuries" (ibid., p. 123).
In sum, fantasy helps develop symbolization by strengthening
the child's ability to differentiate the real from the unreal and by
developing his ability to conceive of possibilities that lie beyond
the there and now. These abilities in turn pave the way toward
theoretical thinking by developing the imagination and a delight
in the conquest of the unknown—both of which are essential to science.
The Exercise of Choice
To choose to do one thing and not another is to make a deci-
sion. It means that one must understand that two things are possible,
weigh them, and select one over the other. To make a decision is to
make a negative judgment about the possibility not chosen, and "The
negative judgement," Whitehead writes, "is the peak of mentality
(1926c, p. 7).
Making decisions between two possibilities strengthens the
development of: (1) the notion of possibility (a prerequisite to the
notion of hypothesis); (2) volitional competence, because it requires
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thinking about what the possibilities being considered would be like
(a prerequisite for conceptualizing the goal state) and because it
involves making a decision and acting on it (elements of will); (3)
independence, because to choose is to assert one's preference; and
(4) responsibility, because to choose is to exercise judgements for
which one may be held accountable if the choice is detrimental to the
welfare of others or oneself.
The child is capable of making choices when he is capable of
asserting his will. This usually occurs at the end of the sensori-
motor stage. Usually the assertion of will is at first impulsive and
does not involve reflecting upon alternatives and making a decision
to choose one based on purposive preferences. The first assertions
of the will are impulsive expressions of desire: "I want a cookie!";
"I want outside!"; and so on. At this point the child can be offered
simple choices about conditions immediately present: "Would you like
to walk or would you like me to hold you?"; "Would you like this
cookie or that cookie?" In all cases the child's decision must be
honored; if he regrets his decision, he must live with it. This helps
him learn that his decisions have consequences for which he is responsi-
ble.
As the child matures, the choices he is offered develop along
the following dimensions:
1. From two possibilities to an infinite number of possibilities.
2. From choices whose realization are immediately present and
observable to choices whose realization are distant in time.
3. From choices of little consequence for his own welfare to
choices of great consequence.
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4. From choices that affect only himself to choices that affectthe welfare of others.
Children given the opportunity to make decisions that steadily
develop along these dimensions will, by the time they reach the middle
of their teenage years, be making mature decisions for which they
assume full responsibility. A curriculum for decision-making that
follows these guidelines calls for significant changes in the way
teachers and parents usually give children responsibilities. Most
schools, for example, progressively reduce the student's opportunity
to make decisions and develop responsibility as he grows older.
Kindergarteners, for instance, are usually quite free to decide who
they will play with, what activities they will participate in, when
they will go to the bathroom, and so on, while high school students
have little or no choice over what they will study and need passes
when they need to leave the room.
In conclusion, making choices strengthens symbolization by
developing the child's ability to conceive of possibilities. Because
thinking about possibilities requires a differentiation of the actual
from the possible, making choices develops the power of abstraction
on which symbolization is based.
Exercises in Social Perspective Taking
Exercises in social perspective taking are advocated by
researchers in the area of moral development. They are based on the
premise that the child's ability to take on the perspective of others
can be exercised when presented with a perspective on a level im
level. When the two levels are contrasted.mediately above his own
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he may sense the conflict and thus widen his awareness. The intention
is not to accelerate the child's social-perspective taking ability,
but to stimulate and exercise its development and prevent the retarda-
tion of social understanding. Selman (1975) explains why accelera-
tion is not a sound goal to strive for:
First, research indicates that movement from stage to stage
is a long-term process. Findings indicate that complete
transition from one level to the next may take several years
or more. Teachers, therefore, should not expect to see great
leaps from level to level in the new ways of thinking, not to
overnight change. Furthermore, the ages given for our
research are only averages. A child may move into a level
earlier or later than the guidelines suggest. And sometimes
a child can be in transition between two levels. Second,
only when the child has a firm command of one level of
reasoning does the level begin to be accessible to him.
In other words, over the long haul, rapid development may
not be optimal development (p. 134).
Learning experiences that exercise the child's social perspec-
tive taking ability within the family would take place between parent
and child; at school they would take the form of discussion among the
students guided by the teacher. At home, opportunities for social
perspective taking usually arise when the behavior of others becomes
a topic of conversation or when the child's behavior is our of line.
In the latter case the challenge the parent faces is to awaken the
child to the effect of his actions on others by helping him under-
stand what the results of his actions were. This can be done by asking
questions in a non-j udgemental and non-threatening manner which lead
the child to understand what the effect of his actions were. By
trying to engage the child in such a dialogue, he can widen his social
perspective taking ability.
In the classroom, Selman reports that filmstrips which present
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moral dilemmas that have to be solved by the viewer offer an excel-
lent opportunity for children to be confronted with levels of perspec-
tive taking higher than their own. In the course of discussing possible
resolutions to the dilemmas, views are invariably expressed that reflect
a variety of levels. If not, the teacher can provide a perspective
that forces the group to reflect on the adequacy of their perspective.
"Children at higher levels," Selman (1975) writes, "usually reject
lower level reasoning as immature or inadequate" (p. 134). The follow-
ing is an excerpt of a discussion between two third graders about
whether to get Mike a puppy for his birthday:
Bill: Get him a dog to replace Pepper.
Bob: But remember, Mike said he didn’t want to see
anybody else's dog.
Bill: Yeah, but that would be his dog.
Bob: Yeah, but it wouldn’t be Pepper.
Bill: Name him Pepper.
Bob: Still not the same thing (ibid., p. 133).
The important factor for parents and teachers to keep in mind,
Selman remarks, "is to help children to focus on reasons and reasoning
rather than on right answers. The teacher must encourage the child to
give reasons for their opinions and to demand them of others in the
group" (ibid., p. 136). Another factor to bear in mind is to
accept the reason the child offers if one is convinced of his sin-
cerity. There are definite limits to the child’s ability to take on
the perspective of others and he cannot be made to understand some-
thing beyond his developmental level.
Exercises in social perspective taking develop symbolization
by helping the child place his views in a broader perspective. This
expands his consciousness and develops the cognitive structures that
enable one to conceive of a greater number of possibilities and to
attain a detached perspective from which one can analyze things
objectively essential prerequisites for scientific thought.
Dramatic Play
Drama can also be effective in developing the child’s social
perspective taking ability. When the child has to take on the role
of another, he is forced to identify with the inner condition of the
character. The child will, to the degree his development allows, see
things through the eyes of the character he plays. Later, through
guided discussion, other children will introduce perspectives that
challenge the child's perspective and growth can occur. Like the
moral dilemma film strips, dramatic play gives the child an opportunity
to exercise his social perspective taking ability without being
involved personally, and thus without emotional investment. Plays
and puppet shows can be easily adapted from fairy tales and stories
found in children’s books. Thus, dramatic play, like exercises in
social perspective taking, develops symbolization by strengthening the
cognitive structures on which scientific thought depends.
Drama also strengthens symbolization in a more direct way.
Drama is an extension of the symbolic play in which all children par-
ticipate in their early years. Symbolic play in childhood involves
making something, like a button, become something else, a man or a
car
for instance. In drama, the "play" depicts people, symbolized
by the
actors, who are real in an abstract, not a concrete,
sense: they are
real to the extent to which they personify character
traits prevalent
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in society and symbolize conflicts within a single character or
between characters with which many people must struggle. Drama thus
strengthens the cognitive structures that symbolic play began to
develop in the first few years.
Exercises in Classification, Seriation,
Conservation, and Transitivity
Earlier in this section it was mentioned that children need
to have access to manipulable objects and guided interaction with
them that strengthens the development of logical structures like
classification, seriation, conservation, and transitivity, well into
the concrete operational stage.
Waite (1975)
,
in his dissertation on the development of the
concept of number, provides a plan for a parent and teacher training
program based on the Anisa Model and on the findings in the litera-
ture on cognitive development. The plan discusses thoroughly the
nature of the educational experiences children need to acquire these
cognitive processes. The reader interested in the details of the
program and examples of educational experiences should became familiar
with this section of the dissertation. Our purpose here is to review
the essential features of educational activities that strengthen the
child's development of the cognitive processes that underlie opera-
tory and hypothetical thought.
Eleanor Duckworth (1972), in an article titled "The Having of
Wonderful Ideas," discusses the importance of giving children experi-
ences that fully engage and tax their intellectual powers and
lead
them to discoveries that give them a sense of achievement
and mastery.
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Such experiences, she says, are the essence of intellectual development.
She cites the following example of such an experience:
The other day I was going over some classic Piagetian inter-
views with a few children to show a friend what they were
like. One involved seriation of lengths. I had cut ten
cellophane drinking straws at different lengths, and was
asking the children to put them in order, from smallest to
biggest. The first two seven-year-olds did it with no dif-
ficulty and little interest. And then came Kevin. Before
I said a word about the straws, he picked them up and said
to me, ’I know what I’m going to do,' and proceeded, on his
own, to seriate them by length. He didn’t mean, 'I know
what you're going to ask me to do.' He meant, 'I have a
wonderful idea about what to do with these straws. You'll
be surprised by my wonderful idea.'
It wasn't easy for him. He needed a good deal of trial
and error as he set about developing his system. But he was
so pleased with himself when he accomplished his self-set
task that when I decided to offer them to him to keep (ten
whole drinking straws!) he glowed with joy, showed them to
one or two select friends, and stored them away with other
treasures in a shoe box.
The having of wonderful ideas is what I consider to be
the essence of intellectual development. And I consider it
the essence of pedagogy to give Kevin the occasion to have
his wonderful ideas, and to let him feel good about himself
for having them (ibid., p. 218).
This is exactly the kind of experience prerequisite to learn-
ing competence. While the child at this stage is not yet capable of
realizing how he learned what he learned, he does know that he is
enjoying it—he senses that dynamic within him that springs to life
whenever potential is actualized.
Duckworth proposes two factors necessary for providing occa-
sions for wonderful ideas: (1) being prepared to accept children's
ideas, and (2) providing a setting geared to the child's
developmental
level that suggests wonderful ideas as he gets caught up
in intellec-
tual problems that are real to him.
The first factor—accepting children's ideas— is
attitudinal
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and comes from having internalized the philosophical axiom that children
are endowed with infinite potential. From this axiom is derived the
teacher’s role as a facilitator of the actualization of the child's
potential and the understanding that this can best be achieved by
drawing out the child's potential and guiding its actualization in a
direction to which the child is predisposed, rather than along lines
the teacher desires. This means that the child's native interest is
the springboard for his development and that his interests are to be
appreciated, encouraged, and developed—not suppressed.
The second factor providing a setting that suggests wonder-
ful ideas is pedagogical; it depends on a thorough knowledge of child
development
,
curriculum, and pedagogy. It is the ultimate goal of
an educational environment arranged according to the Anisa theory of
pedagogy and requires years of preparation and training to achieve.
Anisa' s contention is that a teacher with such training should be able
to create from whatever materials are available innumerable experiences
that give birth to wonderful ideas—even if the materials only amount
to sand, shells, and a stick on a seashore.
Experiences with classification, seriation, conservation, and
transitivity are ideal for the having of wonderful ideas. The child
is biologically equipped with the intellectual structure that will
enable him to grasp these concepts. If the teacher can provide him
with experiences that match his developmental level, the child s
curiosity will automatically be sparked. The teacher's job is to
capitalize on the child's high level of interest and to get as much
educational mileage from the experience as possible by guiding the
300
child to do something with the idea he has. Duckworth gives the example
of a six year old girl who wrote an essay on the compensation of height
versus volume observed while working with capillary tubes.
Such an experience teaches the child that observations of
the actual world can lead to knowledge which is more significant and
pleasing than the observations themselves. It teaches him that in-
tellectual mastery of the world puts the world into an order far
greater than the natural order—an insight that lies at the root of
scientific thought. Such an experience also represents the first
stirrings of learning competence, for the child is aware of the sense
of mastery he feels and knows that it comes from intellectual exer-
cise. Implicit in Anisa's theory of development is the belief that
if children are provided with experiences that meet the criteria
set forth by Duckworth, their entire educational experience can be a
series of wonderful ideas that bring them to their middle teenage
years with the social, moral, and maturity for graduate study (Jordan
1975b).
In summary, exercises in classification, seriation, conserva-
tion, and transitivity develop the child's capacity for symbolization
by strengthening the cognitive structures on which the higher levels
of symbolic thought depend. When the child has fully acquired these
cognitive processes, he is able to represent the operations he can
perform concretely in the abstract medium of mathematical symboliza-
tion. Learning to represent these actions symbolically is the bridge
over which the child must pass to full theoretical and scientific
thought
.
301
Making Maps
Another activity that exercises the child’s symbolic powers is
making maps. Children acquire a knowledge of the relations between
objects in space inside their home, along the route to school, in
the local playground, and so on. Being able to represent those rela-
tions symbolically requires a higher level of symbolic thought.
Children can make maps by first using objects that stand
for the objects that are part of the environment they are trying to
represent. Small plastic houses, cars, and trees, for example, can
be manipulated on a board to represent their route to school. A
higher level of representation would be drawing maps on paper. Maps
can vary in scale, in the size of space they represent, and in the
detail they depict. A curriculum for map making would culminate in
surveying large areas of land and learning to read and make topo-
graphical maps.
Implications for Instruction in Math, Reading, and Writing
The lack of attention symbolization has received from develop-
mental psychologists and educators is reflected in curricula for
young children. In spite of the fact that reading, writing, arith-
metic, and the arts are symbol systems and thus draw upon similar
symbolic processes, educational programs, almost without exception,
do not include instruction in symbolization as a separate subject.
Since learning competence is the conscious ability to learn,
it follows that any educational program that seeks to develop' it
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would want to help the child become as conscious as possible of what he
is learning. Understanding the purpose of something and its relation
to the release of human potential are the most basic ways of becoming
conscious of something and therefore are concepts of central impor-
tance to the Anisa theory of curriculum. According to the theory,
the purpose of something would be the first thing a child would learn
when beginning to learn a new skill, activity, or body of knowledge.
Apprehending the purpose of something helps one appreciate its sig-
nificance. Also, when one knows the purpose of something, one knows
its reality and thus feels a certain familiarity or mastery over it.
Such a feeling enables a child to approach learning from a position
of strength. Confidence in turn means that differentiations, inte-
grations, and generalizations will be made more easily.
An important factor, then, in teaching the symbol systems
is helping children understand the purpose of symbolization and how
it works. While it would be too much to expect a young child to be
able to provide us with a lucid commentary that explains the purpose
of symbolization and its basic mode of operation, it is possible for
them to have a deep intimation of its purpose. This can be done by
having a wide variety of experiences that acquaint children with
symbolization itself. This section outlines curricula for math and
reading that enable the child to learn about symbolization itself be-
fore they take on math and reading.
Gradual Introduction of
Symbolic Representation
Learning to represent symbolically numerical operations and
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words is no easy task for the young child. When most children learn
to read, they are presented with the complex task of learning to
associate graphic figures with the sounds they represent. The com-
plexity of English spelling is such that a single letter can repre-
sent a phoneme, a morpheme, a syllable, or a word; or a group of
letters may represent a phoneme, a morpheme, a syllable, or a word.
Also, the correspondence between the sound of a word and the letters
that stand for them are highly irregular. The task is made all the
more difficult by virtue of the fact that the child is presented
with this highly complex symbolic task when his symbolic powers are
just becoming capable of it. Most children have had no previous
symbolic experience and many have yet to acquire the cognitive struc-
tures necessary for the task—a fact which no doubt accounts for
many of the difficulties young children experience in learning to
read.
Similar problems apply to mathematics. While there is a
direct correspondence between numerical symbols and their references,
the child has yet to enter or is just entering the concrete opera-
tional stage which enables him to grasp the operations he now must
represent symbolically.
Our knowledge of the development of symbolization suggests
that a developmentally based curriculum for math and reading would
prepare the child for his complex symbolic tasks by providing him
with extensive experience in symbolic representation that takes him
from ikonic representation to symbolic representation in gradual
stages
.
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Math Instruction
In the implementation of selected aspects of the Anisa Model at
the McGraw School in Hampden, Maine, I participated in the introduc-
tion of a developmentally based curriculum that helped children in
the first and second grades (ages six and seven years) learn how to
represent symbolically the basic arithmetic operations of addition
and subtraction. The curriculum is based on the integration of the
manipulation of objects with the representation of the objects and
progresses from ikonic to symbolic means. It is introduced after the
child has demonstrated acquisition of classification, seriation, and
conservation as determined by Piagetian tests as described by Cope-
land (1974). The steps of the system are described below (the ob-
jects depicted are beads):
Step 1: The child draws pictures of the objects he manipulates.
Step 2: The child places the numerical symbol that represents the
number of objects he has drawn beneath his drawing.
• 0 €
3
Step 3: The child represents ikonically the arithmetical operations
of addition and subtraction by drawing circles around the
appropriate cluster of objects. Beneath the drawing he
represents the operation with numbers.
First Step: 0
Addition
• e oo
3 2
Subtraction
9 9 6 0 0
5
Second Step: Cl
e o Q9)
5
C© e o) (•_•)
3 2
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Step A: The child is taught the meaning of the signs +
,
and =,
and then introduces them into his drawings. He also uses
them next to his drawings in the numerical equation, now
complete
.
Addition Subtraction
000 + 90 = 000 0 0 9 0 0 6 0- 900= 093+2= 5 5 - 3 = 2
Step 5: The child writes only with symbols, although he has objects
on his desk to help him add and subtract.
3+2 = 5
Instruction. is individualized: only when the child demonstrates
that he has mastered one step is he introduced to the next. One child
may complete these steps in a month, while another may take a year.
Children may work on their drawings several days a week. Novelty is
introduced by drawing new objects, which may be as varied as one's
imagination, and by performing operations that involve a variety of
numerical operations. The math program, of course, is not reduced
to the drawings; it incorporates a wide variety of activities that
tax the child's skills of representation: tending store, playing games
that involve winning chips that stand for some type of collateral,
learning about measurement, and so on. In all cases, the learning in-
volves acting on objects. When the child reaches Step 5, he can begin
memorizing his tables.
Reading Instruction
A similar approach could be applied to reading. In this
case,
children are gradually introduced to the notion that symbols
can
stand for words. The system progresses from ikonic
figures which
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represent objects, to abstract symbols which represent words, to ab-
stract symbols that represent syllables, to letters and clusters of
letters that represent phonemes and key spelling patterns. The steps
of the curriculum are outlined below:
Step 1: Ikonic figures stand for words.
Pictures are cut out of magazines and pasted on cards.
Hundreds or thousands of cards are made. The children ar-
range the cards in patterns that suggest messages. Games
can be arranged (treasure hunts, sending messages, giving
instructions, and so on) that require the children to decode
and encode messages.
Step 2: Abstract symbols stand for words.
Symbols like -#;,^, and WvT, are placed on the cards
used in Step 1. When the children have learned some of the
basic symbols, sentences can be constructed. As in Step 1,
numerous and diverse games can be played that require the
children to decode and encode sentences.
Step 3: Abstract symbols like those used in Step 2 are used to
represent syllables.
Step 4: Letters are introduced and the children are taught that they
stand for phonemes and basic spelling patterns.
This curriculum could be introduced to preschool children around
the age of three or four. Children who begin at this age would be ex-
pected to reach Step 4 between the ages of five and seven. The in-
tent is not to accelerate the acquisition of reading skills (although
that may occur for some children) , but to reduce the number of chil
dren who experience difficulties in learning to read. Considerable
experimentation has to be undertaken to evaluate when children are
ready to advance to subsequent stages, whether all the stages are
neces
sary, whether other steps not listed are involved, and whether
the
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curriculum actually improves reading ability.
The value of both curricula is that they bring to a conscious
level the symbolic function of mathematical and linguistic symbols.
We maintain that when the child is conscious of the purpose and func-
tion of numerical symbols and letters, his basis and motivation for
learning what the symbols stand for and how they are put together
should be considerably greater.
One more point about the relation between vocabulary develop-
ment and reading ability needs to be mentioned.
Moore (1971) reports that several studies point to a correla-
tion between vocabulary development and reading ability. He states
that while no correlation has been shown to exist between the complex-
ity of language and reading ability on the second grade level, a
correlation has been shown to exist on the sixth grade level. "At
the sixth grade," he writes, "the oral language of the children was
an extremely significant predictor of both exceptional reading success
and exceptional failure" (p. 33).
An explanation of these results might be that the greater one's
command of oral speech, the greater one's ability to decode graphic
symbols into speech. Such an explanation seems to be the rationale
behind Cazden's promotion of a reading program complemented by a
program for vocabulary enrichment that teaches children the Latin
roots of words and shows how words are related etymologically. The
vocabulary program is based on the close relation between English
phonology and English spelling patterns.
The orthography assumes a fairly sophisticated degree of
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and polysyllabic derived forms is one of the best ways
o provide him with the means of constructing the phonologi-
cal system of his language more fully as he matures.
. .
In general, connections should be brought out among
words that he already knows but may not yet have classified
together, and new words should be introduced for the pur-
pose of establishing new connections.
. . . Literacy acquisi-
tion from this point of view may well extend over a much
longer period of time than originally assumed, and be closely
interrelated with these other aspects of the child's lin-
guistic development (p. 64 ).
The value of such a program lies in its ability to bring to
the conscious level .the fundamental principle underlying the organiza-
tion of the English language, namely, that the meaning of words and
their connection with other words derives from their roots, suffixes,
and prefixes. English is, above all, a language of word families,
and if the child recognizes this fact, he possesses the key that will
help him understand how to spell and decode it correctly. Most im-
portant, recognition of the principle around which the language is
organized makes English come alive. Understanding the method of
the language enables one to appreciate the purpose of language and
gives one a sense of mastery over it. Such a positive orientation
to language is essential to the development of learning competence.
the list below; all of the words stem from the Latin word credo (to
believe), and have similar meanings.
An example of the interrelatedness of words can be seen in
credibility
incredible
credulity
credible credit
creditable
creditor
accredit
incredulity
credulous
accreditation
creed
incredulous
credential
credence
credendum
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A reading program that combines vocabulary development and
speech skills with learning to read integrates two symbolic tasks
within the same symbol system. The math curriculum outlined above
integrates two symbol systems: mathematics and art. Because the sym-
bol systems draw upon the underlying act of symbolization, it stands
to reason that their integration will have considerable educational
value. Music, for example, has a mathematical basis, and should be
explored at the proper point in development, probably during formal
operations. Throughout all of development, children can represent
the stories and poems they write in dance, drama, the visual arts, and
music. They can also describe in words the mathematical operations
they perform. By representing thoughts and feelings in two or three
symbol systems, children can become conscious of the strengths and
limitations of each symbol system and can acquire a basic familiarity
with them all. Such a familiarity will enable them to appreciate
them throughout their lives, will be the basis for a more intensive
study in one or more of the symbol systems, and will open the door
for increasing numbers of children to the profound and creative ex-
pression of thought and feeling.
Writing Instruction
Vygotsky's (1962) research throws considerable light on the
child's development of writing ability. He maintains that writing
requires a high degree of abstraction because it is speech and thought
in image only and thus lacks the musical, expressive, and
intonational
qualities of external speech. This means that the child must
disen-
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gage himself from what Vygotsky calls the sensory aspect of speech and
replace spoken words with their graphic representations. Thus the
task is an act of double symbolization: symbols (letters and printed
words) stand for symbols (spoken words) that stand for meanings.
Vygotsky reports that his studies "show that it is the abstract qual-
ity of written language that is the main stumbling block, not the
underdevelopment of the small muscles or any other mechanical ob-
stacles" (p. 99).
Another factor that makes writing abstract is that it is
addressed to a person not immediately present and in some cases, it
may not be addressed to anyone at all. Consequently, "The motives
for writing are more abstract, more intellectualized
,
further re-
moved from immediate needs. In written speech, we are obliged to
create the situation, to represent it to ourselves. This demands
detachment from the actual situation" (p. 99). Moreover, writing
requires conscious, analytical thought about language itself. Where-
as in speaking, the child is for the most part unconscious of the
sounds he makes and of the mental operations he performs, in writing,
"he must take cognizance of the sound structure of each word, dis-
sect it, and reproduce it in alphabetical symbols, which he must
have studied and memorized before. In the same deliberate way, he
must put words in a certain sequence to form a sentence" (ibid.). It
short, writing requires that the unconscious process by which the
child speaks be made conscious. Writing thus depends on having
reached a level of cognitive development that usually has not even
begun to emerge when instruction begins.
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Vygotsky’s view of the psychological prerequisites for writ-
ing suggest that a developmental approach to writing instruction Is
needed. The psychological requisites that a developmentally-based
curriculum for writing would try to establish are: (1) helping the
child understand the purpose of writing, and (2) helping the child
learn to encode consciously in graphic symbols what he encodes un-
consciously in verbal speech.
Helping the child understand the purpose of writing
. Learn-
ing about the purpose of writing need not depend on being able to
write. The principal purpose of writing is to communicate ideas to
others not immediately present or to make a record for one’s future
reference. Children can learn about the purpose of writing by send-
ing and receiving messages based on the steps of representation out-
lined above in the reading program. Throughout each step of the read-
ing curriculum, children can encode and decode messages written in
in the ikonic figures and the abstract symbols that stand for words,
the symbols that stand for syllables, and finally, the letters of
the alphabet that stand for sounds. Messages would first be sent
to children in the class and would contain information that elicits
action. The messages could be instructions for activities and games,
and could be part of games in which the child communicates only
through encoding and decoding messages. The next step would involve
sending messages to people distant in time and space, like their
grandparents, for example, who can write back to them in the same
symbolic code. By encoding and decoding messages in this manner,
children can develop an appreciation of the purpose of writing that
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will motivate them to learn how to write with letters.
Helping children encode consciously in graphic symbols what
they encode unconsciously in verbal speech
. Children who acquire an
understanding of the purpose of speech through the encoding and decod-
ing of messages based on successive levels of symbolization will have
had considerable practice in encoding consciously what they normally
encode unconsciously in verbal speech. Thus, when they come to
writing words with the letters of the alphabet, they should be able
to encode their thoughts into written speech with relative ease.
The years between the beginning of writing and the stage of
formal operations should witness a veritable outpouring of written
speech. Stories, personal experiences, dreams, poems, fantasy,
descriptions of nature, and human events are topics children can
write about. The teacher's chief concern is not to instruct the
child in literary technique, but rather to draw out his ability to
put on paper complete thoughts that convey accurately what he wishes
to say. The teacher's function is to help the child become conscious
of what he wants to say and to get him to assess for himself whether
he has said it clearly. By the time the child enters the formal
operational stage and is able to reflect fully upon his thought
processes and his language skills, he should be able to translate
fluidly his thoughts into written speech. Then he can learn the
principles of grammar and the basics of literary technique, and can
learn to apply them in ways that enhance the quality of his writing.
This will give purpose to studying grammar and composition
and there-
fore will increase the child's motivation. At this point
the teacher
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can become more critical of the child's work and point out flaws that
detract from the effect he wishes to create.
Considerable experimentation is needed to test the curricula
for math, reading, and writing instruction outlined above. A number
of questions immediately come to mind. Do the curricula reduce the
difficulties many children commonly experience in learning arith-
metic, reading, and writing? Are each of the levels of representa-
tion outlined in the curriculum necessary? Is each level or are
only certain levels. necessary for certain children, and if so, why?
Are some children able to learn to read, for example, on the level
of letters without having gone through previous levels? If so, what
are the factors that enable them to do so? Does the writing curri-
culum affect higher level cognitive growth? Host importantly, re-
search needs to seek out answers to important questions that concern
the relation between instruction and development
—
questions central
to the science of pedagogy. To what extent does instruction in
symbolic skills influence the development of psychological structures
needed for theoretical thought? Do the psychological structures
necessary for math, reading, and writing unfold in continuous inter-
action with instruction, as Vygotsky believes, or should instruction
begin only after the child has acquired the prerequisite structures
and then serve to reinforce those structures, a position toward
which Piaget leans?
To find the answers to these questions, longitudinal studies
need to be conducted. The studies need to follow children who re-
ceive instruction based on the curricula over a fifteen to twenty
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year period, and compare their achievement to the achievement of
children who receive instruction in other approaches.
Because the curricula are based on the facts of child develop-
ment which in turn are explained by a theory of symbolization logi-
cally derived from a philosophy that defines man as a being of un-
limited potential, we would expect the implementation of the curri-
cula to result in significant improvements in children's performances
in mathematics, reading, and writing—improvements that will further
the development of education as a science and increase its ability
to ensure equal educational opportunity for all children.
appendix
A SUMMARY STATEMENT ON THE ANISA MODEL
The Anisa Model represents a comprehensive educational system
functionally defined by specifications which insure its replicability,
evaluation, and refinement. The specifications set forth educational
objectives pertaining to the actualization of human potential and ex-
planations of how to achieve them. These objectives and explanations
of how to achieve them. These objectives and explanations are derived
from a coherent body of theory which has been deductively generated
from a philosophical base and inductively validated to whatever extent
possible by findings from empirical research.
The philosophy underlying the model is organismic in nature;
it defines man as a spiritual as well as a material being; explains his
reality in terms of the process of his becoming (actualization of
potentiality)
,
accounts for his qualities of transcendence and imma-
nence, and sets forth fundamental ontological principles which expli-
cate man's relationship to the universe.
The body of theory derived from the philosophy includes:
A Theory of Development which defines development as
the translation of potentiality into actuality and equates
that translation with creativity; establishes two broad
categories of potentialities—biological and psychological;
identifies proper nutrition as the essential element in the
development of biological potentialities and learning as
the key factor in the release of psychological potentiali-
ties; establishes five categories of psychological poten-
tialities
—
psycho-motor, perceptual, cognitive, affective,
and volitional; establishes interaction with the environ-
^Anisa is both a word and an acronym. As a word, it has Greek
and Latin roots which refer to a flowering tree whose fragrance has made
it attractive as a symbol. It has been adopted to represent "the tree of
life"
—
an ancient symbol connoting shelter, beauty and grace, and the
perceptual growth and fruition of organic life. The tree of life is re-
flected in the Anisa logogram. As an acronym, Anisa stands for American
National Institutes for Social Advancement, an incorporated not-for-pro^
fit organization under whose auspices the efforts to formulate
the model
were undertaken.
This statement is taken from Conway (1975).
315
316
ment as the means by which development is sustained; fixes
three basic categories of environment (physical, human and
the unknown) and establishes the Self as the micro-cosmic
reflection of the three environments and the most constant
aspect of the environment it experiences; and, categorizes
interactions in terms of their power to facilitate develop-
ment and safeguard survival.
A Theory of Curriculum which fixes the overarching
goal of education as the actualization of human potential-
ities and their structuring into identities around ideals
which guarantee survival and perpetually improve its qual-
ity; establishes two categories of goals or objectives of
the formal educational system—content goals and process
goals; specifies the substance of the former as the infor-
mation culture has accumulated organized in terms of the
classification of environments, including the symbol sys-
tems used to convey that information, and the substance of
the latter as formation of internal structures on which
learning competence depends (i.e., content goals may speci-
fy what to think about, while process goals concentrate on
how to think) ; accounts for the emergence of personal
identity (character formation) in terms of value forma-
tion and defines values as the relatively enduring struc-
turings of potentialities (process) as they are actualized
and integrated with information (content) assimilated
about the various environments; and, specifies three
value sub-systems (material, social, and religious/aesthe-
tic) on which three higher order competencies rest (tech-
nological, moral and spiritual/philosophical) and which
combine to form the total values system that constitutes
the personality— the Self.
A Theory of Pedagogy which defines teaching as arrang-
ing environments and guiding the child’s interaction with
them for the purpose of achieving the goals specified by
the curriculum theory; outlines the diagnostic, prescrip-
tive, speculative, experimental, and improvisational as-
pects of arranging environments and guiding interaction so
that instruction is individualized and learning particular-
ized thereby guaranteeing equality of educational oppor-
tunity.
A Theory of Administration which identifes two basic
functions of administration which must remain in dynamic
equilibrium— leadership and management and defines them
in terms of service consistent with purpose as specified
by the philosophy; provides the rationale for differentiat-
ing the staff, maintaining morale, establishing institu-
tional priorities, assessing needs, identifying resources,
determining feasibility, and allocating resources to
achieve
obiectives as efficiently as possible; provides the
means
for institutional self-renewal.; and, accounts
for the neccs
sity and nature of community and home involvement.
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A Theory o f Evaluation which designates comparative
analysis of children's interactions with particular environ-
ments and their developmental consequences as the focal
point of inquiry; seeks to relate means to ends, distin-
guishing efficient from final causes; and allies the pur-
pose of evaluation with the heuristic, explanatory, and
predictive functions of research and science.
Because the model rests on the universal processes of growth
and development, it has cross-cultural applicability and addresses
directly the problem of how to achieve equal educational opportunity.
%
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